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ABSTRACT

This thesis is based on a quantitative analysis of Time
magazine's coverage of the Vietnam War. It demonstrates that
Time held a pro-war bias in 1967, was neutral during 1968, and
turned strongly against the war from 1969 through 1974. From
mid-1969 on, some articles factually misrepresented what was
happening in Vietnam in such a way as to promote the goals of
the anti-war movement. If events admitted of both a pro-war
and

an

anti-war

exclusively

the

interpretation
anti-war

view.

Time
By

published

1972,

almost

administration

supporters had published a large body of verifiable evidence
(summarized in chapter 3) demonstrating that progress was
being made toward winning the war. Time reported on almost
none of this evidence.

Consequently, this thesis concludes

that the previous authors who have written «üüout the media's
role in the war
Hallin)

were

(Herbert Cans,

incorrect:

Time's

Clarence Wyatt and Daniel
heavily

biased

coverage did in fact hurt the war effort.

XXI
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INTRODUCTION

During the Vietnam War and since, conservative Americans
have believed that a liberal press hurt the war effort by
taking an

anti-war stance. In this view, the media's constant

criticism

helped turn neutral Americans against the war, and

convinced the Communists that there was no need to negotiate
because the pressure of public opinion would eventually force
a unilateral American withdrawal.
The historical community,

however,

has challenged the

conservative view. Herbert Cans' book. Deciding What's News,
argued that the routines of objective journalism and the
institutional nature of the media prevented journalists from
selecting the news on an ideological basis.' In this view
journalists strove for objectivity,

and used a variety of

techniques to balance the news coverage. They had to because
if any particular publication were perceived to be biased, it
would lose credibility and its audience.

Daniel Hailin's

'Herbert Cans, Deciding What's News (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1979), pp.175, 182-86, 190.
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book.

The

"Uncensored"

War, and

Clarence

Wyatt's

Paper

Soldiers both supported Gams. They argued that the corporate
American media had really represented the estaüalishment view
of the war from start to finish. The press had continued to
publish mainly pro-war stories as late as 1968, long after
reporters in the field and protesters at home had begun to
raise serious questions. After 1968 the media did begin to
oppose the war, but only after Congress amd public opinion had
turned against it. Even then, the press continued to give the
administration a significant amount of support. If the media
had been truly anti-war,

it would have turned more harshly

against the war. The press could have gone much farther than
it did, for example, in condemning the My Lai massacre. Daniel
Hailin's quemtitative analysis of the New York Times Vietnam
War coverage during the early 1960s also estekblished that the
press did not report evidence which it had discovered (or
easily could have)

if that evidence did not

support the

Kennedy administration's official line on the war.^
This paper seeks to shed further light on the controversy
with

a

quantitative

coverage printed

analysis

of all

of

the Vietnam War

in Time magazine from July

1967 through

December 1974. First the pro-war and anti-war positions were
defined, then the articles were divided into pro-war, anti
war, and neutral categories. Articles normally took one slant

^Daniel Hallin, The "Uncensored" War (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1986), pp.8-9, 214-15, and chapter two.
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for a paragraph or two, then changed to a different bias for
a while before switching again. Thus to quantify the content,
each section of each article was measured in column inches.
For example, if an article started with nine column inches
(Cl) of neutral coverage, I marked it off and wrote a short
summary of what was in those nine Cl. Thus my notebook entries
look like this:

December 22, 1969
p. 22

9 Cl neutral

will

Time is not sure when negotiations

come or what the terms might be.
3 Cl pro-war

The U.S. "must show aggressor from

Peking to Havana that so called wars of liberation will not
be allowed

to succeed.”
1 Cl anti-war

However, the war, "has proved to be

[too] costly in lives, dollars, and international prestige."

Using these criteria. Time held a pro-war stance in
1967, was neutral through most of 1968, and turned strongly
against the war in 1969. From mid-1970 on Time's numerical
bias

was

over

17

to

1 anti-war.

Many

stories

factually

misrepresented what was happening in Vietnam in such a way as
to promote the goals of the anti-war movement. Following the
1968 Tet Offensive, Time gave the pro-war view little or no
space

and

published

interpretation.

almost

exclusively

the

anti-war

Also, by 1970 administration spokesmen and
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supporters had published a considerable body of verifiable
evidence showing significant progress toward winning the war.
Time published almost none of this evidence.
Time

Incorporated's

editor-in-chief,

Hedley

Donovan,

announced in a 1971 editorial that although there was good
reason to think progress was being made in Vietnamization, the
United States should withdraw all of its forces from Vietnam
as quickly as possible even if it meant losing a war which
could have been won.^ Time also recognized earlier in 1971
that to many Americans a victory in Vietnam would be "the
final

outrage."*

In

April

of

1971

Time

stated

that

it

sympathized with the idea that America ought, as a matter of
principle, to suffer defeat on the battlefield.^ These were
some of the most extreme anti-war positions it was possible to
take. Time stated that Hedley Donovan's anti-war editorial had
evolved from a series of speeches which Donovan had given in
support of the anti-war movement.
This thesis will argue that in the late 1960s and early
1970s

Time magazine's ideological bias again prevented it

from reporting evidence that it was aware of or easily could
have discovered. The difference was that in the later years,
unlike the early 1960s, it was the media's anti-war bias which
prevented it from publishing the pro-war view of events and
^Time, June 14, 1971, pp. 28-30.
*Ibid.. March 1, 1971, p. 10.
^Ibid.. April 5, 1971, p. 12.
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the evidence supporting it.
As late as September 1970 Time reported that over the
previous

four months "the doves have been beaten

[on all

proposed pieces of anti-war legislation, and] public opinion
polls show that public support of the President's policies
remains strong.

Thus, it is the conclusion of this paper

that from mid-1969 on Time did not represent the establishment
nearly so well as it represented the anti-war movement. This
is

significant because these were

the

critical years

deciding how much assistance America would give to

in

South

Vietnam after the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops.
In addition to examining the bias in Time, this thesis
will also raise the question of whether an anti-war bias has
existed in the mainstreeua historiography of the war. Wyatt,
for example, wrote that recent content analysis of the news
had

shown that

it mainly

reported

official

sources

with

relatively little dissent. At the time that Wyatt published,
Peter Breastrup had already published his study of the media's
coverage of the 1968 Tet Offensive,

Big Story. Breastrup

conviningly demonstated that the media completely ignored
official

sources

including

General

William

Westmoreland,

Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff

General

Earle

Wheeler,

analyst

Douglas

Pike

and

President Lyndon Johnson. These men accurately described the
offensive as a crushing defeat for the Viet Cong. However,
*Ibid.. September 26, 1970, p. 25.
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instead of publishing the information provided by official
spokesmen, which turned out to be factually correct, the media
falsely reported that the Viet Cong were winning a great
battlefield victory.
This was an unprecedented situation. Never before had the
Amerian

media

flatly

refused

to

report

the

official

battlefield analysis of the United States army. Even if army
spokespersons had turned out to be wrong, it would seem to be
very significemt that the media completely prevented the
Amerian people from receiving their government's
analysis.

George Herring wrote that reporters

official

groaned

in

disbelielf when General William Westmoreland explained the
battlefield

situation.

Apparently

on

the

assumption

Westmoreland was deceiving them, media sources then

that

created

the false interpretation that America was being defeated on
the battlefield.

Media sources continued to publish their

factually mistaken anti-war view for several weeks, long after
it was obvious that the Communists had been badly defeated.
In any other war this remarkable behavior would have
drawn intense scrutiny from historians. Breastrup describes
the coverage as a "failure of the media" and a "distortion of
reality." How could it have happened? One would expect the
historical community to seriously question this unprecedented
behavior.

Was

subsequent

coverage

equally

biased

against

accurate official sources? Yet the mainstream historiography
of the war has not questioned the anti-administration bias of
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the media's Tet Offensive coverage. To the contrary, Wyatt's
preface flatly denies that it happened.
Wyatt's

thesis

is

that

the

Nixon

administration's

manipulation of the news was largely beyond the journalists'
ability to resist. Under this pressure, the media published
the statements of official sources with relatively little
dissent.
opponent

Consequently,
of

either

the media had in fact not been an
the

military

or

the

governing

administrations. Wyatt does not indicate that coverage of the
Tet offensive was an exception to the rule.
Likewise, Ambassador Martin Herz's quantitative analysis
of media

coverage

in 1972

was

published

prior

to

Paper

Soldiers. Herz demonstated that in covering the December 1972
bombings

the media published the views of administration

critics many times more often them the interpretation of
administration spokespersons. Again, Wyatt does not indicate
that the 1972 coverage was an abberation. He does not argue
that Herz and Braestrup were wrong.

He simply

ignors the

meaning of their work.
Daniel Hallin's The 'Uncensored War was also published
prior

to

Paper

Soldiers.

Hallin

argues

that

certain

institutional constraints limited the extent to which the
media was

free to turn against the war. Still, "journalists

clearly did not think of themselves simply as

'soldiers of the

typewriter' whose mission was to serve the war effort." Every
administration during the war "had periodic crises in its
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ability to 'manage* this more independent or adversarial news
media, and over the years the volume of 'negative* coverage
increased so dramatically that there seems little doubt that
the news coverage did indeed contribute to the public war
weariness .

Hallin

noted

that

editorial

comment

by

journalists turned two to one against the war after the Tet
offensive. None of this is consistant with the exceptionally
strong lemguage used in Wyatt's thesis and conclusions.
Beyond this, pages 196-197 of Paper Soldiers argues that
in the 1970 Cambodian incursion and Opperation Lam Son 719 in
1971 the media were able to see through the false optimism
being offered by administration spokesperson, and published a
much more pessimistic interpretation. The argument presented
in these pages directly contradict Wyatt's thesis (and indeed
the title of his book), at least as regards these battles in
1970 and 1971.
Wyatt
selectively,

appears

to

have

publishing

used

those

the

parts

available
that

evidence

support

his

interpretation and ignoring the evidence that contradicts his
position. The unacceptably selective use of evidence in Paper
Soldiers

is

particularly

Herring,

author

of

the

significant
standard

text

because
book

Dr.

used

George
in many

university classes on the Vietnam War, America's Longest War,
was Clarence Wyatt's thesis advisor (while Paper Soldiers was
being written as a doctoral dissertation).
^Hallin, "Uncensored" War, pp. 6-7
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This thesis will argue that just as Wyatt emd Herring
have ignored Herz,
pages

196-197

of

Breastrup,
Wyatt's

historiography of the war has

Hallin,
own

and the evidence of

book,

the

consistantly

mainstream

ignored those

published sources which seem to undermine their emti-war
interpretation of events.
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PROLOGUE

In the late nineteenth century France added Indochina
(Vietnam,

Cambodia amd Laos)

to its colonial empire.

When

Germam armies occupied France during World War II and Japanese
armies over-ran Vietnam, French power was broken for several
years. In that period a nationalist movement arose, known as
the

Viet

Minh.

government
independence.

led

When
by

Japan
Ho

France,

withdrew

Chi

however,

Minh

from Vietnam,
asserted

refused

to

a

new

Vietnamese

recognize

the

regime. In 1946 it sent troops to Vietnam in an attempt to
reassert French colonial hegemony.
Because the most widely revered Vietnamese nationalist
leaders were also communists, Russia and China assisted the
Viet Minh with military and economic aid. With this assistance
they were able to win the crucial battle of Dien Bien Phu,
effectively forcing France out of the war. Under the auspices
of an internationally regulated cease-fire agreement, France
withdrew its forces from North Vietnam, while the Communists
withdrew from the South.
The Geneva agreement recognized the Communists as the
10
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legitimate government in North Vietnam, and allowed France two
years in which to withdraw from the South. The terms under
which

North

emd

South

were

to

reunite,

however,

were

ambiguous. Dr. Douglas Pike asserted that, "The Agreements are
not clear in meaning or intent.
that,

Sir Robert Thompson states

"the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities," was

signed by the various parties, but the, "final Declaration was
not signed by any members of the conference . . . .

[And] its

standing in international law has since been much disputed.
The Declaration called for free elections in the summer of
1956, but as Pike points out, "it did not specify elections
for what . . . a single legislature for the entire country, or
elections as a referendum," on reunification, "or elections to
choose between Ho Chi Minh and Bao Dai - Ngo Dien Diem, or
whatever."
Pike continued,

"There is no unanimity of view among

international lawyers on the question," of which government
constituted legal authority in Vietnam. Some jurists, "take
the tack that there [were] two states in Vietnam, neither of
which [could] claim total permanent sovereignty." Both the
Northern Communist regime and the new Southern government
were, "of a caretaker nature, which legally should pass out of

Douglas Pike, War. Peace and the Viet Cona (Cambridge:
M.I.T. Press, 1969), pp. 157-62. All of Dr. Pike's quotes on
this page and the next come from this source.
’sir Robert Thompson,
McKay, 1974), pp. 7-8.

Peace Is Not At Hand
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existence upon the creation of a new single state of Vietnam. "
The new government of President Ngo Dien Diem in South
Vietnam argued, with American support, that elections in North
Vietnam could not be free. Since the North had the larger
population, even if all the people in the South were opposed
to the specific terms of unification being offered in 1956
they would still be outvoted by the Communist controlled block
in the numerically larger North.

Approximately one-third of

the population of South Vietnam was made up of the religious
sects, the Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, the Catholic refugees from the
North,

the

Chinese

business

community,

and

the

military

officer class.'’ Throughout the Viet Minh War these groups
had demonstrated their amti-communism. Urban South Vietnam was
also noted for its failure to support the Viet Minh against
the French. These groups represented about one-half of the
population,

all told.

Of the remaining half at

least the

upper-class land owners were strongly anti-communist.
under these circumstances

President Diem argued that

nothing in the spirit of the Geneva agreements required the
southerners to allow a communist totalitarian government to be
imposed upon them against their will. Thompson stated that if
a similar vote had been applied to East and West Germany or
North and South Korea, the numerically larger non-communist
blocks would certainly have prevailed. "That argument silenced
Russia," which had initially supported the North Vietnamese
'®Pike, War, p. 81.
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demand for elections, but then retreated."
The London Economist confirmed in 1973 that,

"lawyers

could spend a long time arguing whether this is what the 1954
Geneva

agreements

intended."

The

Economist

has

an

international reputation as one of the world's finest news
publications. It is not a spokespiece of right wing views. It
consistently referred to the war as a tragedy for a variety of
reasons. When subjected to quantitative amalysis, the great
bulk of its coverage fell in the neutral category. It applied
the same values to the Vietnam war as it applied to any of its
other coverage.

These principles led the Economist to the

editorial opinion that "the Americans were right to respond to
South Vietnam's original and repeated appeals

for help."'^

This made sense in light of the American liberal ideals as set
forth

in

the

first

ten

amendments

to

the

United

States

Constitution. This Bill of Rights guaranteed protection for
the individuals right to freedom of expression in speech, the
press, art and literature, and protection of the individual's
private property from seizure by the government without the
consent

of

Helping

a

communist

the

people's

people

resist

totalitarian

freely
the

elected

imposition

government

was

representatives.
of
well

an

unwanted

within

the

tradition of American liberal ideals.
Beyond the moral and political aspects, there were U.S.
"Thompson, Peace. p. 8,
’^ h e London Economist. January 6, 1973, p. 11.
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security considerations. President Dvight O. Eisenhower warned
that if North amd South Vietnam became united under Ho Chi
Minh, trouble would follow. Eisenhower believed that communist
insurgents, with weapons supplied by Russia amd China, would
conquer Cambodia and Laos. Eisenhower was correct about this.
Vietnamese guerrillas helped to develop the Khmer Rouge and
Pathet

Lao

organizations

which

eventually

overthrew

the

governments of Cambodia and Laos.
Eisenhower believed that the communists would not stop
with

Cambodia

amd

Laos.

He

expected

them

to

foster

insurrections in Thailand, Malaya, amd Indonesia. No one can
say whether these efforts would have succeeded if America had
not opposed the Communists in 1954. If they had, however, the
balance of power in the world would have been consideratbly
different. That scenario would have created a new Communist
block

containing

population.

approximately

one

fifth

It would have given the

of

Chinese

the

world's

and Russian

insurrection specialists a greater degree of prestige and
momentum.

If this had translated into more vigorous Latin

American insurgencies,

leaders in the United States of the

1950s and 1960s would surely have reacted as if these events
were a threat to national security. Thus it was by no means
impossible that an unopposed Communist expansion in 1954 could
have eventually created a situation which Americans would have
seen as genuinely threatening their security. Arguably, then,
there were quite legitimate reasons for the United States to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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assist South Vietnam in 1954.
Unfortunately

the

Diem

unpopular in South Vietnam.

government

quickly

became

By i960 more than half of the

rural population supported the Viet Cong insurgency. In the
late 1950s and early 1960s as U.S. military aid increased, one
might have asserted that the United States was militarily
imposing a hated dictator on an unwilling people. A change in
policy seemed warranted.
Because of the Viet Minh's popularity in the late 1950s
and early 1960s,
government

to

prominent observers advised the Americem

reject

a

military

buildup

in Vietnam

and

concentrate on counter insurgency. Bernard Fall warned that the
situation was fraught with heavy political overtones: "To win
the military battle but lose the political war could well
become the U.S.

fate in Vietneun."'^ Hans Horganthau advised

the Kennedy administration "to avoid military responses [and]
force

political

reforms

upon

the

Diem

regime."'*

Robert

Komer, who headed the allied counterinsurgency effort in 1967
stated that there was no "dearth of advice on how to fight an
insurgency through land reform, rural development programs,
paraumil itary

and

police

techniques."'^

General

Edward

'^Newsweek. August, 20, 1962, p. 40.
'*Charles DeBenedetti, An American
Syracuse University Press, 1990) p. 84.

Ordeal

(Syracuse:

'®R.W. Komer, Bureaucracy At War (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1986), p. 4. The rest of the paragraph comes
from this page.
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Lemdsdale "dissented with vigor” from the military buildup
policy amd recommended counter insurgency. Dennis Duncamson and
Sir Robert Thompson of the British Advisory Mission in Saigon,
"gave similar operational advice, " as did the Michigan State
University Advisory Group.
President John F. Kennedy, however, chose to steadily
increase the number of military advisors to the Army of the
Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) (as well as the flow of weapons and
supplies). When this proved insufficient. President Lyndon
Johnson committed American air power.

The introduction of

massive American firepower did not sit well with liberals.
Although it may have had some marginal military value in
slowing the flow of Communist war supplies,

bombing North

VietneuB did not seem likely to make South Vietnamese peasants
turn

their

support

from

the

Viet

Cong

to

the

Saigon

government. Walter Lippman stated that, "an American air war
against North Vietnam was as foolish as it was immoral."'*
Predicteüaly the bombing failed to turn the war around. With
the ARVN on the verge of defeat in 1965, Lippman wrote that
Americans would have to pay for the "grievous mistake" of a
failing

Vietnam

policy.

Historian

Charles

DeBenedetti

concluded, "They would pay either with their pride through a
political

settlement

or with

their

lives

in

an

extended

w a r . P r e s i d e n t Johnson chose to commit U.S. ground forces.
'^DeBenedetti, Ordeal. p. 94.
'^Ibid. p. 102.
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When American troops landed in 1965, their mission was to
make war on the hundreds of thousemds of South Vietnamese who
were trying to overthrow their government. While American
liberals

could

have

endorsed

the

use

of

known

counterinsurgency techniques (the introduction of democratic
local government, combined with assistance in local security
and economic development), simply killing the 40 percent of
the population which lived in Communist controlled areas could
not be justified. Under these circumstances the liberal anti
war movement arose in America.
The

world

had

changed

since

1954.

The

Communist

insurgency in Malaya had been defeated. Governments there and
in Indonesia were more steUt>le. Some economic development had
occurred.'* President Eisenhower's Domino Theory was probably
less valid in 1965 than it had been a decade earlier. But even
if one believed that Thailand, Malaya and Indonesia were still
vulnerable, it would not have seemed necessary for the United
States to militarily defeat the Communists in order to protect
the remainder of Southeast Asia.'’ The mere existence of an
effective ARVN probably would have been enough to fulfill
America's national security objectives. It would have given
allied counterinsurgency experts enough time to implement the
techniques which they had been arguing would win the war. If

'^Thompson, Peace, pp. 32-33.
'’sir Robert Thompson, No Exit From Vietnam (New York;
David McKay Company), 1970.
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an effective ARVN had existed at all, it seems unlikely that
the Communists would have diverted resources for a large scale
undertaking in another country. It does not seem probable that
they would have chosen such a strategy,

but even if the

Communists had wished to do so their long supply line through
Laos

and Cambodia would have been vulnerable to an ARVN

assault.
In order to meet U.S. security objectives, then, it was
only necessary to insure against the collapse of the Saigon
government, while working to improve South Vietnam's military
performance. Some aggressive combat was required of American
forces

in 1965 to stave off immediate defeat,

accomplished this much,
question

was

'What

but having

as Sir Robert Thompson asks,

next?.

'

A

limited

application

"The
of

American power would have required neither large numbers of
American troops and casualties, nor the expenditure of massive
quantities of American ordinance against Vietnamese civilians.
Also,

it would not have cost $150 billion.

Even if South

Vietnam had never proved viable, eventually American forces
could have withdrawn, secure in the knowledge that Thailand,
Malaya and Indonesia had developed sufficiently that they were
no longer easy targets for insurgency or conquest. Time Inc. 's
editor-in-chief Hedley Donovan made this argument in a 1971
editorial/"

Donovan stated that America had

“ ifeiâ., p. 134.
" Time. June 14, 1971, pp. 28-30.
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national security purpose because the other nations of South
East Asia were no longer at risk.
President

Johnson

emd

General

William

Westmoreland,

however, chose a more aggressive policy. They attempted to
militarily defeat the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese regular
army.

Westmoreland stated his priorities

in

his

book,

à

Soldier Reports; "a commander . . . wins no battles by sitting
back . . . .

if we avoided battle, we would never succeed. We

could never destroy the big units," if American troops did not
aggressively pursue them into their elusive sanctuaries.^
Thus American combat troops fought the Communists throughout
South Vietnam, and American airpower was used against targets
in North Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.
Thompson,

however,

argued
had

mistake.

If

Westmoreland

patrols

near

the vital

detected Communist main

that
used

population

this

strategy

was

a

aggressive

small

centers

could have

force attacks,

he

and used

unit

superior

American mobility to bring in the reserves. Battles fought in
the open agricultural lands would have forced the Communists
to

expose

themselves,

allowing

American

fire

power

to

overwhelm them. The Viet Cong would have been unchallenged in
the vast unpopulated areas of mountainous jungle, but they
would have been cut off from their source of supplies and
recruits. Such a strategy would have taken much longer, and

22

General Willieua Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden
City New York: Doubleday and Company, 1976), pp. 144, 150.
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might never have actually defeated the Communist armies, but
American success did not depend on defeating them. The lover
level of American involvement would have made the war more
palatable to critics during the time required to improve South
Vietnamese performance.

The United States,

however,

chose

General Westmoreland's more aggressive search and destroy
strategy.
Unhappy as they were with the American military buildup,
"The great majority of antiwar critics . . . rejected the
demand for immediate withdrawal as politically infeasible,
dishonorable in view of Washington 's past commitments," and an
abandonment of the

legitimate goal

of checking

Communist

aggression.^ Still liberals were concerned about "the kind
of war being waged.
the people of Vietnam.
least

1,500,

America was causing "untold harm to
During 1965 anti-war forces sent at

"Vietnam-related messages per week,"

to

the

Johnson administration emphasizing "the immorality of the
war.

B-52 raids over North Vietnam called forth, "a moral

judgement on the war's basic inhumanity."
In March 1965 the anti-war forces developed the "idea of
a teach-in to focus attention 'on this war, its consequences

^DeBenedetti, Ordeal. p. 97.
p. 99.
“ ifeid.. p. 100.
26

Ibid., p. 106. The next quote comes from this page also

I
.,li
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and

ways

to

stop

i t . T h e

technique

was

an

instant

success. One hundred and twenty universities held teach-ins
during 1965. As the level of U.S. commitment grew, critics
also developed the argument that America was wasting limited
resources. The nation needed to "choose between devoting its
resources and energies to maintaining military superiority and
international hegemony or rechanneling those resources and
energies to meeting the desperate needs of its people.
Moreover memy anti-war activists were "not necessarily
opposed to all war, but rather to a military subjugation of
newly

emerging

nations.

Liberals

also

focused

on

the

inequities of the draft, which allowed the wealthy, college
bound upper classes to avoid service while the poor could not.
It also forced unwilling American boys to go to Vietnam where
they inevitably beceune part of the immoral process of killing
innocent civilians. Draft resistance developed into a personal
commitment for many anti-war liberals.*"
In 1966 three marines were court martialed and sentenced
to life imprisonment for, "killing civilians while on patrol
near Tribinh." Grimly, Hans Morganthau predicted that "the
real moral heros of this war" would be those officers who quit

p. 108.
” lbid.. p. 111.
” ibid, p.136
"ibid., pp. 166-67,
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their commands rather than participate in the indiscriminate
killing of civilians.Journalists and activists who visited
North

Vietnam

destruction,"

"documented
caused

by

the

fact

American

of

tragic

bombing."

civilian

With

South

Vietnamese civilian casualties averaging more than 2,000 per
week, the United States appeared to be destroying the country
it was supposed to be saving and corrupting itself in the
process."
Martin Luther King stated that,

"I could never again

raise my voice against the violence of the oppressed in the
ghettos without first having spoken clearly to the greatest
purveyor

of

violence

government. ""
enclave

King

strategy,

in

called
and

a

for

the
a

world
bombing

negotiated

today— my
halt,

own

defensive

settlement.

At

the

beginning of 1968, like Martin Luther King, "Most liberals
still

resisted

immediate withdrawal"

but

they

could

not

support the methods by which the war was being fought."
In the spring of 1968 the Tet Offensive shocked America's
confidence.

It caused President Johnson to drop out of the

Democratic

primaries

and

to

open

negotiations

p. 168.
"ibiâ., p. 169.
f p. 170.
^ Ibid.. pp. 172-73.
"Uaid., p. 194.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

with

the

23
Communists." When negotiations failed,
through

1969.

unilateral

Although

(phased)

President

withdrawal

of

the war dragged on

Nixon

amnounced

American

troops,

the
the

fighting continued. The obvious question was if, "Even with a
half-million troops and a punishing three year air war, the
United

States had

failed"

to

significantly limit Hanoi's

ability to make war, how were the South Vietnamese supposed to
hold out after the Americans left? "What purpose could now be
served by continued
acknowledge

"open

fighting?"" Anti-war
acceptance

of

forces began to

American

failure

in

Vietnam."" They called for immediate American withdrawal. In
November 1969, "Perhaps a half-million Americans gathered" on
the Mall in Washington, D.c. "to rescue the nation from the
39

war makers."
light,

When the story of the My Lai massacre came to

it only added fuel to the fire. The war was "a bad

down-hill

careening

nightmare,

entirely

out

of

rational

control.
President Nixon,
opponent.

His

"policy

however,
of

proved to be

negotiation

and

an

effective

Vietnamization

General Westmoreland states on page 233 of A Soldier
Reports that Johnson told him in November 1967 that he had
decided not to seek reelection because of health problems.
"ueBenedetti, Ordeal. p. 238.
“ ifeiâ. , pp. 240, 248, 257.
"ifeiâ., p. 262.
, p. 267.
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largely denied an issue to anti-war" a c t i v i s t s . T h e problem
was that since Nixon had already committed the nation to a
unilateral withdrawal of American troops, it was difficult to
convince

a

majority

of

the

public

that

the

immediate

withdrawal of all troops should be the minimum requirement of
a moral society. One anti-war response to this problem was,
"to challenge the legitimacy of the Thieu government. "" If
South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu could be shown to
be a brutal military dictator who did not enjoy the support of
the South vietncunese people, then it would be much harder for
Nixon to justify the continued fighting. If Thieu were in fact
forcing the war upon a populace who would have preferred to
negotiate

a

settlement,

then

further

U.S.

support

of

Vietnamization was clearly immoral. Peace activists "regarded
Vietnamization as a mercenary policy which would perpetuate
violence

in

Vietnam

denouncing

Thieu

indefinitely.

as a tyrant.^

Liberals

Because Thieu

began

"would not

submit to free elections and could not survive them . . . .
the Saigon regime . . . was itself the real barrier to a peace
settlement."^" American liberals found themselves "unhappily
moving to the side of those who would prefer . . . an American
, p. 268.
"ifeid-f p. 268.
, p. 295.
, p. 312.
"ibid.. pp. 353, 313.
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defeat to Vietnamization."" Randall Woods states that for
one of the most powerful anti-war activists, the chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, William Fulbright, the
war's basic immorality meant that "The worst thing that could
have

happened

in Vietnam was

for America to have won

a

military victory.""
In the spring of 1970 American troops attacked Communist
strongholds in Cambodia. This move injected new vigor into the
forces

opposing

the

war

as

"the

president

unilaterally

expanded it into Indochina. "" At this point the war caused
one of its worst side effects in America. Student unrest in
the wake of the Cambodian incursion brought the national guard
to the Kent State University campus. When guardsmen shot four
students to death, the tragedy reached new dimensions.
Still Nixon fought on.
killing continued.

Despite years of protest,

Many members

the

of the anti-war movement

became exhausted and bitter in 1971 and 1972." The President
was able to continue prosecuting the war and remained popular
enough to win a landslide reelection

in 1972.

Nixon

and

Kissenger's 1973 peace treaty gained the release of American
prisoners and brought the troops home, "with honor." But for

"ifeidw p.
"Randal Woods, Fulbriohti a Bioaraphy
Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 538.
"üeBenedetti, Ordeal. p. 272.
"ibid., pp. 294, 297.
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informed American
activists,
American

"drew

combat

liberals
a

and

the

war

was

distinction between
continuing

struggle for power in Indochina."

U.S.

not
the

over.
end

Peace

of overt

intervention

in

the

Nixon still pursued his

"political objective of an allied anticommunist South Vietnam.
In that respect peace was still elusive amd Vietnam yet an
American dilemma.""
Because anti-war forces considered the Thieu regime to be
the "real barrier to a peace settlement," that most Vietnamese
wanted, it was morally imperative for the United States to
"withhold further military auid political assistance," to the
South V i e t n a m e s e . M o r a l i t y also required America to "end
the bombing of Cambodia and military aid to Lon Nol." Anti-war
forces could at least taüce satisfaction in achieving these
goals. Congress forced Nixon to end U.S. air support of Lon
Nol in the summer of 1973. In South Vietnam the United States
continued to give some aid, but it was not

enough to allow

the ARVN to fight effectively. Sir Robert Thompson wrote that
during 1973 the ARVN was aüale to use only one-fifth as much
ammunition and one-tenth as much gasoline as it had used in
1971, even though the war was still being fought at a rate
which killed 12,778 ARVN personnel (while 14,647 had died in
1 9 7 1 ) George

Herring

states

that

after

the

Paris

"ibid", P* 349. The next quote is from p. 349 also,
^"ibid.. p. 353. The next quote is from p. 353 also,
^^hompson. Peace, p. 156.
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agreements,

"Congress

Vietnam . . . .

drastically

cut

back

aid

to

South

air force operations had to be curtailed by as

much as 50 percent because of shortages of gasoline and spare
parts.

Ammunition

and

other supplies

had to be severely

rationed. The inescapable signs of waning American support had
a devastating effect on morale."" After America withdrew.
South Vietnam collapsed relatively quickly.
This essentially liberal interpretation of the anti-war
movement, as compelling as it seems, leaves several questions
unanswered. The underlying assumptions are that continued U.S.
assistance to South Vietnam was immoral because: one, victory
was

impossible;

and two,

the unpopular military dictator,

Thieu, was forcing the South Vietnamese people to continue a
war which they did not want to
DeBenedetti

argues,

for

example,

fight.
that

Historian Charles
President

Nixon,

"perpetuated the illusion that . . . the United States could
secure an independently viable, noncommunist regime in South
Vietnam."" George Herring states that no amount of support
would have been "enough to save an army that refused to fight
. . . . the American effort to create a bastion of anti
communism

South of the

seventeenth parallel

was probably

doomed from the start."" Randall Woods believed that "the

"George Herring, America's Longest War (New York: McKay,
1996), p. 293.
"oeBenedetti, Ordeal. p.247
"Herring, War, pp. 296, 298.

a
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situation vas that Hanoi had only to wait and refuse to make
concessions; eventually the Americans would be gone and the
pitifully weak Thieu would be summarily dispatched.
But these assumptions must be challenged.

Russia and

China had been supplying the North Vietnamese with all of the
weapons, ammunition,

fuel they had used to fight the war.

After the 1972 Easter Offensive the Communists spent $2.5
billion rebuilding the North's army with the most advemced
artillery, tanks, and MIG aircraft in the Russiem arsenal."
Informed liberals also knew that the Viet Cong's normal daily
fighting tactics eunounted to war by perpetual

atrocity."

What if there had been good reason to believe that the South
Vietnamese wanted to defend themselves from this ruthless,
externally funded attempt to militarily impose totalitarian
communism on them? Such evidence would render the liberal
position, that morality required the United States to refuse
them the means to defend themselves, extremely difficult to
justify.
A great deal of evidence exists supporting the conclusion
that South Vietnamese forces fought hard and defeated their
"woods, Fulbright. p. 561.
"Douglas Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1987), p. 125.
"liffiê,February 9, 1968, p.22-26; May 10, 1968, p.37; June
21, 1968, p.27; October, 31, 1969, p.32-33; November 28, 1969,
p. 19; December 5, 1969, p.29; June 22, 1970 p.34; May 15,
1972, p.30; August 21, 1972, p.17. See also, Gunter Levy,
America In Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978),
pp. 272-78.
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communist

adversary

in

the

Tet

Offensive,

the

Cambodian

incursion. Operation Lam Son 719, the Easter Offensive, and in
local security battles. Equally prominent is the evidence that
the Communist position grew steadily weaker as a consequence
of each of these defeats.

This material

is presented

in

chapters two and three below.
Herring,

DeBenedetti,

and

Woods

assert

that,

American effort was doomed from the start." This

"the

opinion

appears in virtually every mainstream history of the war.
Nevertheless

there exists

a

substantial

body of

evidence

contradicting the assertion that the war was impossible to
win.
A second question about the assumptions which underlay
the

liberal

interpretation

of

the

war

arises

from

the

assertion that President Thieu was a brutal and unpopular
military dictator who forced the South Vietneunese to fight on
when they would have preferred to negotiate an end to the war.
DeBenedetti argues that the Saigon/U.S.A. report "documented
the barbarous repression of the Thieu regime. In this respect
it got to the bottom of the matter of Vietnam . . . [because]
'We do not have the right and do not have the capacity to save
a political regime abroad that does not have the respect of
its

own

people.'""

If America

withdrew

its

support

the

Communists were bound to win but "that could not be as bad as
the repression and destruction wrought by Saigon"
"DeBenedetti, Ordeal. p. 269.
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American

defenders."

George

Herring

added

that

America

"stubbornly supported Thieu long after it was evident the
President had no backing within his own country.
Again, there is a considerable body of evidence which
contradicts these opinions. Dr. Howard Penniman, Professor of
Government at Georgetown University, investigated the charges
that the Thieu regime was brutally repressive. He found that
there

were

twenty-seven

Vietnamese

operating in April 1972. There were,

language

newspapers

"five pro-goveimment,

eight anti-govemment, nine independent and five religious,"
publications. During 1970, 1971, and the early part of 1972
(when the research was conducted), "no daily newspaper had
been suspended and no editor or newsman jailed or fined,"
although

anti-govemment

published."

Dr.

Lucian

editorials
W.

Pye

were

of

the

frequently
Center

for

International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
stated in 1971 that, "compared with most Asian societies South
Vietnam

remains

relatively

open."

Dr.

John

P.

Roche,

Professor of Politics at Brandies University wrote that South
Vietnam

had,

"a

considerably

higher

specific

democratic

gravity than some 100 members of the United Nations." U.S.

“ ibid., p. 322,
^^Herring, War, p. 297.
"Howard Penniman, Elections In South Vietnam (Washington,
D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, 1972), p. 159. The next quote is from p. 188, and
the following is from the back cover of the book.
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Commanding General William Westmoreland described Thieu as
being "honest and candid . . . .
patient and cautious . . .

a master of timing. He was

a deft handler of the leaders of

the religious amd sectional factions.""
Reporters for Time magazine and the Economist were in
South Vietnam during the 1971 presidential election.

Both

agreed that Thieu had "enough solid support in the countryside
to win going away."" Dr. Penniman's observations confirmed
this opinion. The evidence of Thieu's electoral popularity is
presented on pages 84-86 below.
A more important question, however, is whether the South
Vietnamese

people

supported

Thieu's

war

policy.

Events

documented in 1968 and 1972 strongly suggested they did. In
1968 President Johnson agreed to participate in peace talks
with

the

North

Vietnamese

government

and

the

National

Liberation Front (the political representative of the Viet
Cong). President Thieu, however, upset the process by refusing
to cooperate. Thieu believed that if the NLF were allowed to
participate

it

would

amount

to

am

admission

that

they

legitimately represented some portion of the South Vietnamese
people

and

thus

should

coalition government.

be

allowed

Thieu preferred

to
to

participate

in

a

seek a military

victory rather than negotiate on those terms. Because of this

"Westmoreland, Report, p. 218.
"Time. May 3, 1970, p. 30.

I
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Stand Thieu vas hailed as a hero throughout Saigon." Time
reported that the normally quarrelsome opposition press had
united behind the President. A photograph showed members of
the

South Vietnamese

legislature

marching

in

support

of

Thieu's strong pro-war, anti-communist stand.
President Thieu took a similarly strong stand in rejecting
Henry Kissinger's Paris agreement of October 1972. The London
Economist reported that just as in 1968 Thieu had "won a lot
of support this week, even among his political rivals" for his
strong pro-war,

anti-communist

stand." Popular enthusiasm

for the war was strong enough that the elite divisions of the
military, such as the airborne and the marines, filled their
manpower

quotas

from

volunteers

in

1972.

No

draft

was

necessary for these units."
Dr. Penniman agreed, stating that "Nearly all members of
the

National

Assembly

sprang

to

the

defense

of

South

Vietnamese independence" during the 1972 Easter Offensive.
They "led the people in contributing money to the cost of
defending the nation" in this crisis. Penniman concluded that
"the vast majority of the South Vietnamese appear to prefer"
supporting the war effort, rather than allowing a communist
totalitarian government to conquer them."
"ibid..November 15, 1968, pp. 40-42.
"Economist. October 28, 1972, p. 18.
"•Thompson, Peace, p. 112.
"penniman. Elections. pp. 195-96.
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The South Vietnamese people gave conclusive proof of
their preference in 1975. By then it was clear that the ARVN
had neither the money to pay its soldiers nor the ammunition
to fight effectively. The United States had demonstrated that
it did not
retreat,

intend to re-intervene. The ARVN was

and

in

foreseeable future.

no

position

to

in full

counterattack

in

any

Thus the war was over in areas being

"liberated" by the North Vietnamese.
The people living in these areas had a clear choice. If
they rallied to the Communists they could secure a variety of
benefits.

They

would

be

safely

behind

the

front

lines,

physically secure from the war. They would be able to continue
living in their own homes. Most important, perhaps, they would
gain favor with the new government by immediately rallying to
its standard.
If, instead of accepting these benefits, people tried to
flee

the

Communists,

they

exposed

themselves

to

North

Vietnamese artillery fire, which was constantly intradicting
all roads. The best hope of those who survived the deadly
artillery bombardment would have been to find shelter in a
refugee ceunp near Saigon.
Given these two choices, the people fled south by the
hundreds

of

thousands.

They unquestionably

preferred

the

continued suffering of war under the Saigon government to
security and peace under the Communists.
Thus here again the liberal interpretation of the war can

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

34
be

questioned. What is the evidence that the Thieu regime was

an unpopular, brutally repressive dictatorship which forced
the Vietnamese people to continue a war which they would have
preferred not to fight?

One purpose of this thesis, then,

will be to challenge the assumptions underlying the liberal
position in the years after the 1968 Tet Offensive.
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CHAPTER 1
TIME'S IDEOLOGICAL BIAS

This thesis examines the bias in Time magazine's coverage
of the Vietnam War. In order to get a sense of the criteria
used to categorize Time*s articles and measure bias, readers
should cast themselves in the role of a propagandist. If the
propaganda editor for a pro-war publication would have wanted
an article printed, then it was a pro-war article. Conversely,
if the editor of an anti-war publication would have wanted to
print it, then it was an anti-war piece. If neither editor
would particularly have favored an article's publication, but
would have had no particular objection to its use, then the
article was neutral.

The next few pages more specifically

define these positions.
Many representatives of the anti-war position came to
believe that the U.S.

involvement

in the war had been a

mistake from the beginning. It had been immoral for America to
impose

its choice of corrupt military dictators on South

Vietnam. It was objectionable for the United States to use its
35
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massive advantage in technology and firepower against a less
developed,

nonindustrial nation.

It was unconscioneUsle for

Americans to have killed hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese.
Beyond that it was senselessly impractical because the war
could not have been won at any reasonable cost. Worse perhaps,
dissention over the war ripped American society apart. The
U.S. presence in Vietnam was causing both nations needless,
senseless suffering. America had little or nothing to gain
from its continuing involvement in Vietnam, and a great deal
to lose. The surest way to end the U.S. orchestrated tragedy
in Vietnam was to end U.S.

involvement.

From the anti-war

point of view, there was really only one question about the
war: how soon could the U.S. withdraw?
Opponents

of

the

war

favored

publicizing

the

war's

tragedies, the My Lai and Kent State massacres in particular.
An anti-war publicist would have wanted to emphasize the cost
of the war in lives and dollars. Money wasted on the war could
not

be

spent

programs.

on

America 's

legitimate

needs

and

social

Publications teücing the anti-war view would have

written about the suffering of U.S.

service personnel and

prisoners of war. The problems of Vietnamese civilians driven
from their homes into squalid refugee camps would have been
important. Anti-war forces portrayed the Saigon government as
a

corrupt

and

repressive military

protest demonstrations

in the U.S.

dictatorship.

Anti-war

were seen in the most

favorable light.
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It was also very importamt from the anti-war prospective
to define the war as being hopelessly lost. This was crucial
because by 1971 the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN)
had taücen over almost all of the combat responsibilities from
U.S. troops.

If the perception had existed among the U.S.

public

the

that

financial aid,

ARVN

could

advisors,

win

the

war

with

only U.S.

and occasional air support,

Americans would have endorsed this ongoing aid.

some

Those who

wished to cut off funds would certainly have faced an angry
debate.

If,

however,

anti-war

forces

were

successful

in

convincing the American public that the war could not be won
(the ARVN was incompetent, and the South Vietnamese people did
not support the corrupt military dictatorship of the Thieu
regime) then complete American withdrawal would have been the
only reasonable choice.
On

the

other

side

of

the

issue,

pro-war

advocates

believed that the principles of containment applied to the
Vietnam War. They felt that communism was an evil system,
which stole the rights and freedoms of the people whom it
oppressed. Proponents of containment believed that Russia and
China

were

aggressive

military

empires.

They

used

the

"national war of liberation" as their favorite technique for
enlarging their empires.

Communist agents worked in third

world countries across the globe in support of these national
wars

of

liberation.

They

armed

and

trained

guerrilla

insurgents. These small minorities of Communists then tried to
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militarily

subjugate

the

unwilling

majority.

When

the

Communists won, in North Vietnam for example, they used brutal
methods to institute collectivized agriculture and maintained
power through the use of harsh police state tactics."
From this point of view, the U.S. needed to help those
countries which were threatened by international Communism.
Helping people fight Communism was morally good in and of
itself, because it prevented the enslavement and suffering of
the threatened people. But it was also fundamentally necessary
to the security of the United States. International Communism
could only be stopped by force. If the United States could not
help Asiems, Africans, and Latin Americans fight and contain
international

Communism then

eventually America

would be

forced to fight World War Three against the enlarged Chinese
emd Russian empires.
People who believed in containment wanted to preserve the
independence of South Vietnam. Representatives of this point
of view emphasized the fact that ARVN had taken more battle
casualties than the United States in 1968, and by mid-1969 it
was teücing at least 80 percent of the allied battle deaths.^
War supporters wrote about the improving degree of security
provided

by

the

ARVN

in combination

with

the

new

local

militia, the Regional Forces (RF) and the Popular Forces (PF).
69

Douglas Pike, The History of Vietnamese communiap
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), pp. 108-109. See
also Pike, War, p. 71.
^Time. December 12, 1969, p. 15.
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They emphasized the improving stemdard of living of the South
Vietnamese peasantry and their newly prestigious social status
after land reform had made them farm owners for the first time
in the nation's history.
As the United States reduced its presence in Vietnam,
there would have been some level of assistance which would
have allowed South Vietnam to sustain its independence from
the North Vietnamese Communists. In South Korea, for example,
the U.S. maintained troops and economic assistamce over an
extended period of time. War supporters wanted to frame the
debate during U.S. withdrawal in terms of how much continuing
assistance would have been required to

win

a Korea-like

settlement.
Working from these perspectives, this thesis treats those
combat

articles

which portray

allied

troops

in

positive

winning terms as pro-war stories. Articles which portrayed the
Communists in positive winning terms were anti-war.
Peace treaty negotiation stories have all been defined as
neutral. Technically, perhaps, they should all be counted as
anti-war. Certainly there were members of the pro-war camp who
believed that the allies should simply win on the battle field
and forget about negotiating. There were also, however, many
war

supporters

who

would

have

welcomed

a

negotiated

settlement, if the terms had been acceptable. Time's articles
on the peace negotiations were always quite speculative in
nature. There were never enough concrete details about the
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terms for readers to judge whether they could have supported
a treaty or not. Thus, for purposes of this paper, they have
been categorized as neutral.
Using these criteria of classification,

from June 1,

1969, through December 24, 1974, Time published 693 Cl pro
war, 4047 Cl neutral, and 5,578 Cl anti-war. If one looks at
the period from September 21, 1970 forward. Time's bias was
even more pronounced: 228 Cl pro-war, 2758 Cl neutral, and
3,916 Cl anti-war.
In

June

1971,

Time

Inc.'s

editor-in-chief.

Medley

Donovam, laid out the magazine's editorial philosophy. Donovan
argued "for total withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam" as
quickly

as

possible.

He

continued,

"Actually,

there

are

grounds for thinking that the South has a fighting chance, but
. . . the U.S. can no longer stay . . .

to protect or improve

that chance." Donovan believed that too many Americans had
already

died

in Vietnam.

"Coming

out

of Viet

Nam

means

removing all American combat and support forces— land, sea and
air— from South Vietnam, and ending air operations, carrier
based and Thailand based, over Viet Nam, Laos, Cambodia.
This editorial was not one of a series, it was not balanced by
a

similar

pro-war

editorial.

It

represented

Time

Inc.'s

editor-in-chief announcing his conviction about the war. In
the editorial,
being

a war

Donovan explained why he had converted from

supporter to being an

advocate of

June 14, 1971, pp. 28-30.
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withdrawal. Donovan actively promoted his anti-war views, not
only in Time but also through a series of anti-war speeches.
As early as 1967, he told a New York University graduating
class that America ought to "admit that we had attempted
something beyond our powers" in Vietnam.^
Donovan's

view was

essentially that

of the anti-war

movement. The U.S. should completely withdraw as quickly as
possible, even if it meant losing a war which might have been
hypothetically

possible to win. Time outlined this position

as early as the October 24, 1969,

issue.

It contained the

argument that what America required was "a commitment that
U.S.

forces be totally withdrawn regardless of progress in

Saigon or any other factor . . . .

Bitterness at home is

likely to grow so severe if the war is continued even at a
relatively low level that the U.S. system itself is likely to
be impaired."”
This

article

represents

an extreme

form of

anti-war

rhetoric. It completely misrepresents the mood of mass opinion
in America. The fact is that as U.S. combat deaths fell so did
support for the anti-war movement. Public opinion polls showed
consistent support for President Nixon's policy of relatively
low levels of U.S. combat involvement while helping the South

^Stanley Kamow,
Press, 1983), p. 503.

Vietnam; A Historv

(New York; Viking

October 24, 1969, p. 20.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

42
Vietnamese prepare to defend themselves.” A September 1972,
Harris poll found that "55 percent supported continued heavy
bombing of North Vietnam, 64 percent supported the mining of
the Haiphong Harbor, and 74 percent thought it was important
that

South

Vietnam

not

fall

into

the

hands

of

the

Communists.
In a February 1970 article. Time asserted that the policy
of Vietnamization was immoral because it prolonged an immoral
war that could not be won.” Here again, only members of the
anti-war movement felt that Vietnamization was immoral. Most
Americans consistently supported Vietnamization. In May 1970,
Time offered the view that "The President is isolated . . .
not adequately exposed to reasonable opposing views . . .
has not offered the level of moral leadership
country needs.

Thus]

the nation disintegrates

he

[which the
. . . .

If

Americans continue on their present path, their epitaph might
well be that they were a potentially great people."”

It

seems absurd that a respected national publication could have
been predicting the collapse of the republic if America did
not withdraw all forces from Vietnam as quickly as possible.
Yet that is exactly what Time magazine was doing in 1970.

”Hallin. 'Uncensored' War, p. 182.
^Richard Nixon, RN; The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New
York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), p. 689.
” Time. February 9, 1970, p. 26.
” lbid.. May 25, 1970, pp. 16-17.

i
t
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Again, it represents an extreme form of anti-war rhetoric.
In the spring of 1971, Time announced that, "To those who
have long regarded U.S. involvement in the war as profoundly
immoral, a victory would be the final outrage."” In May 1972
Time asserted that the war continued as it did only because of
President

Mixon's

humiliation
America

in Viet Nam.

"assess

debilitating

"almost

.

the
.

obsessive
In November

terrible

cost

. unwinnable,

intolerable war . . . .

of

fear

of

1972
its

personal

Time
.

inconclusive

.

and

helped
.

most

finally

The methods we have used in fighting

the war have scandalized and disgusted public opinion in
almost all foreign countries.""
It was, however, in the April 5, 1971, issue that Time
assumed its most extreme anti-war position. Time announced
that it was sympathetic to the idea that America, as a matter
of principle, ought to be defeated on the battle field. The
article began by quoting columnist Arthur Hoope, "The radio
this morning said the allied invasion of Laos had bogged down.
Without thinking I nodded and said 'good'. And having said it,
I realized the bitter truth:

Now

I root against my

own

country." Time went on to explain, in its own editorial words,
that rooting for an American defeat on the battle field "is
not basically a matter of treason . . . .

since it long ago

” lbid.. March 1, 1971, p. 10.
^Ibid.. May 22, 1972, pp. 11-12.
” lbid.. November 6, 1972, pp. 14-27.
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became clear

that

an American

'victory'

in Viet Nam

is

impossible."*^
Time's editorial philosophy is clear enough. But was it
simply reflecting what it perceived as public opinion? No, it
was not. During 1969-1971, polls showed that most Americans
were angry and frustrated by the length of the war, the number
of dead, and the cost in dollars. They did not, however, want
to

see

America

withdraw

from

Vietnam

in

defeat.*^

They

supported President Nixon's policy of Vietnamization, which
strove to build up South Vietnam's resources to a level at
which

it would

be

able to defend

itself

from the North

Vietnamese Communists. This policy required U.S. combat troops
to remain in South Vietnam defending the country until ARVN
units could develop the strength to take their places. As U.S.
troop strength diminished.

President Nixon stated, on more

than one occasion, that "Air power, of course, will continue
to be used. We will continue to use it in support of the South
Vietnamese until [they] have developed the capacity to handle
the situation themselves."** President Nixon and his policies
averaged a 57 percent approval rating from the American public
during his first term in office, 1969-1972.*

* Ibid.. April 5, 1971, p. 12.
*^Louis Harris, The Anguish of Chance (New York: Norton,
1973), p. 70.
**Time. November 22, 1971, p. 24.
**Hallin, 'Uncensored' War, p. 182.
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Public opinion on the war broke into three groups. A
noisy minority of Americans continued to actively support the
war. Time carried stories of pro-war demonstrations on four
separate occasions scattered through 1969 amd 1970.* I have
not been able to find any figure for the size of this group,
as a national percentage.
The second minority group were those who,

like Time,

believed in the goals of the anti-war movement. A poll in June
1970

showed that 27 percent of the American public were

sympathetic to the anti-war protest demonstrations (53 percent
condemned

them) .*

The

anti-war

movement

then

probably

represented aüaout 27 percent of all Americans. The majority of
Americans were angry and frustrated, but still supported the
President.
Public opinion polls

frecpiently asked in one form or

another whether Americans approved of the President's handling
of the war. In late 1972 a majority of the public responded
positively

to

this

question.*^

Time,

however,

responded

negatively and scolded the American public for disagreeing.
"By any yardstick, except the polls, the Administration should

lime, October 24, 1969, p. 19; November 21, 1969, pp.
25-26; May 18, 1970, p. 10; May 25, 1970, p. 16. See also
DeBenedetti, Ordeal. pp. 258-59.
June 8, 1970, p. 22. See also Harris, Anguish, pp.
65-67.
“^Harris, Anguish, p. 75.

I
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be in trouble over its handling of the war."** The article
then provided detailed criticism of the President's handling
of the war.
Time indicated on six other occasions that it was aware
of the huge gulf separating its editorial philosophy from the
mass of American public opinion.

In October of 1969 Time

eumounced the results of the latest Lou Harris poll: "it is
remarkaüale [that the] President enjoys considerable public
support: a majority backs him on the rate of troop withdrawal
and on the matter of self determination for South Vietnam."*^
In September 1970 Time indicated that although Congress had
passed the Copper-Church amendment in July (ending funding for
U.S. troops in Cambodia), a filibuster had delayed passage
until the United States had already evacuated Ceunbodia. "Since
then the doves have been beaten [on all proposed pieces of
anti-war legislation,

amd] public opinion polls show that

public support of the President's policies remains strong.
In November 1971 Time indicated clearly that its value
system (the values of the anti-war movement) were considerably
more liberal than those of the mass of American opinion. The
article stated that President Nixon was making heavier use of
bombing than even President Johnson had. Lamenting that the
anti-war forces remained dormant in spite of this provocation.
**l4fflg, October 23, 1972, p. 34.
*^Ibid.. October 31, 1969, p. 13.
” lbid.. September 14, 1970, p. 15.
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Time concluded, "The harsh calculation— that it is better to
sacrifice
satisfy

Vietnamese

lives

the American

public

than

American

. . . .

ones— seems

[But,

Time

to

hoped]

Eventually stronger emotional opposition to the air war may
build."

91

The difference between Time's position and the mass

of American opinion was best expressed by sociologist Dr.
Howard Schuman in his study of attitudes about the war.^ As
U.S. combat troops played a smaller role and combat casualties
declined, the issue for members of the anti-war movement was,
"What are we doing to the Vietnamese?" ; for the mass public it
was "Are we winning the war?" In other words, for Time and the
anti-war movement Nixon's use of bombing amounted to a crime
against humanity. By contrast, the general public consistently
supported the use of bombing in am effort to win the war.
In the May 3, 1972, issue Time devoted 63 column inches
to an attack on "the reckless President Nixon [who] risked
WWIII by mining Haiphong Harbor . . . .

[It was] the act of an

emperor, a dictator," who acted alone against all advice. Lost
in the middle of several pages of radical anti-war rhetoric
Time included three column inches stating that, "A Lou Harris
survey showed that 59%
decision."*

If

59

of Americans backed Nixon's mining

percent

supported

the

President's

* Ibid.. November 22, 1971, pp. 28-30.
^*Howard Schuman, "Two Sources of Anti-war Sentiment in
America", American Journal of Sociology. 78:3 (November,
1972):
p. 513.
May 22, 1972, pp. 11-13
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decision, why did Time give only three column inches to this
view,

while

spending

twenty

times

as

much

print

space

condemning, "the act of an emperor, a dictator," who acted
alone against all advice?
Finally, on June 12, 1972, Time reported on two-hundred
"in depth interviews" conducted for the purpose of measuring
voter reaction to the war and how it might affect the 1972
U.S.

presidential

saying that the

election.

Time

introduced the

"North Vietnamese pressed their

topic by
military

advantage [as] the war that will not go away once again preyed
on the nation's conscience." In a virtual non sequitur. Time
then conceded that 70 percent of those interviewed backed the
President's policy on Vietnam, and believed that "Something
like the negotiated settlement in Korea" was now possible.*
The public believed that the allies could stop the advance of
communism in Vietneum, as they had in Korea, because the ARVN,
with the assistance of U.S.

air power but no U.S.

combat

troops, had just turned the tide of battle against the massive
Communist

invasion

known

as

the

1972

Easter

Offensive.

"Something like the negotiated settlement in Korea," with its
long-term commitment of U.S. forces to guarantee the peace,
was exactly what Hedley Donovan had argued so emphatically
against. Thus one sees the enormous distance between Time
magazine and the average American.

*Ibid.. June 12, 1972, p. 16.
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Time's editorial philosophy appears to have affected its
war coverage in several ways. First, when events admitted of
two interpretations. Time gave almost all of its print space
to that view which best supported the interests of the anti
war movement. Chapter two will address this subject. Second,
as Hedley Donovan said,
thinking

that

reporters

and

the

South

editors

"Actually,
has

were

a

there are grounds

fighting

perfectly

chance."

well

aware

for

Time's
of

the

evidence that progress was being made toward winning the war.
Administration spokesmen were doing all they could to bring
such evidence to the attention of reporters.

In the period

from mid-1969

Time

through

the end of the war.

actually

printed 123 Cl which told the story of the war being won.
Unfortunately 123 Cl spread out over 260 plus issues was not
really adequate to

tell the story. The other problem,

for

anyone interested in a balanced picture of the war, was that
Time printed

5,578

Cl

of

anti-war material

in

this

same

period. The details of the story that Time did not tell will
constitute chapter three. Third, Time factually misrepresented
what was happening in Vietnam in a variety of ways. Chapter
four will cover Time's factual misrepresentations.
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CHAPTER 2

THE ANTI-WAR INTERPRETATION OF EVENTS PUBLISHED IN TIME
AND THE

UNPUBLISHED PRO-WAR INTERPRETATION

From mid-1969 on, if the events of the war admitted of a
pro-war and an anti-war interpretation. Time gave almost all
of its print space to the interpretation which best supported
the

interests

illustrating

of
this

the

anti-war

tendency

movement.

include:

The

coverage

topics
of

the

battlefields and villages during the period from 1968-1972;
coverage of the anti-war protest demonstrations in the U.S.;
and coverage of South Vietnam's 1971 presidential election.
The coverage of the battlefields and villages was the
most important in forming an accurate view of the war.

In

early 1968 the Communists launched a massive assault known as
the Tet Offensive.

They captured most of Hue and parts of

Saigon before being repulsed. Prior to the 1968 Tet Offensive
Time had supported the Johnson Administration's policy by
50
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maintaining a two to one pro-war bias in its coverage. The
February 9

issue was the first to carry news of the Tet

offensive. Beginning with this issue. Time *s bias shifted to
a four to one anti-war stance, and the battlefield coverage of
Tet reflected this new anti-war bias.
As spring turned to summer,

it became clear that the

Communists had taken a terrific military beating in the Tet
Offensive, and Time moved from its four to one anti-war bias
back to a strong pro-war bias for a short period,

before

becoming virtually neutral for a year. In total. Time printed
340 Cl describing Tet as a military victory for the Communists
(printed mainly

in

February

and March

1968)

and

177

Cl

describing the campaign as a military victory for the allies
(mainly from the short pro-war period in late spring). Today,
the standard historiographic interpretation of Tet is that
although the Communists suffered a military defeat, Tet was
the turning point in the war for them, because it caused the
American

public

to

stop

supporting

the

war.*

Thus

Time

factually misrepresented the Tet Offensive by giving twice as
much space to coverage representing it as a military victory
for the Communists.
On March 28,
analyses

of

Tet.

1969, Time offered the summation of its
Time concluded that

the

Communists

had

suffered heavy casualties but had been eUsle to replace their
loses and remain on the offensive. "But they had also won a
*Herring, War, pp. 203-204,241.

I
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clear cut psychological victory, demonstrating their ability
to attack almost anywhere in Viet Nam at will and shattering
all the optimistic assessments of the war in the minds of the
U.S.

public."*

This

is

very

much

the

conclusion

of

mainstream U.S. historiography.
Qualified,

newsworthy

experts,

however,

presented

a

differing interpretation of the Tet Offensive. Time devoted
only 17 Cl to this alternative view, as articulated by John
Paul Vann, Sir Robert Thompson, and Or. Douglas Pike.
John Paul Vann was the second ranking civilian in the
pacification/nation building agency.

Civil

Operations

emd

Rural Development Support, commonly referred to as CORDS. Vann
had

been

exception
experience

in Vietnam
of Dr.

longer

Pike.

in rural

than

He had

any

Americzm,

a great

South Vietnam.

deal

with

the

of personal

Vemn demonstrated his

expert knowledge in his loud and public criticisms of the
state of rural pacification in the early 1960s.* Arguably,
Vann had as deep an understanding of the war as any American
and may have been in the best position to judge the state of
rural pacification.
Vann

testified

in

a

1970

hearing

before

a

Senate

subcommittee that he believed that the Tet Offensive had been

*Time. March 28, 1969, p. 19.
*United States Senate Foreign Relations Sub-committee on
Vietnam Hearings; Policy and Prospects. 1970, p. 112. See also
Neil Sheehan, A Bright and Shinning Lie (New York; Random
House, 1988), pp. 5-6.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

53
the turning point in the war.* He, however, contended that
it had been the turning point at which a war that would have
been

enormously

difficult

to

win

became

winnaible.

Vann

asserted that the Viet Cong 's best South Vietnamese guerrillas
had h o m e the brunt of the battle for the Communists, amd they
had sustained crippling loses. He estimated that perhaps twothirds

of

the

Communists'

experienced

South

guerrilla cadre had been killed in 1968.
manpower

loss

forced

the

Viet

Cong

to

Vietnamese

This staggering
withdraw

from

substantial portions of the South Vietnamese countryside. As
the Communists withdrew, newly trained local defense platoons
known as the Regional Forces (RF) and the Popular Forces (PF)
deployed across the country. These 1,000 new platoons used
aggressive night patrols to bring security to most of rural
South Vietnam for the first time.
When the Communists were able to refill the ranks of the
Viet Cong, it was with North Vietnamese guerrillas whom the
South Vietnamese peasants regarded as invaders. Prior to the
Tet Offensive, the South Vietnamese Viet Cong guerrillas had
had access to and support from most of the villages in South
Vietnam. After Tet, they lost regular access to and support
from 75 percent of the nation's hamlets, even at night. This
forced the Communists to fight a conventional war, which would

h e a r i n g s , pp. 98-113. The next two paragraphs come from
these pages. See also Brigadier General Tran Dinh Tho,
Pacification
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Center for Military
History, 1980), pp. 6, 17.
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have been very difficult, if not impossible, for them to win,
if the United States had provided ongoing air support to the
South Vietnamese.
Sir Robert Thompson agreed with Vann. In December 1969,
lims reported that "the Cambridge educated Thompson, 53, was
knighted for devising the strategy that ultimately defeated
local Chinese Communist terrorists in Malaya in the 1950s. .
. . Viet Nam has been his specialty since 1961." At President
Nixon's request, Thompson spent five weeks touring Viet Nam.
He reported that the improvements since 1968 were astounding.
Though

the

victory,

Tet

Offensive

was

a

Communist

psychological

Thompson argued that it was militarily suicidal.

"'The thing that suxrprised me more than anything else was the
extent to which the government has regained control in the
countryside, ' he said . . . 'the war isn't won, but we're in
the kind of position from which we could win . . . .

It could

take three to five years before Hanoi is compelled to give up
her purpose and to negotiate a real settlement. '
Dr. Pike goes further in his interpretation of the Tet
Offensive. Based on his reading of North Vietnamese sources.
Pike believes that the battle of la Drang Valley in November
1965 was a major turning point in the war. In this battle the
Communists sacrificed between 1,000 and 2,000 men in order to
test

the

fighting

techniques

of

the

U.S.

forces.

They

concluded that the modified guerrilla warfare tactics employed
*Time. December 26, 1969, p. 8.
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at Dien Bien Phu would not work against the superior American
fire

power

strategy,

and

the

mobility.

Communists

As
were

they

searched

under

for

increasing

another
American

pressure. They, "had not won a single battle of significance
in two years. Allied fire power was eating deeply into their
reserves of men and supplies.

[Their]

doubled every six months.

A loss of ideological faith

...

desertion rate had

was leading to confusion and demoralization among the key
figures in the South, the cadres."^* Lt. General Ngo Quang
Truong also describes Viet Cong loses and weakness throughout
1966 and 1967 as forcing the change in strategy which lead to
the 1968 Tet Offensive.

General Donn Starry reached the

same conclusion.'* Thus, the Communists were forced into a
new strategy. They judged their massive 1968 assault on urban
South Vietnam to be the least unattractive option in a set of
bad choices. The Tet Offensive was a military catastrophe for
all the reasons cited, but it was not simply a mistake in
strategy. It was a gamble forced on Hanoi by their steadily
deteriorating position in 1966 and 1967.
Time did not quote any of John Paul Vann's testimony
regarding

the

Tet

Offensive

and

its

effect

on

rural

'*Pike, War, pp. 121-24.
'®'Lt. General Ngo Quang Truong, The Easter Offensive of
1972 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History,
1980), p. 5.
'^General Donn Starry, Armored Combat in Vietnam (Salem,
New Hampshire: The Ayer Company, 1982), p. 114.
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pacification, even though Vann had spoken in a Congressional
hearing open to reporters. Time did interview Vann in July
1971.

He

was

quoted

as

denying

any

knowledge

of

South

Vietnamese General Ngo Dzu's alleged connection to narcotics
trafficking.
the

coming

Offensive,

In May 1972 Time cited Vamn's prediction that
spring

would

be

offensive,
an

all

now

out

known

as

invasion.

the
Neil

Easter
Sheehan

explained that by 1970, "While many of the reporters Vamn knew
no

longer agreed with his conclusions

about the war,

he

retained a special credibility with the press because of all
he had put in the bank in the past and because he could still
be

frank about the flaws on the Saigon side."'* In other

words the media was willing to use Vann's expert knowledge as
a source to criticize the war, but would not publicize his
overall evaluation. On June 19, 1972, Time gave six column
inches to reporting Vann's death.'* His

interpretation of

the Tet Offensive did not appear in the magazine.
Time quoted Pike in May 1969 analyzing the divisions
within the North Vietnamese leadership.'* Pike's assessment
of

the serious

problems

facing Hanoi,

however,

published. Time gave Thompson 17 Cl.
'*Time. July 19, 1971,
Ibiâi., May 15, 1972,

p. 22-23.
p. 30.

'*Sheehan, Lie, p. 739.
1ÛA

Time. June 19, 1972,

p. 24.

'*Ibid. May 30, 1969, pp. 29-30.
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In total.

Time published 340 Cl describing Tet as a

military victory for the Communists, 177 Cl describing it as
a military victory for the allies, and only 17 Cl explaining
the pro-war interpretation of the Tet Offensive and its effect
on the state of rural pacification. Time also periodically ran
articles asking the question, 'is pacification working'?, and
invariably concluded that some progress was being made, but
that it was fragile and was unlikely to succeed before the
United States

was

forced out

of Vietnam.'* Time did not

elaborate on who was doing the forcing.
Sir Robert Thompson and John Paul Vann were certainly two
of the world's foremost experts on pacification. Both agreed
that Tet had been the turning point at which the allies had
begun to win the war. Their reasons for believing that the war
had turned (as stated by Vann and others in over 700 pages of
transcript

in

open

hearings

before

the

Congress)

were

logically coherent and were supported by a good deal of solid
verifiable

evidence

(described

in

chapter

three

of

this

paper).
By failing to give the pro-war interpretation of the 1968
Tet Offensive and its effect on pacification anything like
equal space. Time prevented its readership from having the
opportunity to make an informed discission about the war.
Polls suggested again and again that a majority of Americans
108

Ibid.. September 26, 1969, pp. 25-26; February 9, 1970,
pp. 25-26; October 26, 1970, pp. 47-48; March 15, 1971, p.
30; February 7, 1972, p. 34.
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would have preferred to have won the Vietnam War if it could
have been done without sacrificing the lives of U.S. combat
troops. Vann and Thompson were certain that it could have been
done.

If they were correct, then Time's failure to publish

this interpretation did a remarkable service for those who
believed

in

the

goals

of

the

amti-war

movement

and

a

remarkable disservice to the majority of Americans.
The media also took a strong position denouncing the
allies' 1970 operations in Ceunbodia. In March 1970, General
Lon Nol
regime

overthrew Prince Sihanouk's government.
then

closed

the

port

of

Sihanoukville

The new
to

the

Communists. Sihanoukville had been used to import 80 percent
of the Communist war supplies destined for the Mekong Delta
region.

Time then reported that since almost all of the

Communists'
North,

supplies would have to come overland from the

"'they're going to have a helluva time sustaining

themselves in the lower half of South Vietnam. . . . Rocket
and mortar attacks have become almost a rarity . . . there is
reason to believe that the Communists are being forced to
revise their entire strategy for conducting the war.'"'*
North Vietnamese troops responded by stepping up their
support

of

Cambodian

the

Khmer Rouge

government.

and

President

trying

to

overthrow

Nixon

stated

that

the
"My

immediate inclination was to do everything possible to help

109

Ibid.. May 11, 1970, pp. 16-17; June 15, 1970, p. 29.
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Lon

Mol.""'*

In

opposition

to

the

President's

desire.

Secretary of State William Rogers and Secretary of Defense
Melvin Laird "strongly recommended that we hold back, " because
if America aided Lon Nol the Communists would believe the
United States had engineered the coup and that they were
justified in unleashing a full-scale invasion of Cambodia. On
April 22, however, Nixon wrote in his diary, "We have really
dropped the ball on this one due to the fact that we were
taken in with the line that by helping him we would destroy
his 'neutrality' and give the North Vietnamese an excuse to
come

in.

Communists

Over and over again we failto
never need an excuse to

leam

that

the

comein . . . . the only

government in Cambodia in the last twenty-five years that had
the guts to taüce a pro-Westem and pro-American stand is ready
to

fall,"

and

the United

States had

not

yet

taken any

substantial measures to help it.
Nixon

stated, "I

never had

any

illusions

about the

shattering effect a decision to go into Cambodia would have on
public opinion at home.""' He decided to act anyway. General
Abrams had advised the President that in military terms it
would be highly advantageous for the allies to respond to the
North Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. Vietnamization would
significantly benefit if the Communist supply stockpiles were
'"'Nixon, BK, p. 447. The rest of the paragraph comes from
this page also.
"'ibid., p. 449. The rest of the paragraph comes from
this page. Page 450 describes General Abrams opinion.
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destroyed and the supply port remained closed.
This put the President in a peculiar position. A proAmerican government which seemed to enjoyed broad popular
support had come to power in Cambodia."^ The Communist North
Vietnamese army occupied a substantial part of Cambodia and
had

begun

training Khmer Rouge

guerrillas

for their

war

against Lon Nol. Nixon believed that in a military sense he
needed to address the problem. He knew also that the American
media

would

take

the

position,

espoused

by

Communist

propaganda releases, that he had widened the war by invading
a neutral country. The President decided to act in spite of
the

media's

opposition.

unqualified success,

Militarily

the

operation

was

an

and ARVN troops continued to conduct

cross border operations in Cambodia, preventing the Communists
from regaining access to Sihanoukville.
Lt.

General

Truong

confirmed

the

importance

of

the

Cambodian operation. He stated that the Communist's Central
Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) issued Resolution Number 9 in
1969. It "emphasized the strategic importance of the Mekong
Delta,"

and ordered the entire NVA 1st Division into the

Delta. The infiltration "succeeded despite heavy losses" to
the Communists. After the North Vietnaumese were established in
the Delta, the South Vietnamese local security forces "were
"4foods, Fulbriaht. p. 634
Time. June 1, 1970, p. 22; June 8, 1970, pp. 30, 35;
June 15, 1970, p. 29; September 14, 1970, p. 16. See also
Starry, Armored Combat, pp. 166-81.
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thrown off-balance and the pacification effort declined as a
result of extensive enemy attacks and shellings. Not until
after the enemy's sanctuaries beyond the border had been
destroyed during the Cambodian incursion and his capability to
resupply from the sea eliminated were these 1st NVA Division
forces

compelled

to

break

down

into

small

elements

and

withdraw.
The American media did not report the effect of the
Cambodiam operation on the NVA 1st Division in the Delta.
Instead, the media condemned President Nixon. In response to
the American media's apparently pro-communist coverage of the
Cambodian operation, the London Economist wrote, "For years.
North Vietnam has violated the neutrality of this country—
with barely a chirp of protest from the rest of the world . .
. . To
Cambodia

condemn the United States
is about as

for

'invading' neutral

rational as to condemn Britain

for

'invading' formally neutral Holland in 1944.""*
With the Sihanoukville port closed to the Communists,
President Nixon hoped that an allied strike against the Ho Chi
Hinh trail in Laos would damage the North Vietnamese supply
lines

sufficiently to prevent them from launching a 1971

offensive. The operation, code named Lam Son 719, began in
February 1971. Time reported that the ARVN attacked with a

"^Truong, Easter, p. 139.
"*Nixon, BK, p. 453.
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main force of 14,000 men."* Besides this main force, several
artillery

fire bases

were

lifted by helicopter onto

the

mountain tops overlooking the supply trail in Laos. Time noted
that the Communists had 35,000 troops arrayed in defensive
positions around the point of attack. Another 20,000 Communist
troops were converging on the ARVN's position from other parts
of Cambodia and Laos.

Large numbers of reinforcements also

poured into the battle zone from the North Vietnamese regular
army

divisions

assigned

to

defend

their

side

of

the

Demilitarized Zone (DMZ-the border between North and South
Vietnam).

South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu then

threatened to take advantage of the Communist's vulnerability
by launching an invasion of North Vietnam itself. "* Time
reported that China took the threat seriously enough that
"Premier Chou En-lai

retaliated by

[declaring that China

would] 'take all necessary measures, not flinching even from
the

greatest

national

sacrifices,*

to

help

the

North

Vietnamese" if ARVN forces invaded."’
Time also reported that the ARVN faced some unusual
problems. The artillery that the U.S. had helilifted in was
inadequate. The ARVN's "155 mm eleven mile range howitzers are
often out reached by North Vietnamese gunners with 130 mm
"*Time. February 22, 1971, p. 24.
"^Ibid.. March 8, 1971, p. 21.
"*lbid.. March 15, 1971, p. 28-29.
11 0

Ibid.. March 22, 1971, p. 23.
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pieces that can fire a shell 17 miles. [Also] Fog blankets
fire bases and curtails vital air s u p p o r t . S o m e w h a t over
2,000 ARVN troops were killed, while the Communists lost more
than 15,000.'^' After two months of heavy fighting the South
Vietnamese withdrew from Laos.
A reasonable interpretation of Operation Lam Son 719
might have been as follows. After the Communist supply port of
Sihanoukville had been cut off in 1970, the Ho Chi Minh supply
trail became doubly important. If the ARVN had been able to
maintain permament fire bases on the mountain tops above the
trail, with forward spotters directing the artillery fire and
B-52 air strikes, then the North's ability to deliver war
supplies

into

South

Vietnam

would

have

been

seriously

impaired. Recognizing the danger, the Communists made an allout effort to defend their vital interests, even to the point
of

denuding

the

defenses

of

North

Vietnam

itself.

The

Communist defenders outnumbered the South Vietnamese attackers
by three or four to one. Bad weather and exceptionally intense
anti-aircraft

fire limited the effectiveness

of U.S.

air

support. Yet, in spite of all of this, ARVN forces maintained
their position in Laos for two months, killing aüaout 15,000
Communists while losing only around 2,000 of their own dead.
Thus it would be reasonable to interpret Operation Lam Son 719
as a strong proof that the ARVN was a competent and effective
'” lbid.. March 8, 1971, p. 20
'^'Herring, War, pp. 265-66.
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fighting force.
Sir Robert Thompson interpreted Lam Son 719 this way, in
his 1974 book. Peace Is Wot At Hand. "In the first instance
the very fact that the South Vietnamese were able to release
such a force for an offensive operation into the North's
secure 'rear bases' indicated that the balance of capeüaility
was changing." To illustrate this point one has only to recall
that in 1964 the South Vietnamese were on the verge of being
defeated by the relatively lightly armed Viet Cong guerrillas.
General Westmoreland commented that in 1965 "The enemy was
destroying battalions faster than they could be reconstituted
and faster than we had planned to organize them under the
ARVN's crash build-up program."

At that time ARVN would

not have been capable of sending a two-division assault force
to attack Communist sanctuaries in Laos.
Thompson continued, "On the way in the South Vietnamese
fought well, one Ranger battalion on the northern flank was
practically decimated by repeated assaults. After receiving
200 casualties and inflicting three or four times that number
on the enemy,

it successfully withdrew in good order to a

neighboring position, with all its weapons and carrying its
wounded.

There was no rout." After it had caused as much

damage as possible the ARVN began to withdraw. "A withdrawal
in the

face

of the enemy

operation of war . . . .

is probably the

most

exacting

The picture of a South Vietnamese

'^Westmoreland, Report, p. 139.
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coming out on the skids of a helicopter was flashed around the
television screens of the world for days on end. it gave an
unfair and false picture of the fighting quality of the South
Vietnamese troops."'^
President Nixon stated that the American military command
had underestimated the number of Communist troops that would
be marshalled to repel Lam Son. The United States "failed to
respond to this unexpectedly intense level of combat with the
necessary increase in air cover for the invading forces. The
resulting ARVN casualties were heavy, but they continued to
fight courageously." As the South Vietncunese withdrew, Nixon
repeated, "Our air support was inadequate," and under severe
pressure some men panicked.

"It took only a few televised

films of ARVN soldiers clinging to the skids of our evacuation
helicopters to reinforce the widespread misconception of the
ARVN forces as incompetent emd c o w a r d l y . N i x o n believed
the press' falsely negative portrayal of Lem Son hurt the war
effort emong the South Vietnemese whose "morale was shaken by
media reports" of the battle.

In the United States,

"news

pictures undercut confidence in the success of Vietnamization
and the prospect of ending the war." The military benefits of
the operation were great enough, however, that Nixon agreed
with Henry Kissinger's assessment, "If I had known before it

'^Thompson, Peace, pp. 90-91.
'^*Nixon, EH, pp. 498-99. The rest of the paragraph comes
from this page.
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Started that it was going to come out exactly the way it did,
I would still have gone ahead with it."
General Starry agreed that Lan Son 719 "helped to delay
major enemy operations for the remainder of 1971."'* ARVN
troops

also

discovered

the

Communists 's

oil

pipe

line,

destroyed a section of it and were able to supply U.S. pilots
with its location for future bombing raids. Starry's overall
appraisal of Operation Lan Som, and other 1971 battles, was
less optimistic than Sir Robert Thompson or President Nixon.
He

saw

these

engagements

as

a

military

draw

which

"demonstrated that a parity existed in South Vietnamese- North
Vietnamese strength."'* Even this assessment, however, meant
that a marked and steady improvement had occurred in the ARVN
fighting ability.
In 1967 General Westmoreland agreed that steady progress
throughout 1966 and 1967 had made the ARVN a competent enough
fighting force that he expected to begin withdrawing U.S.
forces within two years. Because the South Vietnamese forces
had doubled in size over a three year period it was impossible
to know which of the new officers would provide high quality
leadership in combat until they were so tested. Improvement
would take time and experience.
veneer

of

leadership,"

But in spite of "the thin

Westmoreland

believed

'*Starry, Armored Combat, p. 197
'*Ibid.. p. 198.
pp. 180-181, 186.
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orgamizations in the world could have done" as well as the
ARVN

under

similar

pressure.'*

westmorelamd

"followed

a

policy of maücing myself readily availaüale for interviews."'*
His interpretation of the war, however, was not published in
Time.
Neither did Time interview President Nixon, or publish
his opinion that the media's falsely negative portrayal had
made Lam Son 719
defeat."

It

"a military success but a psychological

devoted

merely

three

column

inches

to

U.S.

Commanding General Creighton Abrams and Sir Robert Thompson
praising the ARVN during the campaign.'*
Time's overall interpretation differed from that of the
war supporters, offering the battlefield analyses that ARVN
troops were,

"getting their asses kicked,"

appeared to be suffering,
[and that]

that the ARVN

"an embarrassing defeat in Laos,

the allies have

paid dearly."'*' The ARVN was

chased out of Laos and "The last group out . . . barely made
it.

[Thus] last week's banner headlines declaring complete

victory were in Hanoi's newspapers,
concluded that

not Saigon's."'* Time

"Many sophisticated Asians

. . . are now

'*Westmoreland, Report, pp. 250-53.
, p. 276.
130

limm, February 15, 1971, p. 31.

'*'lbid.. February 22, 1971, p. 24; March 1, 1971, p. 19;
March 29, 1971, p. 24.
'*Ibid.. April 5, 1971, p. 20.
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privately convinced that Hanoi will prevail."'** All told.
Time printed 120 Cl of anti-war articles related to Operation
Lam Son 719, and only 14 Cl pro-war. None of the 14 pro-war
column inches made an effort to explain how the battle could
be interpreted as proof of the ARVN's competence.
Time 's interpretation made it appear that the ARVN could
not defeat the Communists even with U.S. air support. Thus,
Time made it easier for undecided Americans to believe, as
Hedley Donovan did, that the U.S. should completely withdraw
from Vietnam as quickly as possible. By not publishing a pro
war interpretation of lam Son 719, Time again deprived its
readership of the opportunity to make an informed decision
about the war.
Time's coverage of the 1972 Easter Offensive was similar.
By 1972, all U.S. troops had been withdrawn from combat. Aside
from U.S.

logistical support

(air and artillery)

the ARVN

fought alone. The Communists hoped to take advantage of this
situation by launching their first full scale assault since
the Tet Offensive. They invaded with 120,000 troops. Their
three primary objectives were Hue near the DMZ, An Loc, a
provincial capital 75 miles from Saigon, and Kontum in the
central highlands. The Communists lost 100,000 men and failed
to take any of their objectives.'**
Normally when an invading army suffers a
'**Ibid.. March 29, 1971, p. 23.
Herring, War , pp. 271-75.
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casualty rate and does not take any of its objectives it is
judged to have suffered a military catastrophe. Certainly the
October 30, 1972, issue of Aviation Week and Space Technoloov
interpreted it this way.^^ Administration spokespersons Dr.
Douglas Pike, sir Robert Thompson, and Dr. Henry Kissinger
have all published books supporting this interpretation. Each
of them was a well known,
Inexplicably,

however.

readily available media source.

Time

reached

exactly

the

opposit

conclusion, stating that "Any illusions about the prospects of
victory through Vietnamization . . . were shattered by the
success of Hanoi's Easter O f f e n s i v e . Time gave absolutely
no space to these administration spokesmen's interpretation of
the battle.
Part of what Time did not publish was Pike's view that
the 1972 Easter Offensive,

"required the best weapons the

Communist world's armament factories could produce, and they
met the challenge. The North Vietnamese armies in the 1972
offensive had more tanks (410) than the South Vietnamese (296)
and more long range artillery (130mm and 152mm guns) . . . .
Several hundred fighter planes were also delivered (MIG 15s,
MIG 17s, supersonic MIG 21s, and later, the more advanced MIG
21C and MIG 21D)."*^

"^Aviation Week and Space Technoloov. October 30, 1972,
p. 7.
November 6, 1972, p. 18.
^^^Pike, Vietnam, pp. 120, 125.

i
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In his book. The Easter Offensive, the commander of the
U.S. Marine advisors, Lt. colonel Gerald Turley, stated that
the priority North Vietnam placed on victory in the invasion
could be seen by the commitment of the NVA 308th Division.
"This unit had conducted the final assault on the entrapped
French at Dien Bien Phu . . . .

In the long history of the

Vietnam War, the 308th had left Hanoi to join in only," the
battle of Dien Bien Phu and the 1972 attack.
Sir Robert Thompson described the Easter Offensive as "a
massive conventional invasion with fourteen divisions and the
most m o d e m weaponry, which not one single country in the
Western world, other than the United States, given the shape
and topography of South Vietnam, could have defeated alone
without adequate outside air support— not even

Israel.

South Vietnam's problem was that it had a 600-mile long
border.

The

Communists

were able

to

mass

their

fourteen

divisions under cover of the triple canopy jungle anywhere
along the border.

The ARVN had to defend the

forty-four

district capitals, as well as the various airfields, supply
depots

and

country.
10,000

military

installations

scattered

Popular Forces platoons were
rural hamlets.

military forces

stationed

Given the total

(about 1,000,000 men)

across

size

of

the

in adaout
all

their

the South Vietnamese

^“ Lt. Colonel Gerald Turley, The Easter Offensive
(Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1985), pp. 29-30.
139

Thompson, Peace. p. 28.
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could concentrate only about 6,000 to 8,000 troops, even in
their

more

important

defensive

positions.

To

complicate

matters, in most places South Vietnam was less than lOO miles
wide. Saigon was less than 35 miles from Cambodia.
In the Easter Offensive the North Vietnamese brought
40,000

men across the border at each of three points. They

enjoyed tremendous invading momentum against the relatively
small number of defenders at the point of each attack. These
circumstamces would certainly have been expected to carry the
Communists well into the heart of the country. Because of this
Robert Komer argued that "We tended to underestimate the great
value

of

allowing the

Laos.The

enemy

South Vietnamese

sanctuaries

in

Cambodia

suffered

25,000

amd

casualties

(almost half of the total number of Americans killed in the
entire war), in preventing the North Vietnamese from taking
even their first objectives. It would seem apparent that the
ARVN fought fiercely in the Easter Offensive.
The

London

Economist

commented:

"It

is

still

not

appreciated how much the South Vietnamese Army has," improved
in morale because of the Easter Offensive. "Despite all the
American help from the air the South Vietnamese Army has had
to fight hard on the ground;
held,

in most of the action it has

and in some it has done much better than that.

'^Komer, Bureaucracv. p.
Report, pp. 180-81.

5.

See

also

The

Westmoreland,
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result is a visible improvement in morale.
Lt. Colonel Turley provides a detailed account of what
went right and what went «rrong in Military Region One (MR-1)
during the battle. He states that South Vietnamese Brigadier
General Vu Van Giai, the commander of the ARVN 3rd Division
which had primary responsibility for the defense of MR-1, put
the division in a position of extreme vulnerability. On the
day the Communists launched the invasion, only a few hours
before the battle began. General Giai initiated a plan to
rotate the positions of two of the divisions' three regiments.
"Tactical command posts (CPs) were vacated, unit radios shut
down," and infantry units were marching in open formation down
the

road

"when

thousands

of artillery

rounds

struck the

exposed troops causing instant death and chaos." Thus the 3rd
division

"was

temporarily unable

to

perform

as

a viable

fighting force.
Military

manuals

are

specific

about

the

techniques

required to reduce the risks involved in troop rotations. In
spite of the fact that he was well aware of the buildup of
North Vietnamese forces in the region and the high probability
of an

imminent battle,

Giai did

not

take

even

the most

rudimentary precautions. Turley asserts that "The timing of
Giai 's relief-in-place operation, the unprofessional manner in
which it was executed and his disregard of the warnings of a
^*^Economist. October 14, 1972, p. 32.
’*^Turley, Easter, p. 53.
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major

attack,

inevitably

led

to

the

hypothesis

of

t r e a s o n . G e n e r a l Truong's history agrees with Turley that
the highest level command decisions which led to the fall of
Quang

Tri

Province

were disastrously

inadequate.

After

Quang Tri fell. President Thieu replaced the command staff for
the defense of Hue,

the next city to the south in MR-l.

General Giai was eventually arrested and sentenced to prison.
Aside
created

from this

problem,

fairly recently.

the

3rd

Division had been

Although most of the troops had

combat experience, they had never fought together as a unit.
One of the three regiments, the 56th, "had only been activated
three months earlier,

and still was having many start-up

problems. . . . the quality of the 56th leadership was poor"
and required time and experience for i m p r o v e m e n t . B e y o n d
these problems, the cloud cover was so low through most of the
offensive that tactical air support was
strikes were effective in any weather,

ineffective.

B-52

and were a crucial

element in the defense, but the use of tactical air power and
helicopters was severely limited.
The ARVN fire support bases had been located in the same
positions for several years. They were effectively positioned
to interdict small unit infiltrations, but the Communist long
range artillery located north of the DMZ had these bases
, pp. 34-36.
, pp. 252-53, and Truong, Easter, pp. 38-39.
Easter, p. 47.
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locked in. The North Vietnamese fire was extremely accurate
and

intense.

shells

many

Under the pressure of thousands of
of

the

inexperienced

ARVN

incoming

artillery

crews

abandoned their guns, seeking shelter in reinforced bunkers.
"Thus when it was needed the most, ARVN counterbattery fire
was drastically reduced because of fear in the gun pits.
In spite of these problems the Marines at outpost E-4
repelled three infamtry assaults on March 30th, "inflicting
heavy casualties on their a t t a c k e r s . T w o similar outposts
were overrun. Few of their men made it back to the main fire
base.

On the second day of the offensive the Communists

bypassed outpost E-4 to attack the main fire base Nui Ba Ho.
The Marines in E-4 "continued to bring fire into the flanks
and rear of enemy units attacking the Nui Ba Ho perimeter."
U.S.

advisor.

Captain Ray Smith,

stated that

"the heroic

actions of this platoon inspired the Bravo group [inside the
main perimeter]

to put up even greater resistance to the

numerically superior enemy force."** They repelled several
heavy assaults that day.

During the second

night of the

invasion. Nui Ba Ho was overrun. Similarly, the 4th Battalion
at Fire Base Sarge "had acquitted themselves valiantly." Their
mortar platoon had faithfully provided fire support to the
troops throughout the battle. "By evening every member of the
^**Ibid.. p. 61.
p. 66.
’**Ibid., p. 80.
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platoon

had

been

wounded

or

killed."*^

After

thirty-six

hours of heavy combat Fire Base Sarge was evacuated.

Fire

Bases A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, C-1, C-2, c-3 and Fuller were all
overwhelmed by Communist numerical superiorities of three or
four to one and were evacuated on the second day of the
offensive.

Some

conducted

orderly

retreats;

others

abemdoned their weapons and fled.^^^
Although the weather continued to prevent tactical air
missions, U.S. Naval fire support was effective. "History will
record that the U.S. destroyers were of immeasurable value in
holding back the North Vietnamese attack down Highway 1 to
Dong Ha and Quang Tri City."
Three hundred soldiers had manned Fire Base Nui Ba Ho on
March 30. Three days later the sixty-nine survivors made it to
Fire

Base

Mai

overwhelming,

Loc.

Having

"gallantly

numerically superior

fought

force,

against

an

then survived a

desperation march," they ate their first food in over fifty
hours.
On the fourth day of the invasion Communist tanks were
approaching the vital Dong Ha bridge. If they had been able to
race across the Cam Lo River, they might well have overwhelmed
, p. 82.
’*®Starry, Armored Combat, p. 205.
’^Vruong, Easter, pp. 24-26.
^**Turley, Easter, p. 88.
, p. 91.
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Quang Tri City and attacked Hue before an effective defense
could be organized. Marine advisor Captain John Ripley was
with the ARVN 20th Tank Battalion, which positioned itself to
defend the bridge.
assault was

He stated that the Communist artillery

easily "the most devastating and destructive

attack I had witnessed. It virtually tore up Dong Ha leaving
no area untouched, causing many civilian casualties," killing
all

the

livestock and

flattening the

town.^** Over

1,000

rounds fell in forty-five minutes.
As the last of the preparatory fire fell on Dong Ha the
Communist

tank

column

approached

the

bridge.

A

South

Vietnamese sergeant crawled out into the lead tank's path and
hit it with an M-72 light anti-tank weapon (LAW) . Uncertain of
what

force was opposing them,

spread

themselves

into

crossing the bridge.

a

the North Vietnamese tanks

defensive

posture,

South Vietnamese Marine

rather

than

Brigade 258

commanded by Major Binh was all that stood between the main
North Vietnamese assault column and a clear path to Quang Tri
City.

At this point Bihn and Ripley heard an erroneous radio

report stating that Dong Ha had fallen and the bridge had been
crossed. Each then sent simultemeous reports out over their
respective radio networks to insure there could be no mistake
about the actual situation. Their message said: "There are
Vietnamese Marines in Dong Ha. My orders are to hold the enemy
in Dong Ha. We will fight in Dong Ha. We will die in Dong Ha.
, p. 151.
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We will not leave. As long as one Marine draws breath of life,
Dong Ha will belong to us.” The 3rd Battalion defended the
south bank of the river while Captain Ripley called in naval
fire support. "There was an almost instantaneous response from
the five U.S. destroyers off the c o a s t . I n

addition, the

tanks of the 20th Regiment provide accurate fire, quickly
destroying eleven North Vietnamese t a n k s . T h i s

gave the

allied defenders enough time to wire and blow up the bridge.
Of the seven hundred Marines who took up defensive positions
on April 3rd, only two hundred remained alive when the 3rd
Battalion was rotated off the front line on April I9th. One
hundred and fifty of them were wounded. Major Binh had died.
His prophesy had proved true. The 3rd Battalion had fought and
died, and the Communists had not crossed the Ceua Lo River. The
invaders were delayed long enough for the defense of Hue to be
organized.
On the fourth day of the invasion the largest of the MR-1
fire bases. Camp Carroll surrendered, giving up 1,800 soldiers
and twenty-two artillery guns.

Turley believed that,

"The

surrender at camp Carroll created a catastrophic void in the
shrinking defensive line." At other fire bases the defenders
(in worse condition than at Camp Carroll) had broken through
the encircling attackers and made it to secure ARVN lines. The
. pp. 153-56.
'^starry. Armored Combat, p. 208.
Turley, Easter, pp. 233, 256.
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American advisors in fact did break out and were rescued by
helicopter.

Turley wrote

that

Camp commander

"Lieutenant

Colonel (Pham V«m) Dinh's treacherous act in the surrender of
his regiment enmasse had an enormous adverse psychological
impact on the remainder of the besieged South Vietnamese
units.General
that,

Truong was much kinder to Dinh,

stating

"Troops of the 56th Regiment at the camp valiantly

endured heavy artillery fires and resisted repeated assaults
by enemy infantry

. . . .

Seeing that his situation was

hopeless and wanting to save as many of his soldiers ' lives as
possible," he surrendered.

159

That night the defenders of Fire Base Mai Loc ran out of
ammunition. They destroyed their guns, and broke out of the
defensive perimeter and headed east. They "soon discovered the
trail was littered with the wounded and exhausted Marines of
the 4th and 8th VMMC Battalions. These survivors of FBs Sarge
and Nui Ba Ho and the few stragglers from FB Holcomb had
simply run out of stamina and collapsed along the trail.
Throughout the night the 7th Battalion picked up and somehow
carried

every

encountered."**

exhausted
After

making

or
four

wounded
river

Marine

they

crossings

they

successfully reached secure ARVN lines.
On April 9, 10 and 11 the North Vietnamese assaulted Fire
^**Ibid.. pp. 172-73.
159

Truong, Easter, pp. 29-30.

160

Turley, Easter, p. 199.
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Base Pedro vest of Quang Tri City. They attacked with several
thousamd infamtry and a tamk battalion. Twenty-three tanks
were captured or destroyed amd over 420 Communists killed,
while the South Vietnamese suffered only sixty-six casualties.
Colonel Turley believed, "There was great significamce to the
South Vietnamese victory at FB Pedro where the NVA tanks lay
shattered and burning. First, it presented the disillusioned
South Vietnamese forces in Quamg Tri Province with their first
real

victory

in

a

knockdown,

drag-out

battle."

More

importantly "the defense was all plamned and a successful
counterattack

executed

by

South Vietnamese

forces."

U.S.

advisor Captain A1 Nettleinhem wrote:
I think the whole credit for repulsing
the attack belongs to Colonel (Ngo Van)
Dinh. He had his finger on the situation
at all times. He knew what assets he had
available and then committed them at the
crucial moments.
He's a commander in the full sense of the
word. His subordinate commanders bad
^eat
confidence
in
him,
in
his
judgement. The man presented the best
exemple of decisiveness emd military
skill that I've ever seen."

On April 18th the South Vietnamese repelled two major
assults. "As the momentum of the NVA attack increased, enemey
artillery raked the South Vietnamese positions. However, the
line held firm as ARVN artillery struck back at the exposed

*^Turley, Easter, pp. 239-41.
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NVA infantry causing the attackers to break off" and withdraw
along the full seven miles of the 3rd Division's western
defensive line/** Communist artillery resumed heavy shelling
untill the 23rd when they launched another major assault.
"Again, the ARVN's western defenses held.
On the 27th the Communists attacked with a full division
across the entire front. The ARVN troops had been under heavy
artillery attack for an entire month without being rotated off
the front lines. When the North Vietnamese broke the defensive
line at a couple of points some of the exhausted ARVN units
fled

in

panic.

threatened
thousands

to

Communist
take

the

of defenders

units
Quang

attacking
Tri

north of

from

bridges,

the

city.

the

cutting
"The

west
off

2d ARVN

Regiment rose to the occasion," however, holding the bridges
long enough to allow the other units to retreat.'*^
USAF Major David Brookbank wrote: "Many ARVN forces held
while

others broke and

ran.

The ARVN Marines

never

lost

fighting effectiveness and had to be ordered to withdraw many
times to plug gaps in the line . . . .

because they never

stopped fighting and remained effective,

[they] enabled the

U.S. advisors, cut off at the Citadel, to evacuate."** U.S.
Marine Major Robert Sheridan observed that as thousands of
p. 254.
p. 256.
pp. 261, 262.
**Ibid., p. 285.
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suffering refugees flowed past Brigade 369's headquarters,
"The Marines gave them food, water, money.

The generosity

could not alleviate the suffering of the people as their
numbers were too great.
As thousands of ARVN soldiers crossed the My Chanh River
into Thua Thien Province and retreated towards Hue, Major
Sheridan turned to his Vietnamese counterpart Colonel Pham Van
Chung and said, "Well, sir, it looks like everyone else is
heading

south.

What

are we going

to

do?"

Colonel

Chung

replied, "No, no, we will not go south. We are a good brigade
and with
river.

your help

we

will

kill

all

the

VC

along this

As they dug in Major Sheridan reported, "The enemy

opened the most devastating artillery barrage that the brigade
had ever received. We thought the whole world was falling
apart around us. Our vehicles, bunkers, villages and guns were
being

demolished.

We

wondered

if

anyone

would

live

to

fight."’** The survivors used their M-72 LAWs, naval gun fire
and tactical air support to repel both NVA tank and infantry
assaults.

Colonel Chung was correct;

the Communists never

crossed the My Chanh River to threaten Hue. General Starry
concluded
Vietnamese]

that,

"Although

vastly

outnumbered

[the

South

had succeeded in slowing the momentum of the

massive North Vietnamese invasion. With assistance from U.S.
’**Iteid. f p. 287.
*^Ibid.. p. 298.
’**Ifeid., p. 299.
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and

Vietnamese

tactical

air

forces,

they

provided

the

resistance that delayed the enemy until enough reinforcements
could be brought up to halt the offensive."’**
After

reorganizing

the

defenses

of

MR-i,

the

South

Vietnamese began their counterattack. By September 15 they had
battled their way back to Quang Tri City. In house-to-house
fighting they suffered over 5,000 casualties, "before raising
their national colors over the Citadel's destroyed walls.
The stories of the defense of Kontum emd An Loc were
similar.

Some

units

fought

better

than

others,

but

all

suffered heavily under the incessant artillery bombardment of
the numerically superior North Vietnamese.

At the crucial

moments they held inspite of devastating casualties. Although
some

units

broke

under

extreem

duress,

the

valor

and

sacrifices of most units won the battle.’^’
Time interpreted the battle differently. "Any illusions
about the prospects of victory through Vietneuaization . . .
were shattered by the success of Hanoi's Easter Offensive this
year,

when

only American

air

strikes

prevented

a

South

Vietnamese rout. "’^ Time printed 518 Cl of anti-war coverage
and only 86 pro-war Cl.

The bulk of the pro-war coverage

described the success of the U.S. Air Force. Time's coverage.
169

starry. Armored Combat, p. 212.

’^Turley, Easter, pp. 304-305.
’^’Truong, Easter, p. 176-81.
’^ i m e . November 6, 1972, p. 18.
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moving forward from April 10, 1972, contained the following.
The

Spring

Offensive

has

delivering "A beating"

begun

and

the

to the ARVN.’”

Communists

are

"The colors of the

South Vietnamese flag are certainly appropriate-most of the
people

are

Vietnamese

yellow
air

amd

force

the

rest

"can't

are

fight

red.

amd

The

won't

South

fight."’”

Actually, Time inquired, why should the Communists negotiate
in Paris when they are aüoout to win on the battlefield? The
ARVN

troops

broke

amd

ram

at

Quang

Tri,

leaving

their

equipment behind. By day these men "looted stores in broad
daylight. By night gamgs of deserters started fires and fought
drunken skirmishes in the streets." Can the ARVN even survive.
Time

wondered,

Communist

"much

General

less

Giap's

defeat
"strategy

obviously having its effect."

the
of

North

Vietnamese?"

annihilation

[is]

Nixon's best hope, in Time *s

opinion, was that the ARVN might be able to avoid annihilation
"at least through the seven day Moscow summit" later in May.
The Communists expected to "crumble ARVN and to topple the
Thieu regime" by mid-summer. They are "smelling blood in South
Vietnam."’” Saigon was enveloped in gloom "in the wake of
the abject ARVN collapse."’”
’” lbid.. April 10, 1972, p. 32.
’” lbid.. April 17, 1972, p. 37.
’” lbid.. April 24, 1972, p. 27.
May 15, 1972, pp. 12, 24, 30.
’” lbid.. May 22, 1972, p. 15.
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At this point in early June, Time reported that "The
worst of the ground fighting may be over."’” Time offered no
explanation as

to how the ARVN had survived

its

"abject

collapse," but did conclude that the invasion had "drastically
affected

the

pacification

ARVN."’” Then,

program

[and]

badly

battered

in a paragraph completely out of character

with its previous coverage. Time printed two Cl stating that,
"the North Vietnamese offensive has been obviously blunted at
enormous cost to the Communists."’**
Time's depiction of the abject collapse of the South
Vietnamese military did not represent the view of the United
States Marine Corp's advisors to the South Vietnamese Marine
Corp (VNMC). The senior U.S. Marine Advisor, Colonel Joshua
Dorsey, stated in 1972 that the South Vietnamese Marines "have
been in heavy combat over fifteen years. There is little we
can teach them except, perhaps, how to better utilize their
supporting

arms."

Dorsey

described

the

South

Vietnamese

officers as "a band of brothers with an intense loyalty to
each other. They exhibit great pride in their corps.” Dorsey
concluded that the VNMC's battlefield performance showed that,
"They're good. . . . They've been in some hellish fights and
never buckled. "’*’
’” Time, June 5, 1972, p.28
’” lbid.. June 12, 1972, p. 26; June 19, 1972, p. 25.
July 3, 1972 p. 17.
’*’Turley, Easter, pp. 9-10.
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During April and May, virtually all of Time's coverage
described the "abject collapse of ARVN." During June, July and
August as the ARVN counterattack retook lost ground.

Time

published only five column inches of battlefield coverage.
Instead of covering the ARVN's counter-offensive. Time printed
76 Cl describing the "swelling multitude of refugees . . .
condemned to live in camps or in the putrid shanty towns"
around South Vietnam's cities.**
Time had a choice here.

It could have presented the

refugee problem as resulting from the North Vietnamese army's
attempts

to

militarily

impose

Communism

on

the

South

Vietnamese people. On September 11, 1972, Time printed a 16 Cl
story describing the suffering of civilians in the Mekong
Delta. Fifteen of the column inches described the U.S. policy
"of massive amd calculatedly destructive airpower. . . . Well
dug-in guerrillas can frequently survive an attack,
peasant in his field has little chance

...

but a

a few of the

victims at present in Dinh Tuong Hospital: A 14 year old boy
. . . half of his left arm has been blown away and the other
half is wrapped in a blood dripping bandage. . . .

Le Van Du,

12, resembles an Egyptian mummy, wrapped from head to foot in
bandages."
In the middle of the story. Time gave approximately onehalf of a column inch to the observation that, "To be sure,
the

bombing

victims

represent

only

a

part

’**Time. June 26, 1972, p. 26.
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casualties. Others are suffering from mortar wounds. Communist
fired B-40 rockets and AK-47 rifles; some do not know what hit
them." But, Time concluded, "the bombs are dropping night emd
day on the friendly Vietnamese of Dinh Tuong."’**
Time's coverage of the battle for Dinh Tuong Province
provides an interesting contrast to General Truong's account.
Truong points out that Route 4 was the only paved highway
connecting the rice growing lands of the Delta with four
million consumers in Saigon. It was absolutely vital for the
ARVN to keep the road open. The ARVN 7th and 9th Divisions
"fought many fierce battles in Dinh Tuong"

for control of

Route 4. In August they "fought a major battle

. . . and

completely cleared [the My Tho] area of the enemy

....

By

the end of August, enemy activities in Dinh Tuong Province had
been seriously impeded by our quick and aggressive reactions
on the ground and continuous pounding from the air by U.S.
tactical air and B-52S."’**
Time failed to report the significance or the success of
these battles. Its coverage was limited to the observation
that, "The bombs are dropping night and day on the friendly
Vietnamese of Dinh Tuong." In a similar vein an October 23,
1972, article quoted a war veteran as saying.
We went into villages after they droped napalm, and the human
beings were fused together like pieces of metal that had been
’**Ibid.. September 11, 1972, p. 24
’**Truong, Easter, pp. 151-52.
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soldered. Sometimes you couldn't tell if they were people or
animals. We have jets that drop rockets, and in the shells
they have penny nails. Those nails— one nail per square inch
[over an area] the size of a football field— you can't believe
what they do to a human being. I was there a year and I never
had the courage to say that it was wrong . . . .

when you come

back, you see your own wife, or your own family, then you
understand what you did . . . you can't believe you didn't
have the courage to open your mouth against that kind of
murder.
Beyond

doubt

war

creates

great

suffering.

When

Communists built base camps in and around villages,

the

it was

impossible to attack them without injuring civilians. When
American planes attacked Iraq's military instalations during
the Gulf War, civilians were killed. Time, however, did not
cry

out against

"that kind of murder"when it happened.Time

had

a choice of

whom to portray as the "good guys" and"bad

guys" in the Easter Offensive. Time could have placed all or
part

of

the

blame

on

the

North

Vietnamese

attempt

to

militarily impose communism on the South. Instead Time chose
to portray the Americans as the bad guys, and to do so in the
most graphic, emotion-laden terms.
In this regard Sir Robert Thompson has two stories of
personal experience from the Easter Offensive. When Communist
forces attacked villages near An Loc,
the

"In nearly every case

population fled to the nearestdistrict town."
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Regional Force and Popular Force platoons gathered to drive
the invaders back across the border.

"It was on one such

occasion, when the population fled from the hamlet, that the
children were placed in a pagoda for safety, but several of
them sneaüced out to watch the battle. One girl was hit by
napalm.” The photograph of Kim drew worldwide attention. But
of 350,000 inhabitants of Hau Nghia province, "only thirteen
civilians

were

killed

in

the

whole

invasion

period."**

Thompson's second story came from An Loc itself. After
the Communists had been turned back Thompson visited the town
in June.

"With an escort of four gunships we traveled in at

a height of 7,000 feet to reduce the risk of SA7 missiles and
then spiralled rapidly down into the town . . . .

When I

described my visit on the following day to President Thieu he
immediately asked for a similar flight to be laid on for him. "
For security reasons the trip was kept secret and no media
were invited. When Thieu jumped from the helicopter,

"the

Province Chief, who was there to meet the party, broke down
and wept. The troops in the surrounding bunkers, on seeing the
President, rushed forward, lifted him up amd carried him into
town. "’**
Overall, Time printed 518 Cl of anti-war coverage of the
Easter Offensive and only 9 Cl of pro-war coverage, aside from
praise for the U.S. Air Force's ability to knock out bridges.
’**Thompson, Peace, p. 108.
’“ ibid., p. 107.
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fuel supplies amd tamks. Despite the fact that the Communists
suffered a five-sixths casualty rate and took none of their
objectives.

Time interpreted the Easter Offensive to meam

that, "Any illusions aüsout the prospects of victory through
vietnamization . . . were shattered by the success of Hanoi's
Easter Offensive this year, when only Americam air strikes
prevented a South Vietnamese rout."
A reasonadale alternative interpretation would have been
that with U.S. air support the ARVN had successfully defended
South Vietnam from the Communists' best effort. The results of
the Easter Offensive provided substantial reason to believe
that South Vietnam would be aüale to permamently maintain its
independence,

without

America continued its

the

aid of U.S.

ground support,

1972level of assistance. Time's

hundred in-depth interviews,

described aüaove,

if
two

gave a good

indication of what the average American's reaction would have
been if this

interpretation had been offered.

Once again.

Time 's coverage of the 1972 Easter Offensive helped to promote
the goals of the anti-war movement and deprived its readership
of the opportunity to make an informed decision about the war.

Time 's coverage of the anti-war protest demonstrations in
the U.S. from mid-1969 followed a similar pattern. From the
beginning of October 1969, Time carried 429 Cl sympathetic to
the war protesters and 41 Cl that were critical. Even in the
41

CI

criticizing

the

protests

Time

was
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differentiate between the good protesters, the "broad-cross
section"
"young

of middle class
extremists

overwhelming

[who]

anti-war demonstrators,

and the

marred

the

by

of

the

majority

peace

kept

the

demonstrators."’*^

Beginning on October 10, 1969, Time's coverage stated
that

a variety of Congressmen,

priests,

rabbis,

business

leaders, doctors, and lawyers were supporting the Moratorium
Day anti-war protests.’** Organizers "happily confessed that"
support

for

M-Day

had

grown

so

quickly

that

they

were

scrambling to keep up. Time quoted Secretary of Defense Melvin
Laird's son saying "everybody should be against the war" as he
marched in protest. A former Green Beret and Bronze Star
winner proclaimed, "Now I feel guilty for going over there. I
feel ashamed. [The war] has screwed me up so bad and screwed
the whole county up . . . .
American

boys

on

the

pretense

bastards." Time continued,
frequent

I don't think it's worth killing
of

helping

Southern

crummy

"Mass protest has been neither

nor popular at Rice University,"

conservative

those

school

had

joined

but
in

even this
the

M-Day

demonstrations. The organizer at Rice hoped "that Moratorium
Day will force the Administration to choose whether it will
remain totally indifferent to the national will."
physics

professor

William

Chinosky

had

never

Berkeley
before

sympathized with student protest, but even he became an M-Day
’*^Time. November 21, 1969, p. 23.
’**Ibid.. October 10, 1969, p. 18.
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organizer, saying, "We simply must get the American people to
begin

thinking

rationally

eibout Viet

Nam."

A

Vanderbilt

University organizer said, "It is a bad war and we have to get
out." In Atlanta, "the thought of the war not ending is just
more than people can take"; while in Houston, "business men
have been especially active" in the anti-war protests.’** In
November Time described the March Against Death:
the protesters carried devotional candles
and 24-inch by 8-inch cardboard signs,
each bearing the name of a man killed in
action or a Vietnamese village destroyed
by the war. The candles flickered in the
wind, the funereal rolling of the drums,
the hush over most of the line of march—
but ad)ove all the endless recitation of
names of dead servicemen and gutted
villages as each marcher passed
the
White House— were impressive drama: 'Jay
Lee Richter . . . Milford Togazzini . . .
Vinh Linh, North Viet Nam
. . .
Joseph Y. Ramirez'. At the capitol, each
sign was solemnly deposited in one of the
several coffins, later conveyed back up
Pennsylvania Avenue in the Saturday
march. Mrs. Judy Droz, 23, of Columbia
Mo., was chosen to walk first in the
March Against Death. Her husband, a Navy
officer died in Viet Nam last spring.
In

April

1971

Time

reported

that

a

Massachusetts

housewife walked 450 miles from her home to Washington D.C. to
"express forcefully her opposition to the war." She said, "The
vast majority of the people" she met shared her anti-war
beliefs.

In May

1971

Time

reported

that

’**Ibid.. October 17, 1969, pp. 17-22
ion

Ibid.. November 21, 1969, p. 24.

’*’lbid.. April 12, 1971, p. 12.
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protest had drawn 200,000 people, "one of Washington's largest
ever . . . .

The Washington demonstration was the kind that

cops could have brought their children to ; at
policeman did

. . . .

On the saune day,

least one

in San Francisco,

125,000 demonstrators . . . were led by Bob Silva, a 21 year
old Viet Nam veteran, with medals dangling from his sports
shirt, who rode in a wheel chair . . . .
were happily free of violence."

192

Both demonstrations

When protesters shouted

"Pig," the police replied, "We don't like the war any better
than you do."

Time also reported on John Kerry,

graduate who won a Silver Star,

a Bronze Star,

a Yale

and three

Purple Hearts. Kerry testified before Congress that there was
"nothing in South Viet Nam that threatens the United States of
America. To attempt to justify the loss of one American life
in Viet Neun, Cambodia or Laos by linking such loss to the
preservation of

freedom is to us

hypocrisy." Time commented,

the height of

criminal

"there was no arguing with the

conviction with which he spoke."
Given Time 's coverage one might easily assume that the
anti-war protest demonstration had a much broader base of
support than 27 percent of the public. Time appears to have
been

trying

majority.

The

to
53

sell

the

percent

demonstrations
of Americans

to

who

a

reluctant

condemned the

192

Ifeiâ*./ May 3, 1971, p. 10.

19X

Ibid*., May 17, 1971, p. 15.

194

Ibid*., May 3, 1971, p. 12.
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protests believed that they damaged the war effort by leading
the enemy to believe that there was no need to negotiate
because

sooner

unilateral

or

later

public

American withdrawal/^

pressure

would

force

Time printed only

a

8 Cl

representing this majority point of view, while printing 429
Cl which portrayed the anti-war protesters in the most glowing
of

terms.

Thus

Time's

coverage

of

the

anti-war

protest

demonstrations was biased in such a way as to promote the
goals of the anti-war movement.

Time 's coverage of the 1971 presidential elections in
South Vietnam was equally problematic.

President Thieu had

guided a bill through the South Vietnamese legislature which
eventually made it impossible for Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky
to qualify to have his name placed on the election ballot.
Later, in the face of a general condemnation of Thieu's strong
arm tactics, the South Vietnamese Supreme Court ruled that
Ky's name should be placed on the ballot. Ky then declined to
run. The other candidate who had qualified. General Duong Van
Minh, also withdrew from the race, forcing Thieu to accept
'victory' in an uncontested election.
Sir Robert Thompson interpreted the 1971 election this
way: "As an exiled Northerner Ky never had a chance and his
whole campaign was designed to [pressure] Thieu into giving
Harris, Ancmish. p. 66-67. The poll question seems to
have been phrased, "Do you believe the anti-war protests give
aid and comfort to the enemy?"

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

94
him a suitable appointment . . . .

I happened to be in Saigon

for the first three months of 1971 and reached the conclusion,
in which I was not alone, that Thieu had such overwhelming
support that 'Big Minh' would be unlikely to get 20% of the
vote. This would have finished him as a political figure.
The London Economist agreed two months before the election
that, "It is most improbable that General Minh now thinks he
might win," and Ky had even less support.
Time began its election coverage by asserting, "But can
anyone beat Thieu? Probably not . . .

he has enough solid

support in the countryside to win going away."’** Again on
August 16, Time remarked, "It is widely believed that Thieu
could win without resorting to dubious p r a c t i c e s . T h i s
made sense in light of Thieu's popularity with the Catholics,
the

military

and

the

rural

peasamtry,

who

were becoming

relatively prosperous land owners for the first time in the
nation's history because of Thieu's land reform and economic
development program. The President had been able to shepherd
a revolutionary land reform bill through the legislature which
"differed very little from the original executive proposals,
despite a serious attempt by the Lower House to substitute a

Thompson, Peace, p. 13-14.
197

Economist. August 14, 1971, p. 26.
May 3, 1971, p. 30.
August 16, 1971, p. 29.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

95
much weaker version."^ Dr. Howard Penniman states that the
prevailing opinion in rural South Vietnam was represented by
a village chief whom he interviewed. Like most local officials
he believed that Thieu would have easily won even in a three
way race against both General Minh and Vice President Ky
because Thieu, "gave us the land, the fertilizer, the pigs and
chickens, and provided a school for our children. Few people
on the land know General Minh and fewer know who Ky is. The
peasants would cooperate with President Thieu.
As

the

elections

drew

closer,

however.

Time's

interpretation changed. It ran stories in August, September,
and October which reported that the elections were being
reduced "to the level of a farce, a situation which might in
turn

force

Nam.The

the

U.S.

to

hasten

its

withdrawal

from Viet

election bore "little resemblance to the 'self-

determination* that Washington politicians talk of when they
explain why the U.S. is still in Viet Nam. [It had become a]
bitter

joke,

Washington.

[and
[Thieu*s

a]

source

election

of

deep

rigging

embarrassment
was]

knocking

to
the

underpinnings from the U.S. contention that it remains in
South Viet Nam at the request of a freely and democratically

Charles Stuart Callison, LandrTo-The-Tiller In The
Mekong Delta (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, emd the
Center for South and Southeast Asia studies. University of
California, Berkeley, 1983), p. 83.
Penniman, Elections, pp. 135-36.
”^ i m e . August 23, 1971, p. 22.
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elected government."^ Time concluded that the U.S.

should

suffer no more combat deaths "if the net result of U.S. policy
is to be an electoral farce in Saigon." Time favored "Senate
Majority Leader Nike Mansfield's proposal that all U.S. troops
be legislated out of Viet Nam if the election is not cleared
up."**
Time could have built on its initial assertion by saying
that it was unfortunate that President Thieu had been unable
to resist the temptation to give himself an unfair (perhaps
insurmountable) advantage by tampering with the election laws,
but that since he was popular enough to be re-elected in a
fair election, it was not all that significant. Instead, Time
chose to interpret the elections to mean that South Vietnam
was not worthy of receiving further U.S.

assistance.

Time

published 175 Cl of anti-war election coverage, and only the
three

early

column

inches

indicated that

there

might

be

another point of view. Time had once more pursued the anti-war
perspective.

August 23, 1971, p. 22; August 30, 1971, p. 23
**IbisL.f September 6, 1971, pp. 23-25.
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CHAPTER 3
TIME'S OMISSIONS

Chapter three addresses the story that Time did not tell.
Sir Robert Thompson asserted that what had "always impressed
me with regard to the attitudes of American society, and that
of the West generally . . . has been its abysmal ignorance of
the nature and course of the war."*** During the late 1960s
and the early 1970s administration spokespersons such as the
director of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development
Services (CORDS) William Colby and his second in command John
Paul

Vann

provided

reporters

with

the

details

of

this

alternative story, but it did not see print in Time magazine.
During 1967 President Johnson consolidated all of the
various American agencies which were giving economic aid to
South Vietnam under the umbrella bureaucracy CORDS. In 1970
the Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee on Vietnam invited
the highest ranking CORDS officials, along with a variety of
military

experts,

to

make their best

case

Congressional funding of the war.
97
^®*Thompson, Peace. p. xiii.
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In these hearings the pro-war argument fell into three
main

categories:

security

from

the big unit,

Viet

development/nation

Cong

building.

main

force war;

guerrillas ;

and

Administration

local

economic

spokespersons

argued that the Communist main force units had been driven
away from the bulk of the South Vietnamese people into border
semctuaries in Cambodia and Laos. Also, local security patrols
were effectively preventing Viet Cong guerrillas from having
access to 75 percent of South Vietnam's hamlets,

even at

night. The third prong of the pro-war argument was that the
peasants living in the government secured hamlets had used
American developmental aid to greatly increase the number of
fields which were planted with two crops per year, the rice
yield per crop, and the farmers' income. Thus, war supporters
argued, the bulk of the population lived in relatively good
security and increasing prosperity.
John Paul Vann's

testimony carried the

authority of

experience. He had gone to Vietnam in the early 1960s as a
U.S.

military

advisor

to the ARVN.

Once

in

rural

South

Vietnam, Vann discovered that a majority of the peasantry had
joined the Viet Cong insurgency. They had not done so because
they were Communists, or even sympathized with communism. They
had done so because of their overriding desire for better
government.
As

soon as he understood the situation,

Vann became

sharply critical of the American war effort. He explained to

1
!
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reporters that it did not matter how much military pressure
the U.S. applied, if half of the peasantry still supported the
Viet Cong, and the other half remained passive, the United
States

was

going

to

lose

the

war.

Vann

retired

after

completing his twenty year military service in order to return
to the United States and publicize his view that the South
Vietnamese people did not support their government and that
unless Saigon could be made to provide better government and
a better life for its people, the war would inevitably be
lost.**

When President Johnson formed the CORDS team in

1967, Vann joined it to help in the nation building effort he
believed would win the war. As outlined above, Vann testified
that the 1968 Tet Offensive had been the turning point in the
war because of the crippling losses suffered by the South
Vietneumese Viet Cong and the new local security forces which
had replaced the Viet Cong across the countryside. At the
hearings, Vann testified that local security was sufficient to
enable "most of the civilian population of the delta" to live
in peace. Hamlets and government installations could expect on
average

to be

attacked only

once

every eighteen months.

"Actually, of course, there are many places that have never
been

attacked, "

and

a

few

that

the

Viet

Cong

attacked

regularly.**^
Marine

officer

F.J.

West

had

participated

**Hearinas. p. 112. Also Sheehan, Lie, pp. 5-6.
p. 90.
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development of local security as a member of a Combined Action
Platoon (CAP). CAPS were made up of half Popular Forces and
half U.S. Marines. In his book. The Village. West describes
the process by which the local security forces with whom he
worked gained

control

of

a contested village.** When he

initially joined the CAP,

its night patrols faced frequent

fire fights. One night a company of Viet Cong overrem the
CAP'S fortified base camp. The defenders casualties were high,
but eventually the cost of guerrillas killed by night patrol
ambushes became too great for the Communists.

Infiltration

attempts became rare events. West described the sense of trust
that developed between the villagers and the CAP. Once, after
driving the Viet Cong from the town in a relatively large
scale fire fight, the defenders dramk free at the local bars
for a week.
Marine Captain Michael Peterson supported West's view of
local security in his book. Combined Action Platoons. Peterson
asserted that the morale and the sense of achievement were
very high in the local security forces. CAP Marines were twice
as likely as regular Marines to request a second tour of duty
in Vietnam.**
Sergeant

Richard

Wallace,

a

squad

leader

in

a

CAP

platoon, testified at the hearings that, "by working with the
**Francis J. West, The Village (New York: Harper and Row,
1972).
^**Michael Peterson, Combined Action Platoons (New York:
Praeger, 1989), p. 26.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

101
PF every day and sharing their damger and hardships,
marines and PF developed close ties . . . .
marines

the

In fact most

come to feel as if they are part of the village

community. " Wallace stated that before his CAP was estcüslished
in 1967,

"the VC guerrillas had a free hand in the area,"

gathering

food,

supplies

and

recruits.

In

1970,

however,

guerrillas no longer received "moral or material support from
the people. Nearly all the hard core VC supporters have been
driven

out

legitimate

or

captured and

government"

people
without

are

supporting their

fearof

Communist

retaliation.
After mid-1969, when Time interviewed U.S. soldiers, it
invariably did so as a forum to criticize the war. Time gave
no space to soldiers like West, Peterson and Wallace who had
a proud sense of achievement in their work in Vietnam.
Sir Robert Thompson

witnessed alocal security

battle in 1973. "I visited a hamlet

forces

on the north bank of the

Thu Thua canal in Long An province, just after the cease fire
in 1973." This canal was the first physical obstacle in that
area to the North Vietnamese invading forces. The hamlet was
defended by a PF platoon and the local Peoples Self Defense
Force (PSFD-civilians whom the Saigon government had supplied
with rifles). In the first few days following the cease fire,
small Communist units attacked hundreds of these hamlets near
the border, hoping to expand the area under their control. The
^'^Hearinos. p. 287.
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local forces engaged their assailants, and although casualties
were suffered and houses were burnt down,

the attack was

driven off. "The villagers were not elated by their victory .
. . [but] you could see a quiet determination that if it
happened again, and it would, they would do it again. Their
families were there, their lamd was there. . . . Some would
die, others would take their place. They would keep the enemy
out.
General Tram Dinh Tho wrote that while the urban PSFD
tended to be trigger happy, in mamy villages they performed
well.

"In

insecure

hamlets

and

in

certain

areas

under

religious influence [Catholics, Cio Dai, amd Hoa Hao] the PSDF
. . . were rather well disciplined.

In both cases,

they

appeared to be genuinely motivated by the need to protect
their communities."^’^
In

1967 the U.S.

Army developed a rating system to

measure local security, the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES).
One of the key

differences separating 'A* and 'B' hamlets

from ' C hamlets on the HES questionnaire was that the hamlet
chief had to be present day

and night in the more secure

hamlets, but only during the day in ' C h a m l e t s . H E S asked
this because it was widely recognized that the Viet Cong made

^’’Thompson, Peace, p. 16.
^’^ho. Pacification, p. 158.
^’^Richard Hunt, Richard Schultz,
Lessons From An
Unconventional War (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), p. 60.
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a priority of assassinating

local representatives of the

Saigon government. The strategy was designed to discourage
people from participating in local government and to show that
Saigon was not even strong enough to protect its principal
local officials. In hamlets where the Viet Cong had access at
night, even occasionally,

the hamlet chief and the school

teacher slept in the fortified compound of the local security
forces.

By

1970

HES

rated 75 percent of South Vietnam's

hamlets as either "A" or "B".^’*
In Vietnam,

a village of several thousand people was

normally comprised of several hamlets of a few hundred people
each. The largest hamlet, with the local businesses, generally
sat astride the main tremsportation route, either a road or a
canal. Smaller hamlets formed rings radiating out from the
center. Normally the central hamlet had the highest security
rating, while the outermost ring was least secure. Likewise,
villages closest to the Communist border sanctuaries were
least secure.
sweeps,

it

When allied troops made search and destroy

was

the

outer-lying

(contested)

villages

and

hamlets that got caught in the line of fire. By 1970 many
residents of these contested areas had moved to the more
secure central villages and hamlets. When interviewers asked
why they had moved, they most often responded that they wanted
to escape from the bombing and the fire fights. The second
Komer, "The Impact of Pacification on Insurgency in
South Vietnam" Journal of International Affairs. (25:1) 1971,
p. 63.
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most

cited

reason

for

moving

was

the

better

economic

opportunity in the government secured a r ea s .C o n s e q u e n t l y ,
administration spokespersons argued,

if 75 percent of the

hamlets were secure, then somewhat more than 75 percent of the
rural population lived in day to day security.
In the 1970 hearings, pro-war spokespersons argued that
urban South Vietnam was more secure than the countryside.
Donald

MacDonald,

International

the

Director

of

(AID)

mission

Development

the
in

U.S.
South

Aid

for

Vietnam

testified that of the 10,000 AID employees working in urban
areas none had been killed or wounded during 1969 or 1970. He
also stated that security had improved greatly since the Tet
Offensive. MacDonald stated that his wife was safer walking in
Saigon than she would have been in Washington D.C. or New York
City.^* Sir Robert Thompson agreed: "It was remarkable that
during the whole of this period there was hardly a terrorist
incident

in Saigon and I can say with complete personal

conviction that Saigon was a safer place in which to live and
walk

around

both

by

day

and

night

than

most

American

cities."*^ South Vietnam had about 6,800,000 urban residents
and about 10,800,000 rural inhaüaitants.^’® If virtually all

^’^Robert Sansom, The Economics of Insurgency (Cambridge,
M.I.T. Press, 1970), p. 240.
^’^Hearinas. p. 602.
^’^Thompson, Peace, pp. 64-65.
^’"Hearings, p. 78.
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of Saigon's 4,000,000 people, and most of the rest of the
urban South Vietnamese were safe from contact with Viet Cong
cadre, and 8,600,000 of the rural people resided in secured
hamlets,

then

the

vast

majority

of

the

population

was

reasonaibly well protected from Communist tax collectors and
assassins.

Pro-war

adherents

second

area

of

emphasis

was

the

increasing prosperity of the peasamtry. The U.S. spent aUbout
$12 billion on economic development programs in Vietnam.
Dr. Douglas Pike said in 1969, "in spite of the war and in
some

ways

because

of

it,

a

surprising

amount

of

nation

building activity has gotten under way. Economists in Vietnam
believe that within a year or two after the end of hostilities
Vietnam will be at the point of economic take-off."^® While
doing field research in 1967 economist Dr. Robert Sansom found
that the nation building effort included an ambitious canal
digging program in the early

1960s.The

canals brought

irrigation water to many new fields. Farmers discovered that
a small,

relatively inexpensive American pump could raise

water from the canals to the surrounding fields. The hand
pumps which had been the peasants' only tool required too much

210

Pike, Vietnam, p. 127.

“ ®Pike, Ear, p. 41.
^ ’sansom. Economics. pp.151-212. The next two paragraphs
come from these pages.
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time and energy. The new mechanical pumps greatly increased
productivity and profit.
Another new tool, the Honda rototiller, was also much
faster and cheaper to use than plowing with a water buffalo.
Using

the

newly

available

irrigation

waters,

pumps,

and

rototillers many farmers were able to plant a second rice crop
each year during the dry season.

American fertilizer and

insecticide also helped to increase the yield per acre. All of
these

things,

canals,

pumps,

tillers,

fertilizer,

and

insecticide came to the Vietnamese farmer at below market
rates. America's $12 billion nation building effort subsidized
these imports.
In the late 1960s, scientists developed a hybrid strain
of high yield rice. This "miracle rice" had a shorter growing
season, which made double cropping (planting two crops per
year in each field) easier and more attractive. Use of miracle
rice seed was expanding rapidly in the early 1970s.
The

government

also

sponsored

the

Self-Help

Hamlet

Development Program. The GVN provided materials and technical
assistance if the local people asked for it. But because "The
programs would lead to success [only] when they reflected the
true aspirations of the population

. . . .

projects were

initiated and managed by the people from start to finish."*^
^ ^ e n r y C. Bush, Gordon H. Hessegee, and Roger V. Russel,
The Impact of the Land-to-the-Tiller Program in the Mekong
Delta (Vietnam: Control Data Corporation, 1972), p. 19.
Tho, Pacification, p. 110.
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Self-help projects included installing irrigation systems,
constructing bridges, dams and sewage systems, digging wells
and fish breeding ponds, building enclosures for pigs, cattle
and chickens, and construction of market places and brick
factories.
Another government effort, the Animal Husbandry Program,
taught farmers how to select breeding stock, the advamtages of
various mixed feeds, and how to treat livestock diseases. The
GVN provided, free of charge, either forty breeding pigs per
hamlet or ten breeding chickens per family.^* Similarly the
Fisheries

Program

surveyed

lakes

to

determine

fish

suitadsility, dug breeding ponds, taught fish culture, built
refrigeration

rooms,

and

provided

breeding

stock.

The

government also made loans for the cost of motor boats amd
fishing gear.
Pacification programs under the Diem government had been
impossed from aüaove, and had alienated many rural Vietnamese.
Thus General Tho believed that local planning was crucial to
the acceptance of the Self-Help programs in the later stages
of the war. "Experience showed that when their own interests
were at staüce, and when they had a voice in the management of
their own affairs, the people volunteered and willingfully
cooperated.
In 1970 the Thieu Administration added the last piece to
pp. 122-23.
, pp. 125-26.
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the rural prosperity puzzle by instituting a sweeping land
reform program and establishing the Rural Development Bank,
providing the new land owners with credit to buy seed and
equipment.^

The

Land-To-The-Tiller

(LTTT)

redistribution

eliminated all plantation sized farms and absentee ownership.
Most rural peasants became farm owners and directly benefitted
from the new improvements in productivity amd profit.
During 1971 and 1972, economist Dr. C. Stuart Callison
and Dr. Henry Bush did field research in rural South Vietnam.
Both confirmed the new rural prosperity. After thirteen months
of study Callison concluded that "There is no question that
the LTTT Program effected a major redistribution of wealth and
income from the landlord to the tenants."

Hew land owners

immediately began investing more money in mechanized farm
equipment, fertilizer, insecticide and high yield rice seed
than they had as tenants. The effect was that between 1970 and
1974 rice production increased by 41 percent in the Delta.^
The new double cropping with miracle rice was an extremely
leibor intensive form of agriculture, leading most new owners
p. 143.
^Villiam Duiker, Vietnam Since the Fall of Saiaon
(Athens, Ohio: Ohio University, Center for International
Studies, 1980), p. 18; See also Lewy, America. p. 189; General
Tho, Pacification, pp. 29, 142-143; and Charles Stuart
Callison, Land-to-the-Tiller in the Mekong Delta (New York:
Center for South and Southeast Asia Studies, University of
California, Berkeley, 1983), p. 82.
^Callison, Land, p. 332.
“ ’ifeiâ., p. 329.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

109
to hire non-family labor to help them farm their land. The
development of South Vietnamese agriculture was creating a
significant number of new jobs.
In addition to the new farm employment, rural families
were spending part "of their higher incomes on such things as
housing

materials,

furniture,

local

construction

education

and

laübor,
other

basic

household

services,"

thereby

creating more jobs in the local economy.™ Beyond this, land
recipients were newly interested in supporting local projects
to

build

or

improve

schools,

roads,

bridges,

canals,

irrigation facilities, and health clinics.*"
The most significant effect of land reform, however, was
expected to be political. After the 1968 Tet Offensive, the
Saigon government's influence in the countryside had been
rapidly increasing. Even in areas in which they still could
not live, landlords were increasingly aüale to visit during the
day

to

collect

rents.

Thus,

prior

to

land

reform,

the

peasantry had a major incentive to hope that the Viet Cong
would not be entirely defeated, allowing the landlords to
regain the oppressive power they had excercised before the
insurgency.™
But

when

the

Saigon

government

began

issuing

ownership titles it had "no small psychological
p. 333.
” ^Ibid.. p. 334.
232

'ifeid. pp. 35-41, 337.
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former tenants."™ If the GVN won a complete victory,

the

peasantry no longer had to fear the return of the landlords.
Following the LTTT program the people had less incentive to
support the Viet Cong, while two strong incentives to support
the war remained: first, they had a genuine fear of Viet Cong
terror; and second, the communists imposed high tax rates on
incomes above the subsistence level, in those areas to which
they had access.™
Callison

concluded

that

while

his

research

was

not

designed to empirically measure new political support for the
Saigon

government,

"it

was

clear

that

support

for

the

insurgents in the Delta was waning in the early 1970s . . . .
[and]

it would appear the land reform had a stabilizing

effect."™
Dr.

Bush's

research was

aimed

at

both

economic

and

political effects. He published a paper in 1972 in which he
listed the consumer goods newly in evidence in the villages he
studied. These included furniture,

radios, motor scooters,

concrete

all-weather

foundations

for

homes,

roofs,

and

occasionally even televisions and trucks.™
Bush argued that in peasant cultures land ownership is
normally a highly valued mark of social prestige, and that
™ Ibid.. p. 337.
f pp.54, 191, 285. Also, see pages 126-32 below.
™Ibid., pp. 337, 339.
™Bush, Impact, pp. 19-21, 25.
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this

was

true

of

the

South Vietnamese

peasantry.

Also,

government agents had thoroughly indoctrinated the peasants
concerning the Communists' plans for farm collectivisation.
Bush asserted that the peaseuitry of a third-world nation can
normally be expected to support that government which has
given them land (as well as the supplies and tools to farm it)
against a government dedicated to teücing their land away. He
observed that in the villages he studied the new land owners
strongly supported the Thieu government and its war against
the Communists.™

The administration spokespersons ' third argument was that
the big unit, main force war was being won. Communist main
force armies had been driven into the mountainous jungles, the
Delta swamps,

across the borders to sanctuaries in Cambodia

and Laos and back

into North Vietnam.™ The war was being

fought primarily in eleven provinces along the borders, and in
the jungles and swemps.
forty-four
security.

239

provinces
Colby

had

Thirty-three of South Vietnam's
come

described

to

having

experience
taken

an

day-to-day
unescorted

motorcycle tour with Vann, across the Delta. They slept in
former Viet Cong strong-holds, which had been cleared by ARVN

™ I b i d .. p. 57-58, 65-66.
™Hearings, p. 113. Also, Truong, Easter. p. 4-5; Starry,
Armored Combat, pp. 155-56, 180; and Tho, Pacification, p. 26.
239

Komer, "Impact," p. 68.
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units and secured by Popular Force patrols.™
When Lt. Colonel Turley inspected Military Region One,
just south of the DMZ, prior to the Easter Offensive he found
"There was a growing feeling of tranquility among the people
as nearly seven years of heavy fighting appeared to have
diminished into occasional harassing incidents. Highways long
closed were open to traffic, which stimulated the rebirth of
a growing economy."^*’ The markets in Quang Tri City,

Dong

Ha, Hue and Cam Lo "humming with the incessant chatter of
bargaining Vietnamese, were full of food and wares."
How well did Time represent these views of the war's
supporters?

Time

did

not

cover

the

1970

Senate

Foreign

Relations Sub-Committee's hearings on Vietnam. This is quite
surprising if one subscribes to the view that news stories
were selected on the basis of institutional constraints. By
Herbert

Cans'

newsworthy.

definition

the

hearings

were

exceptionally

Cans states that the holders of high office

become newsworthy by virtue of their position.
experts are newsworthy.

People who

have

been

Recognized
interviewed

before are newsworthy.
At the 1970 Hearings,
Relations

Committee

William

Chairman of the Senate Foreign
Fulbright

^*®Williaum Colby, Honorable Men
Schuster, 1978), p. 284.

presided.

(Mew York:

™Turley, Easter, p. 19.
242

Cans, News, pp. 8-12.
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Time

had

Simon and

113
quoted Fulbright on
Senate

debate.™

several occasions criticizing the war in
The

Hearings

were

a

major

event

on

Fulbright *s calendar, taking several weeks and filling over
700 pages of transcript. We have seen that Time interviewed
•John Paul Vann, and quoted him, on more than one occasion.
Likewise, Director of CORDS William Colby had been interviewed
and

quoted.™

newsworthy

Despite

personalities

the
and

presence
a

of

parade

all

of

of

other

these
expert

witnesses. Time did not cover the hearings. It published none
of the Administration's most knowledgeable spokespersons' best
arguments for continued funding of the war.
In general. Time gave the case for an expanding area of
security and prosperity very little attention. In his book.
Honorable Men. Colby described his frustration with the media:
"Almost every week I invited one of the resident American
newsmen to accompany me on one of my overnight trips in the
field . . . .

they rode up canals that had been under enemy

control a few months before;

they drove with the morning

market traffic over roads no longer blocked by mines. But only
a few wrote an account of what our program was doing and the
changes it was bringing to the people in the countryside."™
The reporters Colby took into the countryside had the

™ T i m e . October 10, 1969, p. 17; April 13, 1970, p. 18;
June 1, 1970, p. 9.
™ I b i d . . March 28, 1969, p. 27.
™Colby, Men, pp. 278-79.

;
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

114
opportunity to verify the Administration's claims. Did the
hamlet chief and school teacher really sleep in their own
homes? Were the farmers using new water pumps and rototillers?
Did their houses really have new concrete foundations? Were
the people sitting on their new couches listening to their new
radios? Were they driving around on their new motor scooters?
One would
noticed

imagine that even a casual visitor would have

these

sorts

of

things

in

a

Vietneunese

village.

Economists Dr. Robert Sansom, Dr. C. Stewart Callison, and Dr.
Charles Bush have all published their research conclusions
stating that these things were happening.
When journalist Robert Shaplen toured the Delta in 1970,
he found that.
There is no doubt that improvements have taken
place. Many roads that had been closed to traffic
for years are open again . . . . There is no doubt
that many people have moved out of Communist areas
in the Delta in the last year . . . . As far as
economic improvements in the Delta, today one can
see there thousands more Hondas, sewing machines,
television and radio sets, and the like, than one
could a year or so ago, and the current rice crop,
amounting to more than f ^ e million tons, is the
highest in several years.

Dr.

Pike stated in 1969 that,

"Economists in Vietnam

believe that within a year or two after the end of hostilities
Vietnam will be at the point of economic take-off." Historian
William Duiker did research in Vietnam after the Communist

™Robert Shaplen, "Letter From Saigon", The New Yorker.
January 31, 1970, quoted in Hearings. p. 149.
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victory. Re found, "In 1975 the urban economy in the South was
relatively

advanced."

The

work

force

was

technologically

trained, and marketing systems were in place. "Many towns and
cities

possessed

a

relatively

advanced

commercial

and

manufacturing sector. Moreover, the technological level of the
population was high, and there was a large and dynamic petty
bourgeoisie.

Transportation and communications were

sophisticated.
significant

There

progress

in

can

be

no

economic

legitimate
development

quite

doubt
and

that

nation

building had grown out of America's $12 billion in economic
aid. How could the investigative reporters whom William Colby
was dragging around South Vietnam have missed these signs of
progress? And yet Time published no stories describing CORDS
work in positive terms.
South Vietnam's security and prosperity in 1972 provided
a obvious contrast to the situation which nad existed in 1965.
When Dr. Penniman visited Saigon in 1971 "friends urged me to
check with the U.S. embassy" to see which parts of the city
were safe.

Embassy employees told him that he could walk

amywhere in the city and that "Saigon is safer than either
Washington or New York." Penniman was pleasantly surprised
that "It was a situation in striking contrast with that of
four years earlier [during his last visit] when the city was
by no means quiet and safe everywhere and no one would have

™Duiker, Vietnam, p. 23.
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advised a visitor that it w a s . " ™
Likewise,

the

Commander

of U.S.

forces

in

Vietnam,

General William Westmoreland described a variety of terrorist
attacks in Saigon after his arrival in 1964, and continuing
into

1965.

Many

incidents

were

aimed

specifically

at

Americans. Aside from the Viet Cong attacks "seething local
political

turmoil

in

Saigon

also

posed

a

threat.

Demonstrations, sometimes violent, by students and religious
radicals,
day."

249

Buddhists and Catholics,

In

the

summer

of

1964

were the order of the

"street

fighting

Buddhists and Catholics broke out in Saigon.

between

[Driving] the

roads without heavy armed guard became increasingly perilous;
American dependents were forbidden to travel by any meems
other than a i r . " ™ Richard Hunt agreeded that in late 1965
"many

district

and

provincial

capitols

were

inaccessible

except to an armed convoy with air cover.
In

contrast

to

the

situation

in

1965,

by

1970

Congressional staff members Richard Moose and James Lowenstein
were able to travel unescorted throughout the Mekong Delta.
They rode bicycles.

Obviously a dramatic change had taken

™Penniman, Elections. pp. 22.
249

Westmoreland, Report, pp. 44-47.

™ I b i d .. p. 72, 65.
^ ’Richard Hunt, Pacification (Boulder, Colorado: Westview
Press, 1995), p. 36.
“ Hfoods, Fulbright. p. 551.
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place. The Administration's claims of progress, supported by
such a vide sampling of evidence, should have been evaluated
and reported. The claims were easy to verify or deny. Given
lims's

stated editorial philosophy and the tone of their

normal coverage, one would assume that the magazine would have
relished the opportunity to demonstrate the inaccuracy of
published U.S.
prosperity.

Yet

government claims of rural development and
Time published no

analyses

of

the rural

economy at all.
The only in-depth story Time published eü3out pacification
reported on a "D" rated village. Only 5 percent of all South
Vietnamese villages in which pacification had been tried at
all had a security rating this low. The article left readers
with the impression that while some progress was being made,
it could all be swept away at any t i me . ^ Although this was
true of "D" rated villages. Major F.J. West did not think that
was true of the village he had helped to secure. John Paul
Vann and Sir Robert Thompson certainly did not think that
pacification gains in the "A" and "B" villages could be undone
by

the

Communists,

if

South

Vietnam

were

given

enough

resources to defend itself from the North Vietnamese main
force invasion. At the 1970 hearings Vann testified that the
Communists were capable of massing their troops and capturing
hamlets on a small scale in 1970, but that it cost them eüaout
100

men

for

each

hamlet

they

overran.

Since

” ^Time. October 26, 1970, pp. 47-48.
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thousands

of

defended

hamlets,

the

Viet

Cong

and

North

Vietnamese together did not have nearly enough manpower to
roll

back

the

progress

which

had

been

made

in

local

security.^*
The

Easter

Offensive

offered

strong

confirmation of

Vann's analysis. Just prior to the invasion over 82 percent of
the nation's hamlets were rated either 'A' or 'B'. Under the
extreme pressure of the all out assaults against An Loc,
Kontum, and Hue almost half of the ARVN units in the Mekong
Delta were transferred from local security assignments to the
front l i n e s . I n

spite of these troop transfers,

and the

massive nature of the invading forces, the Viet Cong were only
able to bring the number of 'A' and 'B' hamlets, nation-wide,
down to 69.9 percent, at the lowest point in October.^*
The Communists' inability to disrupt pacification in the
heavily populated Delta was due in large measure to the battle
of Kompong Trach,

a small Cambodiaui town just across the

border. ARVN forces met the NVA's 1st Division and forced it
"to exhaust its combat potential on Cambodian soil . . . .
[thus the Communist's]

mission to destroy the pacification

progress in IV Corps [the Delta] was unsuccessful; they caused

^ Hearings, p. 116.
*®Truong, Easter, p. 155.
^^ichard Hunt, Pacification (Boulder, Colorado: Westview
Press, 1995), p. 256.
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only

minor

disruption.

By

December

1972,

counter-offensive had restored the number of

the

ARVN

'A* and

*B'

heumlets throughout South Vietnam to 80 percent.^
Time failed to report another crucially important aspect
of the war; North Vietnam's weakness in 1972. The new weakness
of

Hanoi's

position

resulted

from

two

techniques

used

initially by the United States in 1972. The first was the use
of laser guided bombs (smart bombs). Certain railroad bridges
had been frequently

targeted but never hit

(because U.S.

pilots were trying to avoid being shot down by one of the most
sophisticated anti-aircraft defense systems in the world)
In the 1972 bombings, however, these bridges were destroyed.
Sir Robert Thompson contends that

"between 800 and 1,000

sorties were flown against the Than Hoa bridge south of Hanoi
and it was never hit. But now [in 1972] in the first sortie of
four

Phantoms,

bomb."

Pike

it was
agreed

hit
that

at
the

once

by

North

a

had

2,000

lb

been much

smart
more

severely deunaged in the 1972 bombings than previously. Laser
guided bombs had demonstrated "a destructiveness the PAVN
(North

Vietnamese)

High

Command

did

not

possible.
Easter pp. 144-45.
^unt.

Pacification, p. 256.

gem

Pike, Vietnam, pp. 119-20.
Thompson, Peace, p. 113.
“ ’pike, Vietnam, p. 97.
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Second,

President Nixon mined the Haiphong Harbor in

North Vietnam. This magnified the North's extremely vulnerable
logistical position. "Because North Vietnam had no full-scale
armament factories (as opposed to assembly plants), all of its
weapons and ammunition," as well as all of its fuel, had to be
imported.During
"The

consumption

the Easter offensive,
of

POL

(fuel)

and

Thompson stated,

ammunition

alone was

running at several thousand tons per day.
Aside from these military needs. Pike stated that, "from
12 to 15 percent of the rice eaten in the North" was imported,
along with substantial guemtities of other f o o d s . T h o m p s o n
adds

that

cereals"

"the North

had

to

import

in 1973.“ ^ Beyond this,

one

million tons of

the USSR was

"supplying

Vietnam with fertilizer, pyrites, various metals, agricultural
machinery, industrial equipment, motor vehicles, oil products,
foodstuffs and clothing and fabrics, totaling 220,000 tons" in
the period from July to September 1971. "Cargo delivered to
North Vietnam from Soviet ports

in the

Far East totaled

350,000 tons" in the same p e r i o d . N o r t h Vietnam had been
importing between two and three million tons of supplies each
year.

In the wake of the December 1972 bombings they were
9*)

Pike, War, p. 35.

“ ^Thompson, Peace, p. 114.
“ *Pike, Wa£, p. 35.
“ ^Thompson, Peace, p. 138.
“ *Pike, Vietnam, pp. 115-16.
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unable to tremsport euiything like this quantity of material
into

the

country

(prior to

repair

of

the transportation

network).
When
bombing.

the

Soviets

reacted

mildly

to

North Vietnam felt aJaandoned.

was very serious.

the mining

and

Hanoi's position

Thompson stated that during the Easter

Offensive, "All regular NVA divisions, except the 316 Division
in Laos, had been committed and the reinforcements being sent
forward . . . contained many teenagers with little more than
three weeks t r a i n i n g . A d m i r a l Thomas Moorer, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff confirmed this.

General Truong

stated that elements of the ARVN 7th Division defeated the NVA
207th Regiment in the Delta during November 1972, taking 73
captives. "Most of these prisoners were teen-agers, ill-fed
and ill-equipped,

some without weapons or éunmunition. They

disclosed that they had been abandoned by their leaders who
fled when the fighting became tough.
the period following their enormous

Truong stated that
losses

in the Easter

Offensive was the first time in which he had encountered such
weak Communist forces.
In addition to describing the weakness of NVA troops in

“ ’^Pike, Vietnam, pp. 92-93, 96.
Thompson, Peace, p. 121.
269

Aviation Week and Space Technology. March 5, 1973, p.

13.
^^Truong, Easter, pp. 153-54.
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the South, Thompson further asserted that the 1972 air war
over North Vietnam had "kept the damage . . . running at a
higher rate than Hamoi's capacity to repair it.

In early

1973 the food shortages would have begun to take hold. Because
of the Communist losses suffered in the Easter Offensive, and
the North's inability to replace its lost men and materials,
"South Vietnam was in a much stronger political and military
shape by September, 1972, than it had been before the invasion
started six months earlier.
Aviation Week and Space Technology supported Thompson's
analysis.

Its October 30, 1972, issue described the Easter

Offensive as a severe military reversal for the Communists. It
stated:

"Hanoi

is

negotiating

from

the

weakest

military

position it has held in eight years." The North Vietnamese
army had "literally lost its major military capability in its
disastrous southern offensive." Host of its tanks, artillery
and aircraft had been destroyed. Hanoi had "watched its once
never-ending source of foreign supplies trickle to a halt and
its once massive supply stockpiles dwindle to anthills" under
the newly accurate smart bombs. Aviation Week concluded that
the Communists had suffered "a major military defeat" and
faced "an economic disaster in the north unless they find some
way to relieve the unbearable pressure" of their imported
supplies being cut off.

"That is why they are willing to

^^’Thompson, Peace, p. 121.
^” lbid.. p. 122.
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negotiate

now.

We

hope

the

American

people

.

.

. will

understand the valid and necessary role of applied military
power in achieving real peace instead of a surrender labeled
'peace*.
This represents a reasoned and informed expert opinion.
It is also a view held by our foremost expert on Vietnamese
Communism,

Dr. Douglas Pike. The Broadcast Code of Ethics

requires that all licensed television stations and networks
present this sort of opinion in a reasoned and convincing way,
as well as reasoned opposing views, and allow the viewership
to form their own conclusions. American Ambassador Martin
Herz's quantitative analysis of the network news broadcasts in
late

1972

concludes

that

this

view

of

North

Vietnamese

weakness was not convincingly reported as required by law.^^^
Lt. Col. G.H. Turley's book. The Easter Offensive, agrees
that "most Americans have little appreciation for the true
ferocity of the Easter Invasion, or for the indication it gave
us of the South Vietnamese willingness to fight and die for
their independence."^^ Thus, the anti-war movement was able
to convince "Congress to cut off the funds which would have

^^Aviation Week and Space Technoloov. October 30, 1972,
p. 7.
^^^Ambassador Martin Herz, The
Prestige Press and the
Christmas Bombing (Washington D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy
Center, 1980), pp. 64-65.
Jaunes H. Webb, quoted in the preface to Turley, Easter,
p. viii.
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made it possible for them to defend themselves.
Tram Dinh Tho agreed:

General

"South Vietnam was lost not because

pacification had failed but because" it was abandoned by the
United States in 1 9 7 3 . ^
Aviation

Week

agreed with

Ambassador

Herz

that

the

national television networks and nationally distributed news
weeklies had not published the pro-war view. In a February
1973 editorial Aviation Week argued that although the American
public had not been informed of it, "The Hamoi government is
aware of the crippling military/industrial damage it suffered"
in the December 1972 air assault. "About 1,000 sorties were
flown, each dumping 24 tons of iron bombs with radar guided
precision that was astonishing by any standards other than
laser-guidance.
In testimony before Congress Admiral Moorer estimated
(from reconnaissance photos) that 160,000 tons of supplies per
month were being imported into North Vietnam prior to the
December bombing, and that only 30,000 tons per month could
get through thereafter (until repairs to the transportation
infrastructure were implemented). Moorer described the damage
done to bridges, rail yards, electrical generators and power
grids, fuel storage areas, canal barges, harbor facilities,
radio

transmitters,

and

airfields.

Between

, p. vii.
277.

Tho, Pacification, p. 169.

278

'Aviation Week. February, 12, 1973, p. 7

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the

Easter

125
Offensive and the December bombing. Communist losses in 1972
had been devastating. Admiral Moorer concluded "I do not think
that they, as of this moment, have the capacity for what I
would call main force unit action.
Dr. Pike emphasized that "the growing stability of the
6VN

[amd the]

success of Vietnamization, " along with the

effects of the Easter Offensive, the harbor mining, and the
smart bombs put Hamoi in a position of weakness.
The DVR s i ^ e d the [Paris] agreements because at
the time it could not do otherwise. It signed
because of military punishment, having been badly
mauled in the 1972 Easter Campaign . . . .
It
signed because of Chinese defection and Soviet
pressure . . . . Whatever else they were, the Paris
agreements were no victory for Hanoi, and were
certainly not regarded there as such.
President Mixon stated that "Kissinger had brought back
terms that would achieve our and Thieu's objective while
allowing the North Vietnamese to save face.

To Nixon, the

Communists' key concessions were: the Thieu government would
remain in office unless voted out by the South Vietnamese
people; and although North Vietnamese troops were not forced
to withdraw from the South "the agreement regulating the
replacement of forces and closing the border sanctuaries in
Laos and Cambodia would effectively cut them off from their
source of supplies." If the Communists abided by the terms of
, March 5, 1973, pp. 12-13.
“ ®Pike, Vietnam, p. 97.
“ ’Nixon, BK, p. 692. The rest of the paragraph comes from
this page also.
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the treaty these troops could not have defeated the ARVN and
overthrown the Thieu government. Nixon believed that the Paris
accords "amounted to a complete capitulation by the enemy:
they were accepting a settlement on our terms."
The London Economist agreed that the concessions which
the Communists offered on October 8th had "made their weakness
visible.

The Economist concluded that as the victors the

Americans had a special obligation to be generous with the
defeated Communists.
President Nixon had no illusions about the good faith of
the North Vietnamese.

He believed "they would observe the

agreement only so long emd so far as South Vietnam's strength
and America's readiness to retaliate forced them to."“ ^ In
that

regard Nixon wrote to President Thieu

"You have my

edasolute assurance that if Hanoi fails to abide by the terms
of this agreement it is my intention to take swift and severe
retaliatory action.
Thus even with the agreement which was signed, there was
good reason to believe that, given continued U.S. support as
stipulated in the treaty.

South Vietnam would be eüale to

maintain its independence. As it turned out, the Communist
infiltrated enormously more men and materials

into South

Vietnam than the treaty allowed, while the United States (as
^^Economist. November 4, 1972, p. 18.
“ *Nixon, EK, p. 690.
^ Ibid.. p. 718.
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Watergate

crippled

Nixon)

virtually

abandoned

South

Vietnam.
If instead of signing the treaty in early 1973,

the

United States had continued to re-arm South Vietnam, while
preventing the Communists from resupplying (by harbor mines
and

the

smart

bombing

of

the

transportation

systems)

throughout 1973, Hanoi's position would have become steadily
weaker.

This

would have

cost America

few

if any men

or

airplanes because as, Thompson argues, "By 28 December the
North's defenses were shattered and the B-52s, if the bombing
had not stopped the following day, would have been able to
roam over the North with impunity. Hanoi was no longer eüale to
track them with radar, its MIG 21s could no longer get off to
intercept them, and the resupply of SAMs was only a fraction
of their expenditure in the first few days of the raids (1,242
SAMs were fired in eleven days).

Aviation Week and Space

Technology supported Thompson: "By the fifth day the Northern
defenses were beginning to sag and no B-52s were lost for two
full

operational

days

. . . .

defenses were shattered.
whole

system

was

By Dec.

28,

the Northern

Thompson concluded that,

breaking

down,

including

the

"The
radio

communications on which the Communist regime is pazrticularly

“ *See page 24 above.
“ ^Thompson, Peace. p. 135.
^ “ ^Aviation Week and Space Technoloov. February 12, 1973,
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dependent for control. At this point the war could have been
won . . . [if] the bombing and mining [had continued] for as
long as necessary through 1973. Hanoi simply could not have
faced this prospect.
Instead of pressing its advantage in late 1972, however,
the United States abandoned South Vietnam while the Soviet
Union poured an enormous amount of aid into North Vietnam,
rebuilding its shattered army. Dr. Pike states: "Estimates on
the cost of this effort vary but may have been as high as $2.5
billion.The

Soviets

built highways

and oil

pipelines

into South Vietnam to service the sophisticated tanks and
mobile

field

Vietnamese.

artillery

During 1974,

they

were

giving

to

the

North

the South Vietnamese experienced

scarcities of money, artillery shells and fuel. Time reported
on December 23, 1974, that ARVN guns had been limited to two
artillery shells per day.“® At An Loc,

during the Easter

Offensive, the Communists had been firing 7,000 shells per
day.“ ’ Time

also

reported that the

South Vietnamese Air

Force could no longer fly adequate support missions because of
aviation fuel shortages. When Time published this story in
late December 1974, the Communist offensive that would finally
defeat South Vietnam had already begun.

If, upon receiving

“ “Thompson, Peace, p. 135.
“ *Pike, Vietnam, p. 125.
“ “Time. December 23, 1974, pp. 35-36,
“ ’ibid.. January 15, 1973, p. 25.
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news of these shortages, any of Time's readership had wanted
to supply more shells amd fuel to

the beleaguered South

Vietnamese, it would have already been too late. During the
period of March 24, 1974, through the end of the year. Time
printed 5 Cl pro-war and 159 Cl anti-war. During the spring
and summer, when it would have mattered, Americans did not
leam

from Time magazine that South Vietnam required more

military

aid

to

counter

the

massive

buildup

of

North

Vietnamese forces by the Soviet Union.
In conclusion, after mid-1969, what Time did not print
was as important as what it did print. The magazine did not
cover the 1970 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on
Vietnam.

It

development.
marines

did

not

publish

amy

evidence

of

economic

Time did not describe the experiences of CAP

like F.J.

West and Michael

Peterson.

It did not

adequately explain the massive nature of Soviet military aid
prior to the 1972 amd 1975 Communist offensives. Time did not
inform the American public of North Vietnam's weakness in
1972. And finally, it did not help readers to understand that
America's failure to match Soviet aid had left South Vietnam
unable to defend itself in 1974. These omissions were crucial
to the pursuit of editor-in-chief Medley Donovan's stated goal
of

convincing

the

American

people

that

the

U.S.

should

completely withdraw all forces from Vietnam as quickly as
possible.
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CHAPTER 4
TIME'S FACTUAL MISREPRESENTATIONS

This chapter focuses on several topics on which Time
factually

misrepresented

what

was

actually

happening

in

Vietnam in such a way as to promote the goals of the anti-war
movement. The first subject of misrepresentation was a set of
scare

stories asserting that the U.S.

must withdraw

Vietnam immediately or face certain dire consequences.

from
The

second set of stories involved Time 's misrepresentation of the
state of economic development and pacification. The last topic
addressed

in

this

chapter

involves

Time's

portrayal

of

America's Communist opponents in the war.
Perhaps the most obvious misrepresentation Time presented
to the American public was its picture of the entire American
military presence in Vietnam as a colony of heroin addicts.
Time ran a series of articles from December 1970 until June
1971 in which it explained that good American boys were being
shipped

into

a

Vietnamese

den

of

iniquity.

Lonely

and

frightened, they were seduced by the peer pressure of the many
heroin addicts already there. "It is one sorry byproduct of
130
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the war that cannot be eliminated by Vietnamization," Time
warned. "As the U.S. soldiers come home all too often they
bring their new habits with them."“ ^ The argument in this
series of articles was that even though U.S. battle casualties
were relatively low by this point, responsible parents still
had very good reason to resist allowing their children to be
sent to Vietnam. Time quoted a U.S. officer as saying, "The
soldier going to South Viet Nam today runs a far greater risk
of becoming a heroin addict than a combat casualty.

This

was based on the estimate that 10-15 percent of the homeward
bound G.I.s were addicted to heroin. Time commented that "the
dimension of drug addiction among American troops offers one
more heart-rending reason why the U.S.
quickly as possible."

As

continued

bolder

to

run

ever

should get out as

spring turned to summer.
scare

stories,

Time

eventually

estimating that as many as one-third of all G.I.s returning
from Vietnam were addicted to heroin.
In the August 9, 1971,

issue a short article reported

that Dr. Jerome Jaffe, director of the drug eüsuse program of
the Illinois Department of Mental

Health had begun doing

urinalyses on homeward bound soldiers. About 5 percent of them
had detectaüale levels of narcotics in their systems, but it
“ ^Time. March 1, 1971, pp. 14-15.
“ ^Ibid.. April 19, 1971, pp. 21-22.
gQA

Ibid.. June 7, 1971, p. 9.
”^Ibid.. June 28, 1971, p. 20.
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did

not

follow

anything.

that

Some had

all

5

received

percent

were

injections

addicted

to

of narcotics

as

pain killers for their wounds recently enough to show up in
the urine tests. In the year that these teenagers spent in
Vietnam,

some percentage of their former classmates became

addicted to drugs in their neighborhoods back home. The early
1970s are generally recognized as a relatively free era in
this

regard.

Time

offered

no

evidence

that

a

greater

percentage of the teenagers in Vietnam became addicted to
heroin than their peers back home.
Time

spent

97

column

inches

spread

out

over

seven

separate

issues publicizing the great heroin scare.

Time

stopped

printing

with

these

stories

only

when

faced

irrefutadale proof to the contrary. The rebuttal article got 8
column

inches.Thus,

Time

had

factually misrepresented

what was actually happening in Vietnam in such a way as to
promote Hedley Donovan's

goal

of convincing the American

people that they ought to push for removal of all American
forces from Vietnam as quickly as possible.
In a similar type of article. Time played upon American
racial fears and prejudice. In the September 9, 1969, issue
Time's

reporter

asserted

that

the

contemporary

African-

American soldiers were much different than they had been.
"Before the war went stale and before black aspirations soared
296

Ibid.. August 9, 1971, p. 22.

“ "ibid.
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at home, the black soldier was satisfied to fight on an equal
basis with his white comrade-in-arms . . . .
amother war being fought in Vietnam—
Americans . . . .

But now there is

between black and white

Many of today's young black soldiers are

yesterday's rioters . . . .

Elaborate training in guerrilla

warfare has not been lost upon them, and many . . . believe
that Vietnam may prove a training ground for the black urban
commando of the future." Time took a poll of black G.I.s and
reported that "45% said they would use arms to gain their
rights when they return to America." Time warned its white
middle class readership that if it continued sending black
soldiers to Vietnam, when they started returning "this fall
and winter . . . they could constitute a formidaüale force in
the streets of America,

schooled amd tempered in all the

violent arts as no generation of blacks has ever been.
This

type

of

article

probaüsly contributed

to

white

America's fear of young black men and may have created a white
racial backlash against innocent black veterans. Time printed
no evidence that black veterans were more likely to commit
racially motivated violent crimes.

In the absence of such

evidence.

racial

Time

helped

to

promote

prejudice

while

factually misrepresenting the war and its consequences. This
article seemed to give middle class whites another good reason
to support Medley Donovan's goal of withdrawing all U.S.
forces from Vietnam as quickly as possible.
Ibid.. September 19, 1969, p. 22
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Time also misrepresented the war in a series of articles
which

analyzed

the

degree

of

South

Vietnam's

economic

development. As we have seen, three Americam economists did
field research in rural South Vietnam during the war. They
found that farm productivity and income had risen sufficiently
to allow farmers to invest in home improvement construction,
vehicles, power tools and consumer luxuries. Two respected
historians confirmed the three economists'

findings.

Even

lias's reporters and editors were aware that U.S. aid programs
had created "an economic infrastructure especially valuable to
a developing nation

. . . [and that]

Thieu's land reform

program has already given much of the peasantry reason to back
him."

299

This four column inch story appeared in August 1973,

after America had signed a peace treaty and withdrawn from
Vietnam.

President

Nixon had

already

suffered

the

first

crippling effects of the Watergate scauidal, and Congress was
moving to pass legislation designed to sharply curtail the
Executive Branch's war making ability. There was little chance
that this good news about the success of nation building would
affect future U.S. policy.
During the years in which America was deciding how much
continuing assistance to give Vietnam after U.S. combat troops
withdrew.

Time printed three articles analyzing the South

Vietnamese economy. The first appeared on August 31, 1970. It
said that vehicle exhaust fumes
August 27, 1973, pp. 33-34.
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engulf Saigon in a noxious blue haze . .
. . Alleys aure scenes of chaos, as dogs,
children and chickens scurry amid garbage
and rubble. Row after row of shacks are
built on stilts and often are constructed
from sheets of rolled beer cams. One
family lives with hundreds of Miller High
Life emblems as the
facade of its
house, while a neighbor may prefer the
hues of
Pabst Blue Ribbon or Budweiser.
Beneath mamy of these dwellings flow
canals whose black waters reek of raw
pungent sewage. In the shacks, which have
no electricity amd little furniture,
adults and children sleep side by side in
a single room measuring no more tham 8 ft
by 10 ft. Even so they are
l u c k y
[compared to the homeless. Although the
war has created some jobs, what] has
happened to Saigon is indicative of what
is happening all over South Vietnam . . .
When the war finally ends. South
Vietnam is likely to face a severe
economic crisis . . . [its] cities are
already developing many of
the
same
fateful characteristics that have caused
despair and urban ^Terrorism in other
parts of the world.
An October 12, 1970, article said that unless something
could be done "aüaout Saigon's faltering economy
unhappy U.S.
Congress

has

. . .

am

Congress might sharply curtail American aid.
reason

to

be

concerned"

because

of

South

Vietnam's high inflation rate, trade deficit, and overvalued
currency. "To ease the situation. President Nguyen Van Thieu
last week decreed a package

of reforms

aimed

at cutting

inflation to 15% next year - a dubious proposition
. . . Thieu's reforms may well prove too little and too

“ “ibid.. August 31, 1970, p. 35.
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late."“ ’ In November 1971,

Time carried a short,

neutral

article describing some of Thieu's proposed reforms.“ ^
Anyone who took Time 's coverage of the South Vietnamese
economy to be an objective appraisal would have been forced to
conclude that the situation was hopeless. Time presented its
readership with a factually inaccurate picture of the state of
economic development in South Vietnam, falsely suggesting that
the anti-war movement was correct: complete withdrawal was the
only rational choice.
The American economists who did field research in rural
South Vietnam described President Thieu's land redistribution
program as one of the most successful of such efforts in the
history

of

the

third world.*®

Prior

to

the August

1973

article referred to eü3ove. Time reported on land reform only
once. On July 11,

1969, Time stated that Thieu had made a

revolutionary land redistribution proposal, but, "There is, of
course, the major question of whether Thieu's government can
muster the political will and managerial skill to succeed in
the task."
a

304

Again, Time's coverage of land reform painted

factually inaccurate picture which made it appear that

things were not going as well in Vietnam as they really were.

“ ’ibid.. October 12, 1970, p. 33.
“ ^Ibid.. November 29, 1971, p. 39.
303

Bush, Impact, pp. 85, 57-58,
Land, pp. 325-41.
304

65-66. Also, Callison,

Time. July 11, 1969, p. 29.
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The last topic on which Time misrepresented the war was
in

its

articles

portrayal

of America's

Communist

opponents.

Time

described the North Vietnamese leadership as wise

men who had suffered greatly in pursuit of their one goal, the
legitimate right to rule in their own country. Although the
demands of the revolution had forced them to employ harsh
tactics and the war they directed had brought much suffering,
they were still loved by their people:
The face that he [Ho Chi Minh] presented to the
world was that of an avuncular, slightly shabby
poet . . .
He impressed most visitors with his
gentleness, but no man can hold together a
Communist Party for nearly forty years, as he did,
without an iron hand . . . Ho Chi Minh's life was
dedicated to the creation of a Unified Viet Nam,
free from foreign control, and the 19 million
people of his tortured land suffered mightily from
his total devotion to that vision. Even so, they
affectionately knew him ^ 'Bac Ho' (Uncle Ho). So
did many in the South.
[His North Vietnamese
followers] possess a serenity rarely seen in Asia.
They always seem to be fighting an invader or a
natural calamity. The Mongols, the Chinese and the
floods were all defeated . . . . General Giap once
proudly said that the Vietnamese were the only
people to stop the Mongols. 'We will be the only
ones to stop the Americans in the 20th century. '

The problem with Time 's depiction of the North Vietnamese
was that they were not sacrificing themselves in pursuit of
their one goal, their legitimate right to rule in their own
country. North Vietnamese armies had invaded Cambodia and Laos
*®Ibid.. September 12, 1969, pp. 22-26.
“ “ibid.. October 23, 1972, p. 42-47.
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in the early 1960s and had been attempting to militarily
impose

their

thereafter.

Communist

The methods

rule

on

these

the Communists

unwilling

peoples

routinely used to

prosecute these wars were comparable to the most gruesome
terrorist acts practiced anywhere in the world.
Historian Guenter Lewy has made a detailed study of
Communist terror tactics during the war.“ " He contends that
an organized bureaucracy staffed by over 25,000 men "drew up
target lists" and then assassinated more than 27,000 persons
and 2ü3ducted more than 42,000. "The mortaring of refugee ceunps
was a common occurrence," as was laying land mines in the
rural market roads. A favorite Viet Cong tactic was to fire
snipper rounds at allied soldiers from a hamlet friendly to
the

GVN,

hoping

to

draw

return

fire

on

the

innocent

inhabitamts. "At other times, the VC assaulted villages amd
hamlets directly with the intention of killing men, women and
children." The Communists used flame throwers to attack the
undefended villages of Daüc Son in 1967 and Son Tra in 1968,
killing 330 and injuring many more. At Phuthan in 1970 they
methodically

dropped

grenades

into

the

mouths

of

the

villagers' bunkers killing "an estimated 100 civilians."
"Another terror tactic involving the intentional and
indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians was the shelling
with 122-mm rockets of Saigon, Danang and other major cities."

307,

Lewy, America, pp. 272-77. The next two paragraphs come
from these pages.
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Lewy asserts that the use of terror "constituted an integral
part of communist strategy." The routine use of atrocity was
calculated to "drive home the point that the GVN could not
protect the people under its control," and thus intimidate
support for the Saigon government.
North Vietnamese armies were still in Ccunbodia and Laos
subjugating the populations long after the U.S. had retired
from Vietnam.

The bellicose leaders of North Vietnam even

fought a short war against the Communist Chinese in the late
1970s. They simply were not the wise, gentle, peaceful people,
wanting only what was rightfully theirs, that Time portrayed
them to be.

Dr. Douglas Pike stated in 1969:

"The rule in

North Vietnam is as harsh, arbitrary, and intrusive as in any
totalitarian nation on earth."*® Pike described the process
by which the North Vietnamese Communists imposed collectivized
agriculture on the peasantry in these terms: "In the name of
land

reform

they

set

ad>out to

destroy

a village

social

structure that had existed for a thousand years. Village life
. . . suddenly was transformed into a jungle of animal rage."
Hanoi
"which

created

the

denounced,

People's
tried,

Agricultural

and

jailed

or

Reform

Tribunals

executed

certain

villagers. Tribunals apparently operated on a quota basis."
They had to produce a certain number of victims. If wealthy
landlords

existed

in

the

village,

they

were

of

course

denounced. In many villages, however, the difference between
*®Pike, Ear, p. 71.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

140
the richest and poorest inhabitants was slight. In some areas
the wealthiest had already fled. Under these circumstamces
"Party cadres deliberately created a

condition of

social

pathology by working on the emotions of individual villagers."
Those who had gained power through the various new tribunals
and committees were encouraged to denounce whomever they most
disliked.

"It was not uncommon for an individual owning no

land to find himself listed as an exploiter." Between 50,000
and 100,000 were executed. This land reform amounted to
the exploitation of basically decent people
memipulating their emotions so as to surface
dark stain of inhumanity that exists in all of
This dehumanized the Land Reform ceunpaign
beyond mere murder, £md it created within
society a subliminal force of which it still
not rid itself.
Alexander Solzhenitsyn,
Nobel

Prize

by
the
us.
far
the
has

a Russian author who won the

for Literature,

was

sharply

critical

of

the

Western press for its idealization of Communist regimes. He
believed

that

the

media

was

overly

critical

of

Western

government's actions, while glossing over much worse aibuses
committed by Communist regimes. He particularly criticized the
presses'

sympathetic attitude toward Viet Cong attrocities

during the Tet Offensive. "The proven brutal mass murders at
Hue are only noted in passing, almost immediately pardoned,
because societie's sympathy inclined to that point of view,
and no one wanted to go against that inertia. It was nothing

309

Pike, History, p. 108-109,
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short

of

scandalous.

yime

magazine's

coverage

is

a

classic example of Solzhenitsyn's point. Time printed 40 Cl
describing the massacre of 5,700 Communist victims at Hue,
while

publishing hundreds

of

column

inches

covering

the

American massacre of just over 200 victims at My Lai.
Lewy states that "The magnitude and ruthlessness of the
VC terror during the occupation of Hue left a deep feeling of
revulsion among the people of South Vietnam.

General Tho

wrote that the People's Self-Defense Forces "arose in the waüce
of the enemy 1968 Tet offensive as a result of the spontaneous
demand from the people. The attacks waged by the Communists
during 1968 completely alienated the people who had incurred
heavy

losses

atrocities.

[particularly]

because

of

Communist

Sir Robert Thompson asserts that although the

militant Buddhists around Hue had opposed South Vietnamese
President Ngo Dinh Diem in the early 1960s, the Communist
massacre
Howard

at Hue,

Penniman

"completely altered their stand.
agreed

that

although

the

conducted anti-govemment demonstrations as

Buddhists
late as

Dr.
had
1966,

"events have sharply changed this relationship." Most of the
civilians whom the Viet Cong had tortured and buried alive had
Alexander
Solzhenitsyn,
"Peace
and
Violence",
Aftenposten. Oslo, September 11, 1973, quoted in Thompson,
Peace, pp. 35-36.
^’’Lewy, America, p. 275.
^’^ o .

Pacification, p. 150.

^’^Thompson, Peace, p. 11.
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been Buddhists. "This may well have crystallized the views of
some who had previously seen little to choose between the
governments of the North and South.

In 1970 the Buddhists

moved to join the system" by entering a slate of candidates in
the Senatorial e l e c t i o n s . A l t h o u g h American liberals saw
little to concern them in the torture and murder of thousands
of Buddhist civilians, apparently the victims' families amd
survivors did object. Their new participation in government
was rewarded when their candidates won the largest share of
legislative seats.
President Nixon stated that during the Easter Offensive
at both An Loc and Quang Tri "as terrified civilians rushed to
flee

the

scene

of

combat.

North

Vietnamese

indiscriminately slaughtered thousands of them.

troops
Ian Ward

of the London Daily Telegraph covered the story on Route I
outside of Quang Tri. Ward called the massacre "an act of
calculated

butchery

unprecedented

even

in

this

conflict.

Forward observers for the Communist artillery targeted the
columns of desperate refugees.

Sir Robert Thompson stated

that, "The casualties along Route I (the stretch of road is
now known as

'La Route Terrible ') were estimated at over

^’^Pennimam, Elections, p. 195.
^'^Nixon, BK/ p. 586.
^’^London Dailv Telegraph, quoted in Thompson, Peace, p.
41.
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20,000."*^ U.S.

Ambassador Martin Herz confirmed that the

North Vietnamese had, "deliberately aimed artillery fire at
thousands of refugees trying to flee southward from Quang
Tri.

Lt.

Colonel

Gerald

Turley

commanded

the

U.S.

advisory team coordinating air strikes and naval gunfire in
Quang Tri province during the Easter Offensive.
radio contact with all the U.S.

He was in

advisors who were moving

around the battlefield. Turley reported that the Communists'
battle plan involved the intentional shelling of civilians in
villages
created

and
its

desperate,

cities throughout the
intended effect.

region.

This

strategy

The roads were clogged with

fleeing refugees,

making it difficult for ARVN

units to move during the battle. North Vietneunese artillery
units had been prepositioned to fire on the various major
roads, again, to interdict ARVN movements. Their decision to
shell fleeing civilians was apparently in keeping with their
war

long strategy of

government.

Turley's

intimidating support
book

contains

for the Saigon

photographs

of

the

destruction to military and civilian vehicles along various
roads of the region.
Turley states that on April 27th the Communist artillery
began to hit Quang Tri city.

"The intensity of the NVA's

^'^Thompson, Peace, p. 41.
^^‘nerz. The Prestige Press and the Christmas Bombing, p.
23.
319

Turley, Easter, pp.
between pp. 131 and 132.

60,

76,

98,

photographs appear
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bombardments and

its indiscriminate shelling of populated

areas had the desired effect as more civilians were forced
into

the

roadways

military vehicles,

further

complicating

the

personnel and supplies

movement

. . . .

of

Taking

advantage of this helpless mass of humanity. North Vietnamese
forward observers methodically began to adjust the fire from
their

130

refugees.

mm

guns

Turley

all

along

indicates

the
that

lines
the

of

unprotected

memories

of

the

Communist's massacres at Hue (just south of Quang Tri) in 1968
added to the panic. Time did not publish any account of this
story.
It would not seem difficult to believe that the South
Vietnamese genuinely hated the Communists,

and wanted to

defend themselves from a Northern victory. The American media,
however, did not accurately portray the Communists' atrocities
late in the war, the Southerners' willingness to fight amd die
for their freedom, or the Northern weakness in late 1972. Thus
the media's anti-war bias probably contributed to the American
Congress' willingness to abandon South Vietnam to an enemy
who, by the standards applied to Bosnia in the 1990s, would
certainly be considered war criminals.
Time did run a 53 Cl story describing Cambodia's Khmer
Rouge. The author, journalist Robert Anson, explained that he
was captured and taken to a Cambodian village, where he was
held prisoner. He spent several weeks there. As he grew to
^Turley, Easter, p. 259.
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know them he discovered that the Khmer were the nicest of
people. Anson enjoyed a great deal of conversation with them
"and in a short time became remarkably close . . .

a bond was

forming between us. I could almost watch it growing stronger
daily." Anson described his guilt when he saw that the allied
assault on North Vietnamese positions in Cambodia had forced
North Vietnamese guerrillas to teach the Cambodiams "how to
crawl quietly through the grass, dragging their rifles behind
them." When he saw the bomb shelter, evidence that his own
countrymen had

tried to

kill

these

honest

peasants,

his

feelings forced him to turn away. Anson was deeply touched by
the gifts his friends gave him when they set him free.^*^
The import of the article is unmistakable. The message is
that the Khmer Rouge were such wonderful people that no decent
man would be willing to go to war against them. This is a
factual

misrepresentation

literature

on

Cambodian

of

a

people's

history

character.

describes

them

The
as

a

particularly violent people throughout the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. It should have come as no surprise that
the Khmer Rouge would slaughter over a million
countrymen

when

they

gained

power

in

1975.

of their
They

were

exactly the opposite of the kind and gentle humanitarians Time

^ Viroe. September 7, 1970, pp. 18-19.
“ ^arl d. Jackson,
Cambodia 1975-1978
(Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 179-208. See also David
P. Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1991), pp. 236, 241.
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described. A recent movie, "The Killing Fields" brought their
well-documented atrocities to popular notice. Time's portrayal
of the Communists as the sort of people that no decent man
could go to war against misrepresented the situation in such
a way as to promote Hedley Donovan's goal of convincing the
American people to push for immediate withdrawal of all U.S.
forces.
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CONCLUSIONS

In the 1970s, the liberal anti-war movement believed that
it was morally imperative to force a cut off of American funds
for the defense of South Vietnam. Their underlying assumptions
were that: 1, the war was already hopelessly lost, and thus
further assistance would only prolong the suffering and delay
the inevitad)le Communist victory; and 2, the hated military
dictator. President Thieu, was forcing the South Vietnamese
people to continue the war when they would have preferred to
negotiate peace.
This thesis, however, has shown that substantial evidence
exists supporting the conclusion that the South Vietnamese
fought

hard

Cambodian

and

successfully

incursion.

Operation

in

the

Lan

Tet

Som

Offensive,

719,

the

the

Easter

Offensive, and in local security battles. Also, evidence from
the 1971 presidential election showed that President Thieu in
fact enjoyed wide popular support. Dr. Howard Penniman has
demonstrated that Thieu's government was relatively open,
responsive, and democratic. More importantly, evidence from
the 1968 and 1972 treaty negotiations showed that the South
Vietnamese people did in fact want to defend themselves from
147
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the ruthless, externally funded attempt to impose totalitarian
Communism upon them. The media, however, consistently failed
to publish the evidence supporting these conclusions. The
media's failure prevented the American people from having the
opportunity

to make

an

informed decision

eUaout how much

support should be given to South Vietnam after U.S. troops
were withdrawn.
A second conclusion which follows from this research is
that the current mainstream historiographic interpretation of
the

American

media 's

coverage

of

the

war

is

directly

contradicted by the coverage in Time magazine. For example,
after October 1969, Time carried 429 Cl describing the anti
war protest demonstrations in glowing terms and only 41 Cl
critical

of the demonstrations.

criticized

the

protests

between the

"radical

responsible

adults

Time

youths"
who

were

"shameful and irrational" war.

Even

was

in the

careful

who caused
peacefully

41 Cl which

to

distinguish

trouble

and the

protesting

the

Only 8 Cl represented the

belief that anti-war demonstrations encouraged the Communists,
even though polls

showed that 53 percent of the American

public condemned the protest demonstrations while only 27
percent were sympathetic. The most reasonable interpretation
of this anti-war protest coverage is that Time was trying to
sell the protest movement to an unwilling public.
Herbert Cans' book.
quantitative

analysis

Deciding What's Hews. contained a

of

the

news

aired

by
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television networks, as well as the news published in Time and
Wewsweek magazines. He did most of his research in the late
1960s while the war was in progress. Regarding the media's
coverage of the anti-war protest demonstrations. Cans wrote
"Marches and demonstrations are,

from one point of view,

protest activities, but the news almost always treated them as
potential or actual dangers to the social o r d e r . L a t e r he
reiterated, "The anti-war demonstrations of the past decade
were covered as disorder stories,"^* and again toward the
end of his book, "The anti-war protests were, for most of the
war, treated as social disorder news.

Cans also asserts

that journalists did not select news stories based on their
ideological content, amd "In time of war they do not report
news that may damage the war effort.
Cans admitted that his "quantitative analysis omitted the
Vietnam War and all domestic news directly related to the
war.

Although he did not subject this news to a rigorous

formal analysis.
understand

its

Cans

felt he

import.

The

had

fact

read
that

enough
Cans

of

it to

drew

false

conclusions about the media's war coverage without having
analyzed it leaves his methodology open to criticism.
’^Gans, Hews, p. 53.
» p. 58.
’“ ifeiâ., p. 280.
^^Ibid.. pp. 183-189.
p. 6.
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quantitative analysis presented in this thesis shows that his
interpretatation was directly contradicted by the available
evidence in Time magazine's coverage of the Vietnam War.
In the preface to his book.

Paper Soldiers. Clarence

Wyatt states, "For over twenty years, all have agreed on one
point— the press was a major factor in the United States'
failure in Vietnam. " Liberals praised the media for helping to
end the war, conservatives blamed the press for losing the
war.

However,

Wyatt asks:

"Is either of

these two views

accurate? Both are based on a belief that the press was a
powerful

adversary

of

the

government

and

the

military.

However, research over the past few years has indicated that
such a belief is misplaced. Content analysis of newspaper and
television coverage shows that, more often than not, the press
reported

official

information,

relatively little dissent.

statements

and

views

with

The evidence presented in this

thesis directly contradicts this assertion in the preface to

gQidiçr?.
Wyatt does make clear that the U.S. government engaged in
a number of activities during the Cold War which it tried to
keep secret. The U-2 incident over Russia in the late 1950s
and the Bay of Pigs fiasco during the Kennedy Administration
provide

good

cooperated

examples.

with

the

Wyatt

shows

government

that

during

the

press

these

328

often

years

by

Clarence Wyatt, Paper Soldiers (New York: W.W. Norton,
1993) , p. 7.
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suppressing news voluntarily, if the government opposed its
publication. During the Vietnam War, Wyatt demonstrates, the
Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon Administrations all used various
techniques to try to manage the news. During the Nixon years,
reporters were intimidated and even deported from Vietnam.
The conclusions

in

Paper Soldiers, however,

are not

supported by the evidence. Wyatt argued that if the founding
fathers could visit us today they "would be shocked by the
power

that

has

flowed

into

the

Executive

fundamental part of the m o d e m Presidents'

Bremch."

A

power has been

their control of information. "As the Vietnam war showed, the
ability and inclination of the Executive Branch to restrict
and

manipulate

2d>ility

to

information

resist."^

This

is

largely

paper

beyond

concludes

the

that

press'
in

the

period after mid-1969 Wyatt was wrong; Time did effectively
resist Nixon's ability to manage the news.
Daniel Hailin's book. The "Uncensored" War, presents a
much stronger case than either Paper Soldiers or Deciding
What's

News. Hallin

did

a

quantitative

analysis

of

779

television network news broadcasts aired in the years 19651973.

From this he concluded that the news coverage changed

dramatically

after

the

1968

Tet

Offensive.

"Before

Tet,

editorial comments by television journalists ran nearly four
to one in favor of administration policy; after Tet, two to

p. 219.
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one a g a i n s t . D i d

the media's amti-war bias

after 1968

hurt the war effort? Hallin chose to frame the question this
way: "Could American power have been used more efficiently in
Vietnam if officials had had more control over the media?
Perhaps. But the case is by no means as strong as is often
supposed.
Hallin provides a good analysis of the data available to
him. However, his sample of 779 broadcasts represents less
than 9 percent of all television network news broadcasts
during the period 1965-1973, It is too small to allow him to
form an accurate judgment as to the degree of bias in the
total news presentation.
Hallin

also did

a quantitative

analysis

of the war

coverage in the New York Times newspaper for the years prior
to 1965. This allowed him to make a crucially important point.
The media's pro-war bias in the early 1960s prevented it from
reporting the negative things that reporters had discovered on
the ground

in Vietnam.

government's
situation

optimistic

which

the

Reporters could see that the U.S.
reports did not match
journalists

were

the

actual

observing.

The

media's pro-war bias prevented it from publishing an anti-war
interpretation of events in the early 1960s. This precluded
the American people from having the opportunity to make an
^Hallin, "Uncensored" War, p. 161.
p. 211.
f pp. 8, 9, 214-15, and chapter two.
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informed judgment ad>out what type and amount of assistance
should have been committed to South Vietnam in the early and
mid-1960s.
Hallin's conclusions about the early war are excellent.
Apparently, however, either his sample size was too small to
draw accurate detailed conclusions, or the television coverage
was remarkably more pro-war than that of Time magazine; and no
one who has examined both has reached this conclusion.^
Hallin wrote that although the media turned anti-war after
Tet, it did not turn very hard against the war, and it did so
only after Congressional and public opinion had moved into
opposition:

"for the most part television was

a follower

rather than a leader . . . . The Nixon administration retained
a good deal of power to

'meunage* the news."

In Hallin*s

opinion pro-war news coverage largely accounted "for the fact
that the Nixon administration was able to maintain majority
support
war.

for

its

Vietnam

policies

through

four

years

of

A more reasoned)le interpretation would seem to be

^Herz, Prestige Press. Herz quantified the coverage of
the New York Times. Washington Post. Time. Newsweek, and
C.B.S. television news on five separate questions dealing with
the coverage of the December bombings. His results tables are
printed on p. 19, 29, 33, 35, and 40. On one question C.B.S.
was more pro-war (or at least less anti-war) at a 6-1 bias,
compared to Time's 19-1 coverage. On two questions Time and
C.B.S. were fairly equally anti-war. On two questions,
however, C.B.S. and Newsweek were the only media sources which
provided absolutely no pro-war coverage at all. Clarence Wyatt
and Herbert Gams both examined the coverage of the various
national media sources also. Neither of them indicated that
they found television to be more pro-war than Time.
^Hallin, "Uncensored" War, pp. 10-11.
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that the American people wanted to avoid defeat so badly that
they were willing to support the President in spite of the
media's attempts to discourage them.
A more fundamentally important conclusion revealed by the
research

for

this

thesis

is

that

the

mainstream

historiographic interpretation of the Tet Offensive

(that

although it was a military defeat for the Communists, it was
the turning point which led to their victory, because it ended
public approval for American participation in the war) is not
up-held by

the evidence.

Tet did not

in

fact

cause the

American people to stop supporting the effort to preserve an
independent, non-communist South Vietnam. The evidence on this
point is indisputeüaly clear.
Politicians are the nation's most sensitive observers of
public opinion. If there had ever been anything like majority
support for the anti-war position many candidates would have
liked to campaign on an anti-war platform. This was never the
case.

In the 1970 Congressional elections:

Senate doves were
defeated too . . . .
[either] . . . .

felled but about that many hawks were
There was not much change in the house

few candidates had made the war central to

their campaigns . . . .
in the voting.
1972,

"Three leading

The

it appeared to play only a small part
one

candidate,

George McGovern

who did make the anti-war position central

campaign lost in a landslide.
^^DeBenedetti, Ordeal. p. 293.
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In June

1972

Time

reported that

it had conducted a

detailed interview survey of potential voters. The results
confirmed that less than one-third of the American people
believed in the goals eund values of the amti-war movement,
while

70

percent

believed

that

a

Korea-like

settlement,

guaranteeing the permament independence of South Vietnam was
possible, and they supported President Nixon in his pursuit of
this conclusion to the war. A September 1972 Harris poll
confirmed that 55 percent of Americans supported the continued
heavy bombing of North Vietnam,
mining of Haiphong Harbor,

64 percent supported the

and 74 percent thought it was

important that South Vietnam not fall into the hands of the
Communists.^
In October 1972 Henry Kissinger announced that he had the
basis of a treaty guaranteeing peace with honor to the United
States. President Thieu, however, refused to sign. He demanded
the removal of all North Vietnamese troops from South Vietnsun.
The Communists then insisted that President Nixon repudiate
Thieu, and sign the treaty which Kissinger had negotiated.
Instead, Nixon stood by South Vietnam, and resumed prosecution
of the war while continuing to negotiate for a better treaty.
During this period in October and November 1972, polls showed
that

a majority

of

the

American

people

approved of

the

President's handling of the war.
There

is

no

^ixon, M #

room

for debate

on

this

point.

p. 689.
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indisputably certain that in 1972 the mass public rejected the
goals and values of the anti-war movement,
President Nixon's

efforts

and supported

to secure an independent,

non

communist South Vietnam.
Another conclusion that follows from this thesis is that
North Vietnam was

in very serious trouble in

1972.

They

required 100,000 tons of imported food per month to feed their
people. In the wake of the Christmas bombings they were able
to transport only 30,000 tons of cargo (which had to satisfy
their needs for both food and war supplies) per month into the
country.

It seems probable that continued bombing of the

transportation routes would have reduced their ability to
import goods even further. Continued bombing would have cost
few if any American lives or airplames because virtually all
of North Vietnam's radar dishes and surface-to-air missile
sites had been destroyed. There were no functional runways
left for their MIG aircraft to take off from. They had few SAM
missiles left, and they were limited in their eüaility to bring
new missiles

into the country.

Their inventory of tanks,

artillery, fuel and ammunition had largely been destroyed, and
five-sixths of their army had just been killed or disabled. It
is difficult to see how they could have continued to prosecute
the war in 1973 at a level which would have threatened the
stability of the South Vietnamese government.
In spite of these facts the most widely used textbook for
Vietnam War classes, George Herring's, America's Longest War.
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Stated that "the American effort to create a bastion of anti
communism south of the

seventeenth parallel was

probably

doomed from the start." Herring made absolutely no attempt to
describe North Vietnam's weaJcness in late 1972, as if this
evidence were so obviously meaningless that history students
had no reason even to be informed of it. Herring, in fact,
positively

asserts

that

in

his

judgment

the

Communist

negotiating position had in no way been weakened by the events
of 1972 . ^
In a similar vein, the section of America's Longest War
on pacification
economic

includes

progress

absolutely no discussion

described

by

three

of the

economists,

two

historians and a host of journalists and experts. On this
topic Herring concluded that, "Instead of rethinking a policy
which had brought no results, Nixon clung stubbornly," to his
pacification strategy in 1971. ^
In addition to this. Herring's conclusions regarding the
Tet Offensive and its effect on pacification, the Cambodian
incursion.
toward

Operation Lan Som 719,

Saigon

movement,

and

and

the

the

media's

the Buddhists'

Communists,

the

coverage

of

anti-war
the

essentially no different than the anti-war
offered

by

Time

magazine.

Herring's

war

attitude
protest
are

all

interpretation

conclusions

either

completely ignore or directly contradict the analyses of Or.
^^Herring, War, p. 275.
^ibid, p. 265.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

158
Douglas Pike, Dr. Robert Sansom, Dr. C. Stewart Callison, Dr.
Charles Bush, Dr. Gunter Lewy, Dr. Howard Penniman, Dr. Lucian
Pye, Dr. John Roche; media sources, the London Economist, and
Aviation Week and Space Technology, the experts who worked
longest in South Vietnam Sir Robert Thompson, John Paul Vemn,
General Donn Starry,

Lt.

Col. G.H. Turley,

and Ambassador

Martin Herz. One would not be aware, from reading Herring,
that many of these individuals existed. Herring never suggests
that any alternative interpretation has been published.
All of this material forms a disturbing pattern which
requires some explanation. One possible interpretation is that
the authors of the mainstream historiography of the war were
among the one- third of all Americans who had come to believe
in the goals and values of the amti-war movement. They began
their research with a strong anti-war bias. The nature of bias
is that it prevents individuals from noticing evidence which
undermines the premise of their beliefs. Thus Herbert Gans and
Clarence

Wyatt

were

ad>le

to

extensively

examine

Time

magazine's coverage of the war, and then reach conclusions
which were directly contradicted by that coverage. In much the
saune way the historical community failed to notice that the
mainstream

interpretation

of

the

Tet offensive

has

been

directly contradicted by the availaüale evidence for an entire
generation.

Similarly,

the

most

widely

used

text

for

university Vietnam classes appears to represent the liberal
anti-war interpretation of events, to the exclusion of all
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evidence undermining that interpretation.
It was in the self interest of the liberal anti-war
community to reach the conclusion that Tet 1968 had turned the
American public against the effort to sustain an independent,
non-communist South Vietnam. The liberals' stated desire to
end all U.S. participation in the war, even if it meant a
Communist victory, was easily justifiable if they were simply
leading the majority of the American people. Their actions
would not be as acceptable if it were the case that supporters
of the anti-war movement, a minority of less than one-third of
the American people, had gained control over virtually all
sources of information, media and university, and they had
used that power to impose a misleading,

falsely negative

interpretation of the war on the majority of the public, who
unlike the liberal community did not prefer an American defeat
to Vietnamization.
A substantial portion of the evidence used to support the
historical community's anti-war interpretation comes from a
seemingly unimpeachable source, the officers of the U.S. Army
itself. Logically it appears that these men were in a position
to know what was happening, and they had to overcome their
natural pro-military bias in order to offer journalists and
academic

researchers

an

Westmoreland disagreed.

honest

view

of

events.

General

"If a man had the money and could

maintain his grades, he could defer service until he finished
college and even graduate school." This policy "had serious
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effects for the United States Army." Campus anti-war militancy
had closed down some ROTO programs, and limited the number of
students willing to join those still operating. ROTC programs
were thus uneüt>le "to provide officers in the numbers needed."
To

fill

the

education and

at

gap:

"As

a

man

finally

last submitted to

completed

the draft,"

his

the army

inducted a lot of men with master's and doctoral degrees who
did not want to be in the army, much less in Vietnam. They had
spent years on campus, and many had developed strong anti-war
views. "The deferred man often brought his anti-war militancy
with him when he finally got into uniform . . . .
to

discredit

authority

by

fighting

haircut

many tried

regulations,

publishing and distributing underground newspapers, sponsoring
or participating in protests, trying in any way possible to
foment

unrest."

officers who

339

Thus

brought

there

was

a

substantial

a strong anti-war

bias

pool

of

to Vietnam.

Accademic researchers who were looking for evidence to support
an anti-war interpretation would not have had trouble locating
their end-of-tour reports for use as source material.
The question of Sir Robert Thompson's suitability as a
historical

source

is

of

particular

interest.

His

interpretation of the war prior to 1968 is virtually identical
to the liberal academic view. Thompson's book. Wo Exit From
Vietnamr was published before the Pentagon Papers. It was
written in a period during which Time magazine still supported
339

Westmoreland, Report. pp. 298-99.
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the war.

Thompson's criticisms were based not on previous

authors, but on his personal understanding of the war. He
believed that if the overall aim of American foreign policy
was

"to

promote

peace,

freedom,

progress

and

prosperity

throughout the world," then the strategy followed in Vietnam
was

counterproductive.

340

Thompson argued

that

if a great

power is to intervene in a local conflict without damaging its
international prestige, its actions must be justifiable and
acceptable to the great majority of people in its own country,
the country subject to intervention, emd world wide public
opinion.
limited

Furthermore, the resources committed must be of a
scope.

The

commitment must

be

sustainable

until

success has been achieved. The methods of intervention must
also be broadly acceptable. For example,

the United States

could have defeated the North Vietnamese by using nuclear
weapons, but that would not have advanced the overall aims of
U.S. foreign policy or America's international prestige and
leadership.*^
The strategy America followed in Vietnam prior to 1969
failed on all counts. President Ngo Dien Diem was clearly not
acceptable to the majority of South Vietnamese in the late
1950s

and

the

early

1960s.

When

America

stepped up

its

involvement in 1965 the cornerstone of its strategy was to
inflict enough pain on the Communists to force them to give up
340

Thompson, No Exit, p. 108.

^^Ibid.. pp. 108-109.
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their purpose of conquering South Vietnam. The methods used to
achieve

this

attrition.

goal

were

intensive

bombing

and

a

war

of

The American troops' mission was to put enough

'seaurch amd destroy' pressure on the Communists to break them.
This strategy, however, required hundreds of thousamds of men,
and over a million tons of bombs. This was not acceptaOale to
a majority of Americans or other peoples around the world.
By 1968 the aunount of power being applied exceeded amy
possible benefits. Thompson believed that "Not one of the four
American Presidents concerned would have become involved in
Vietnam

if

commitment

they

could

would

counterproductive

have

be.

method

foreseen
The

America

what

the

most

used

was

eventual

particularly
bombing

North

Vietnam. "When the oil depots round Hamoi were hit [in 1966]
the British Government, which up until that time had fully
supported United States policy in Vietnam, " no longer condoned
the American tactics, or the suffering they brought to the
civilian population. "World-wide controversy was kindled and
dissent within the United States itself became one of the
vital factors," in America's ability to continue the war.^^
While the bombing had only a minimal effect on the Communist
aüaility to infiltrate men and supplies into the South, it had
the

psychological

effect

of

rallying

the

whole

North

Vietnamese population to a highly intense participation in the
, p. 110.
, pp. 95, 50.
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war effort.^
Another problem with the bombing campaign and the massive
build-up of American troops was the logistical support network
it required. "The vast complex of supply depots between Saigon
and Bien Hoa has to be seen to be believed. They could not be
measured in acres but only in tens of square miles."** It
required a

significant percentage of the available troop

strength just to guard the airfields and supply depots. By
1968 America had dropped over 1,000,000 tons of bombs and lost
close

to

eight

hundred

aircraft,

without

producing

a

demonstraüaly convincing beneficial result.**
On the ground the war of attrition required too many
American

men

and

casualties.

Hanoi

had

a

large

population base and the political will to accept

enough
100,000

killed or disabled per year over an extended period of time.
The American public, however, was not willing to accept the
number of casualties recpiired to win such a war. Even those
peoples around the world who believed in containing Communism
did not believe the Vietnam War was worth its cost in human
misery. Also, American tax payers were not willing to foot a
$30 billion a year bill.*^ Beyond this, the massive American
presence had a variety of negative impacts on the people of
p. 140.
**Ibiâ., p. 141.
, p. 96.
pp. 56-61.
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South Vietnam. In the final analysis, by the end of 1967 none
of the American efforts had made a significant impact on the
insurgency's rural resource base. If necessary the Communists
could decline battle emd simply wait until the costs forced a
unilateral

American

withdrawal.**

Thompson

had

a

wide

variety of more specific criticisms, most of which seem valid
in retrospect.
Given the American people's unwillingness to accept the
costs of a war of attrition on a long-term basis, the moral
outrage of people in many nations,

and the United States

military's apparent determination to continue doing "more of
the same," Thompson states, "It was my own view in June, 1968,
that the United States had lost the war."
In his analysis prior to 1968, Thompson had anticipated
the liberal anti-war interpretation of events, and done so in
a more detailed and knowledgeable way than many other authors.
While he continued to deplore the American tactics of the
early war, his opinion of who would eventually win changed
after

mid-1968,

Offensive,

the

because
CORDS

Vietnamization program,

of

Communist

effect

on

loses

in

the

pacification,

Tet
the

and the effects of harbor mining,

smart bombs, and the Easter Offensive.
The mainstream academic community has

not considered

Thompson to be an acceptable source in spite of his detailed
p. 34.
^ ^Ibid.. p. 179.
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analysis in agreement with their interpretation prior to Tet
1968. George Herring mentions Thompson only in connection with
a 1962 counterinsurgency program and to denigrate the amalysis
he presented to President Nixon in 1969. Herring wrote that:
"With no place else to go, Nixon eagerly and uncritically
embraced Thompson's conclusions."**
John Vann has been
Thompson.

Neil

Sheehan

treated in much the same way
states

that

although

he was

as
a

creditable source prior to the Tet Offensive, by 1969 "Vann
had invested so much of John Vann in the war that he had to
talk himself into believing," that his side was winning. He
was unable to accept "the truth eUaout the war,"

—

that

progress was not being made and it was still irretrieveüaly
lost.*’
The

question

which

arises

here

is

whether it

is

reasonable to believe that these men, who had such a deep and
insightful understanding of the war prior to 1968 could have
actually lost their ability to make accurate judgements in
1969. If Vann and Thompson were deluding themselves, they were
not alone. Many other observers believed the war had turned in
the allies' favor. Dr. Douglas Pike, Dr. Robert Sansom, Dr.
Stuart Callison, Dr. Howard Penniman, Dr. John Roche, General
Donn

Starry,

Lt.

Colonel

Gerald

Turley,

General

William

Westmoreland, William Colby, General Tran Dihn Tho, and Lt.
*°Herring, War, pp. 95, 251.
* ’sheehan. Lie, pp. 743-45.
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General Ngo Quang Truong have all published books supporting
the view that the allies were winning the war. Many conclude
that South Vietnam lost primarily because it was abandoned by
the United States. Is it the mainstream historical contention
that all of these sources have been so completely discredited
that it would be improper to present their interpretation to
students in a balanced text? Where this line of reasoning
appears to break down entirely is with the London Economist.
When subjected to quantitative analysis, the great bulk of its
war coverage falls in the neutral category. It consistently
referred to the war as a tragedy for a variety of reasons. Yet
it

firmly

believed

the

Communist's

negotiating

offer

in

October 1972 was an admission of defeat.
Either all of these sources were so hopelessly incapable
of thinking rationally about the war that their interpretation
does not even need to be presented to students in a baleuiced
text, or the liberal authors of the mainstream historiography
have taken such a strong anti-war bias that they have excluded
legitimate evidence which undermines their interpretation.
Is there any indisputable, hard evidence to support the
pro-war interpretation? Yes, there is. The ARVN's performance
unquestionaUüly improved. In 1965 the relatively lightly armed
Viet Cong were "destroying battalions faster than they could
be reconstituted."*^ In 1972 the massive Communist invasion
killed 25,000 South Vietnamese soldiers, but did not destroy
*Hfestmoreland, Report, p. 139.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

167
any fighting units. The ARVN was strong enough to turn the
invasion and then counterattack. It could not have done so in
1965. It would seem that the ARVN had unquestionably improved.
Likewise, in 1965 "many district emd provincial capitals
were

inaccessible

cover.
bicycle

In the
and

except

to

an

armed

convoy

with

1970s unescorted Americans were

motorcycle

around

rural

South

air

eüole to

Vietnam.

The

Communist position would seem to have been unquestionably much
weaker.
Perhaps the most important improvement in South Vietnam's
position was due to the Land-to-the-Tiller program. It removed
a major incentive for the peasamtry to work against the final
defeat of the Viet Cong, and added a great incentive for the
people to support the Saigon government. Two field research
studies

concluded

that

land reform was

in

fact

reducing

support for the Communists and increasing support for the
Saigon government.

The

allied nation building

effort was

unquestionaübly improving the standard of living in rural South
Vietnam. Our normal expectation would be that land reform and
increasing incomes should have created greater loyalty and
commitment to the Saigon government in the future.
Thus there would seem to be very solid evidence that the
position of the allies was improving between 1965 and 1972.
The ARVN unquestionably demonstrated that
support)

(with U.S.

air

in 1972 it was capaible of defeating the Communist

^^^Hunt, Pacification, p. 36.
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maximum effort. With continued American air support, advisors
and money, presumably they should have won again in 1975, or
whenever the Communists launched their next invasion.

The

hypothesis that the ARVN could not have won in 1975 would
require

that

a

historian

speculate

that

the

continuing

positive trend of South Vietnamese performance would have
reversed in 1973, and that the ARVN would have become so much
weaker that they would have lost in 1975 even with continued
American support.
It is an enormously different thing for a historian to
present the evidence of improving South Vietnauaese performance
and then speculate that it would have reversed, than to simply
state that the allied effort was doomed from the start. In
making the assertion that no progress was being made toward
winning the war, George Herring has implicitly judged that all
of the pro-war sources listed above have been so completely
discredited that they do not need to be considered. Either all
of these source have been so discredited, or the mainstream
historiography of the war has rejected legitimate historical
sources and a valid interpretation.
Along this seune line, a most important conclusion of this
thesis

is

that

the

American

media's

falsely

negative

representation of the war probably deprived President Nixon of
the public support he needed to continue the harbor mining and
transportation route bombing in 1973. This continued aid would
have cost America little, and would have been vital to South
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Vietnam's

prospects

for

survival.

Although

polls

clearly

showed that a majority of the public supported Nixon's efforts
to preserve South Vietnam's independence in 1972, this broad
approval had limits. For example, the December 1972 bombing
demonstrated the media's ability to affect public opinion.
Even though the bombing

severely damaged the

capacity to prosecute the war,

Communists'

and the entire twelve day

assault caused fewer civilian casualties than the Communist
artillery barrage on the refugees fleeing Quang Tri,
American

press

described

unconscionable act.

the

December

bombing

of high

an

Time stated that the "brutal" Richard

Nixon launched "the bloodiest air strikes ever . . . .
claims

as

the

civilian casualties"

were

Hanoi's

plausible.

"The

American resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam has made
the world recoil in revulsion.

Time's quotes "condemned

the bombing as a crime against humanity on the moral scale of
such NAZI atrocities as the death camp at T r e b l i n k a . T h e
B-52 was described as "a cruel weapon [used] to terrorize the
North Vietnamese

. . . .

the bombings will

not soon be

forgotten or forgiven by many Americans, by much of the rest
of the world," or by the Communists.

Time predicted that

negotiations would become more difficult because of the air
war. Another quote stated that: "Mr. Nixon is no longer, and
January 1, 1973, p. 10.
^^^Ibid.. January 8, 1973, p. 10.
^“ ibid.. January 8, 1973, pp. 12-14.
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will never again be, a respectable man."

Ambassador Herz's

quantitative analysis of the news concluded that all the
national media sources took a similarly biased position.
The media coverage of the bombing significantly reduced
President Nixon's approval rating on his handling of the
war.^^^ How could it have been otherwise? If any percentage
of the American people put any credence at all in the media's
view, it must necessarily have damaged public support for the
President.
Beyond this. Congressional attitudes toward the war were
influenced by media

coverage amd public opinion.

Nixon's

private interviews with influential Congressmen convinced him
that there was a real possibility that the legislative branch
would cut off funding for the war in January 1973 if he did
not have a peace treaty in hand.^^ Thus although the allies
were militarily in a position of maximum strength in late
1972, the President felt he had to take a treaty which was
good enough, rather than hold out for a better one.
The December bombing, however, was not the first instance
of media coverage hurting the war effort. The press's falsely
negative coverage began with the 1968 Tet Offensive.

Time

spent 340 Cl reporting the false interpretation that this
battle

was

a military victory

for the

Communists.

Peter

Braestrup's book. Big Story, shows that the entire American
^^^Herring, War, p. 281.
^“ Nixon, EK, pp. 701-02, 742-43.
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media, television as well as print, treated Tet in the same
way.” ’
Howard

Schuman's

research

indicates

that

this

was

critically important to the mass public's support for the war.
"Just before the Tet attacks in January 1968, with American
leaders confidently predicting victory, the number of self
described hawks outnumbered doves by two to one.
months

after Tet the proportion of doves

But two

in the country

slightly exceeded that of hawks . . . . The shift in the space
of just 60 days represents probably the largest and most
impoxrtant cheunge in public opinion during the entire war."” ®
Time also described operation Lam Son 719

in falsely

negative terms. After the supply port of Sihanoukville had
been closed to the Communists, the Ho Chi Minh supply trail
became their only
reacted

vigorously

access
to

to much of South Vietneun.

Lan

Som's

threat

to

their

They
vital

interests. The Communists outnumbered the South Vietnamese by
three or four to one,

and yet the ARVN held its position

astride the Ho Chi Minh trail for two months,

inflicting

15,000 casualties while edasorbing only 2,000. Inexplicably,
Time failed to report any of the reasons for seeing this
battle as proof of ARVN's competence, and instead interpreted
it to mean that South Vietnam could not win even with U.S. air

359

Peter Braestrup, Bia Storv
Press, 1983).

(New Haven: Yale University

360

Schuman, "Two Sources," p. 515.
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support.
Likewise, in its interpretation of the Easter Offensive
Time failed to report the massive nature of Soviet assistance
to North Vietnam, amd the overwhelming power of the invasion
force. Almost all of Time's coverage made the ARVN seem weaüc
and helpless. When the allies turned the tide of battle. Time
stopped reporting it.
In exactly the saune way. Time refused to publish the
success of America's economic development and nation-building
prograun in South Vietnaun. Three economists and two historians
verified the observations of numerous experts regarding the
success of this effort. Nevertheless, Time reported precisely
the opposite—

economic failure— on those few occasions when

it mentioned the economy at all.
Again
media's

Howard

Schuman's

research

indicates

that

the

falsely negative coverage probably had a critical

impact on public support for the war. Schuman found that those
who supported the anti-war movement did so on moral grounds.
They reacted most strongly against American offensive moves
such as the bombing, the Cambodian incursion. Operation Lan
Som 719, and the mining of Haiphong Harbor.” ^ In contrast,
the mass public showed majority support for each of these
moves. When members of the general public were asked the openended question of why they were angry about the war, the most
frequently stated response was that it was not being won.
5A1

Ifeidw pp. 519-26.
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These respondents seldom mentioned moral concerns. The mass
public simply ignored Time's thousands of column inches of
moral reasons for opposing the war.
The most reasonable conclusion one can draw from this
research is that if Time had published 5,000 column inches of
stories written by the experts who believed that progress was
being made in Vietnam, such as F.J. West, William Colby, John
Paul Vann, Sir Robert Thompson, the London Economist. Aviation
Week and Space Technology. Dr. Robert Sansom, Dr. C. Stewart
Callison,

Dr.

Charles

Bush,

Dr.

Howard Penniman,

and Dr.

Douglas Pike, the American people would have had an entirely
different and more positive view of their nation's involvement
in Vietnam.
Because

of these

facts,

I would

speculate that the

media's falsely negative coverage (and its effect on public
opinion) probably had a direct influence on the outcome of the
war. North Vietnam was in a weaker position in late 1972 than
at any previous point. If America had continued to prosecute
the war throughout 1973 at the same level as it had in 1972
(economic aid, advisors, and air support) there is good reason
to believe that Hanoi would have been forced to accept a peace
treaty much more advantageous to South Vietnam.
Public opinion polls in 1972 clearly established that a
majority supported President Nixon's efforts to secure a peace
treaty which,

if adhered

to,

would

have

preserved

South

Vietnam's independence. It stands to reason then that if the
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American people

had been given

a

fair

appraisal

of the

Communist weakness in late 1972, very likely a majority would
have supported South Vietnamese President Thieu in his demand
that all North Vietnamese troops leave South Vietnam before
the

mines

were

removed

from

Haiphong

Harbor,

the

transportation route bombing was stopped, and the peace treaty
was signed.
violation

of

If a later Communist invasion had occurred in
the

peace treaty,

mining

emd bombing would

presumably have been just as effective again.
Thus the media's falsely negative portrayal of the war,
its failure to document the advances in the South Vietnamese
economy, and its refusal to present the American public with
the evidence of North Vietneun's weakness in late 1972 probeUale
deprived President Nixon of the public support he needed for
the sustained use of air power and harbor mines in an attempt
to win the war.
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